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University students are requesting, and many of their professors are issuing, 
“trigger warnings.” Trigger warnings are a kind of content warning; they give a 
précis of the material to follow and caution that it may cause a reader or viewer to 
experience symptoms of distress. The use of these trigger warnings in higher 
education is controversial: Their purpose is to reduce or eliminate the distress 
students may otherwise experience in response to “triggering” course content, but 
no data exist regarding how effective they are at achieving this purpose. 
Moreover, there is reason to suspect these warnings may backfire and exacerbate 
the very symptoms they are intended to alleviate. We  conducted the first 1
investigation into the effects of trigger warnings: We gave some subjects a trigger 
warning, but not others, then exposed all of them to negative material, and 
measured the analogue symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder they 
experienced. Meta-analyses on data gathered across our six experiments revealed 
that trigger warnings had trivial effects—regardless of if subjects had seen a 
trigger warning beforehand, they judged the material to be similarly negative, and 
reported similar levels of negative affect, intrusions, and avoidance. These results 
suggest that trigger warnings are neither meaningfully helpful nor harmful, and 
that students and professors should not rely on them to mitigate students’ distress.  2
 Here, my use of the word “we” reflects that, although the research in this thesis is my own, I 1
conducted it in a lab where I supervised a team comprised of undergraduate and Honours students. 
I also received advice and direction from my supervisors. For those reasons, I often use the word 
“we” in this thesis. Elsewhere in this thesis, I use the word “we” in a different sense; for example, 
to refer to what is or is not known in the wider scientific community. 
 Portions of this thesis were adapted from:  2
Sanson, M., Strange, D., & Garry, M. (2018). “Trigger warnings” are trivially helpful at reducing 
symptoms of distress. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
But I have expanded on the introduction, methods, results, and discussion.
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The Origin and Spread of Trigger Warnings 
Universities around the world are grappling with demands for trigger 
warnings (for example, in the UK, in the US, and in Australia: Manning & Wace, 
2016; Medina, 2014; Palmer, 2017). These warnings caution students that the 
course content to follow may lead them to feel upset, or otherwise experience 
symptoms of distress—the implication being that the students may be harmed, 
and their learning may be negatively affected (Gust, 2016; Jarvie, 2014; Medina, 
2014; National Coalition Against Censorship [NCAC], 2015; Palmer, 2017; 
University of California, Santa Barbara, Associated Students Senate [UCSBASS], 
2014).  
For example, in early 2014, a student newspaper at Rutgers University 
published an article suggesting that assigned readings of “works with grotesque, 
disturbing and gruesome imagery” should come with warnings alerting students to 
“the graphic content within these works [that] often serve as trauma 
triggers” (Wythe, 2014, para. 2, para. 3). The rationale for this suggestion was that 
these warnings would protect students, by allowing the students to “plan their 
reading schedule ahead of time for tackling triggering massages [sic] and/or 
discussing an alternate reading schedule with their professor” (Wythe, 2014, para. 
9).  
The following week, the student senate at the University of California, 
Santa Barbara attempted to make it mandatory for professors to include in their 
syllabi forewarnings about “[r]ape, Sexual Assault, Abuse, Self-Injurious 
Behavior [sic], Suicide, Graphic Violence, Pornography, Kidnapping, and Graphic 
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Depictions of Gore,” because “[h]aving memories or flashbacks triggered [by 
those topics] can cause the person severe emotional, mental, and even physical 
distress. These reactions can affect a student’s ability to perform 
academically” (UCSBASS, 2014, para. 7, para. 10). In fact, a recent survey of 
Arts and Humanities faculty in the US found that, of its respondents, “7.5% 
reported that students had initiated efforts to require trigger warnings on 
campus…and 12% reported that students had complained about the absence of 
trigger warnings” (NCAC, 2015, p. 3).  
Taken together, these anecdotes and data provide evidence that at least some 
students believe being forewarned about the presence of negative material is a 
good idea. But where did those students get the idea that such forewarnings would 
be helpful?  
The exact origin of trigger warnings is unclear—they seem to have evolved 
gradually into their current form. Journalists have examined this issue, and at least 
one has drawn links between reports of long-standing customs in group therapy 
sessions and the current use of trigger warnings (Vingiano, 2014). Specifically, 
she suggests that, with the advent of internet chat rooms, this group therapy 
community moved its discussions online and took with it the custom of prefacing 
material about some topics with a content warning. Wherever the practice of using 
trigger warnings originated, it is clear that niche online communities have long 
practiced labelling content that refers to traumatic experiences, or otherwise 
mentions subject matter that (in the judgment of the user posting the content) 
might elicit symptoms of disorders in other users (Jarvie, 2014; Marcotte, 2013; 
Vingiano, 2014; Waldman, 2016). The understanding in these communities is that 
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these warnings give users the choice to either avoid looking at or reading that 
content, or to proceed to do so with caution, having had the chance to mentally 
forearm themselves in whatever ways they think will help them cope with their 
reaction to the content (Jarvie, 2014; Marcotte, 2013; Vingiano, 2014; Waldman, 
2016).  
More recently, the practice of signposting material as containing possible 
“triggers” has become mainstream: Trigger warnings have become routine online, 
appearing on widely used sites including Tumblr, Twitter, and even the 
Government of Canada’s website (Daro, 2016; Vingiano, 2014; Waldman, 2014; 
see also, Marcotte, 2013). Moreover, trigger warnings have migrated into the 
offline world, where they are increasingly applied to educational material on 
college campuses (American Association of University Professors [AAUP], 2014; 
Jarvie, 2014; Kamenetz, 2016; NCAC, 2015). 
Trigger Warnings in Education: A Contentious Issue 
How widespread is the use of trigger warnings in higher education? The 
aforementioned survey of Arts and Humanities faculty in the US further found 
that over half of respondents reported they had issued warnings to their students 
about course content (NCAC, 2015). Even more recently, when National Public 
Radio in the US surveyed a more diverse group of American faculty, they found 
very similar results: just over half of their respondents said they had issued 
warnings to their students about “potentially difficult” content (Kamenetz, 2016, 
para. 6). These data are not necessarily representative of all disciplines (cf. 
Boysen, Wells, & Dawson, 2016, for evidence these results may not generalise to 
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psychology instructors, for instance). But they nonetheless paint a picture in 
which trigger warnings now loom large on campuses.  
What is more, there is evidence this rise to prominence has led academics—
from disciplines as varied as communication and journalism, law, medicine, 
philosophy, politics and international relations, and queer studies—to consider the 
implications that trigger warnings have for their teaching and research (Bentley, 
2016; Forstie, 2016; Kumagai, Jackson, & Razack, 2017; Manne, 2015; Suk 
Gersen, 2014; Wyatt, 2016). Perhaps unsurprisingly, views among the 
professoriate are divided (NCAC, 2015; Wyatt, 2016).  
Some professors support the use of trigger warnings (Gust, 2016; Hanlon, 
2015; Manne, 2015; NCAC, 2015). Many of their arguments describe trigger 
warnings as pedagogical courtesies that demonstrate educators’ care for the 
mental wellbeing of their students (Wyatt, 2016). For example, one professor said 
she believes warnings allow students to “better manage their reactions” to 
possibly upsetting material (Manne, 2015, para. 4). Another said that giving 
students a trigger warning “reminds them to be particularly aware of the skills and 
coping strategies that they have developed and to switch them on” (Gust, 2016, 
para. 5).  
In line with the views expressed by those professors, some universities have 
begun drawing up and implementing “pro-trigger warning” policies. For example, 
in 2013, a policy task force at Oberlin College wrote guidelines urging professors 
not to teach potentially “triggering” course material unless it was unavoidable, 
and to use trigger warnings before any such material (Oberlin College, Office of 
Equity Concerns, 2013). Closer to home, in 2017, Monash University began 
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piloting a policy that requires academics to place warnings about any 
“emotionally confronting” content in course outlines (Palmer, 2017, para. 4; see 
also, Lesh, 2016). But the Oberlin policy was subsequently withdrawn due to 
outcry from some of its faculty (Medina, 2014; Wilson, 2015).  
Indeed, looking beyond Oberlin, many professors do not hold a positive 
view of trigger warnings (AAUP, 2014; Wyatt, 2016). Some of these professors 
are concerned about the effects trigger warnings may have on academic freedom 
of speech. For example, the American Association of University Professors issued 
a statement saying trigger warnings may have a chilling effect on the quality of 
education, both by narrowing the range of what is taught and by constraining 
students’ interpretations of it. Moreover, the statement suggested it was unlikely 
that trigger warnings would help the students for whom they are intended, because 
educators cannot anticipate all possible “triggers,” and simply pointing out 
upsetting topics does not constitute an effective treatment plan for students who 
become significantly distressed (AAUP, 2014). More recently, the AAUP’s 
Canadian counterpart expressed similar sentiments (Canadian Association of 
University Teachers, 2015).  
Individual universities have also taken public stands against trigger 
warnings, citing similar problems. For example, in 2016, just before the start of 
the US academic year, the University of Chicago sent a letter welcoming 
incoming first-year students. In this letter, students were told that “we do not 
support so-called ‘trigger warnings,’” largely out of concern that the warnings 
could become a form of censorship (Grieve, 2016, para. 2). 
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But decline in the quality of education and restrictions on academic freedom 
are not the only potential problems that may stem from the use of trigger 
warnings. Still other professors—many of them professors of psychology—have 
weighed in on the “anti-trigger warning” side, out of concern for the mental 
wellbeing of students. These professors have suggested that—despite the intended 
effects of trigger warnings—flagging content as potentially “triggering” may 
backfire and actually be harmful to students. For example, Edna Foa, a clinical 
psychologist and expert in anxiety disorders and posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), has said issuing trigger warnings to students could harm them, because 
“[i]f we act as though they cannot handle distressing ideas, we communicate the 
unhelpful message that they are not strong” (quoted in Waldman, 2016, para. 25; 
for a review of her work, see Foa & McLean, 2016). Similarly, Jonathan Haidt, a 
social psychologist and expert in American “culture wars,” and his lawyer 
colleague, Greg Lukianoff, wrote that  
expansive use of trigger warnings may also foster unhealthy mental habits 
in the vastly larger group of students who do not suffer from PTSD or other 
anxiety disorders. People acquire their fears not just from their own past 
experiences, but from social learning as well. (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015, 
para. 32)  
In other words, trigger warnings may lead many students—not only those at 
whom the warnings are typically aimed, but also those for whom they are not 
necessarily intended—to be more distressed by the content that follows than they 
otherwise would be (see also, McNally, 2014).  
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The professoriate is not the only group on campuses split by the issue of 
trigger warnings. One small survey of undergraduate students found that the same 
proportions of students (24%) agreed as disagreed that having read a trigger 
warning about topics such as genocide and acts of terrorism led them to feel better 
prepared to encounter that material in class (Bentley, 2017). This finding suggests 
that students, too, are divided on how useful trigger warnings are. 
If we step back, then, and summarise the current state of affairs, we see that 
trigger warnings are widely used in higher education (as well as elsewhere). But 
their use is controversial. Indeed, at least one writer has dubbed trigger warnings a 
source of “never-ending…debate” (Flaherty, 2015). Yet something is missing that 
might help to settle the debate: data. There exists no empirical research on the 
effects of trigger warnings. Google Scholar and Web of Science searches (most 
recently conducted January 29, 2018) revealed no published experiments 
addressing the issue. Thus, as best as we have been able to ascertain, all the 
coverage by journalists, and discussion among faculty and students—not to 
mention all the policy-making both for and against trigger warnings at universities
—has happened in the absence of data regarding what trigger warnings do or do 
not do.  
Determining what trigger warnings do, or do not do, is of both practical and 
theoretical importance. On the practical side, surely it is important for universities, 
professors, and students alike to know the extent to which trigger warnings 
achieve their intended purpose—meaningfully reducing distress brought on by 
“triggering” material—as well as uncovering any unintended side-effects 
warnings may have on students’ wellbeing or learning. On the theoretical side, it 
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is possible to draw on psychological research to make the case that trigger 
warnings should be helpful. But it is also possible to draw on psychological 
research to make the case that trigger warnings should be harmful. Such a discord 
means that it is important to determine if, when, and why trigger warnings 
increase or decrease distress. 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Trigger Warnings 
Trigger warnings are commonly aimed at people who suffer from PTSD (for 
example, UCSBASS, 2014). That is, these warnings are often framed as a way to 
curb the distress people may feel in response to material that reminds them of a 
previous traumatic experience. But trigger warnings are also discussed more 
broadly, as a way to reduce the distress that many people may feel in response to 
potentially upsetting material per se, without reference to their having a diagnosed 
disorder—and sometimes even without reference to specific prior experiences (for 
example, Friedersdorf, 2016; Gust, 2016; Manning & Wace, 2016; NCAC, 2015). 
In other words, when it comes to students, trigger warnings are primarily intended 
to reduce distress following exposure to negative content encountered in course 
materials.  
What are these symptoms of distress? Table 1 summarises a widely used list 
of symptoms, which are also diagnostic of PTSD (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2013). As the table shows, to be diagnosed with PTSD, people 
must have experienced a traumatic event in one of several possible ways. This 
requirement comprises criterion A. Further, in the wake of that event, people must 
then report a debilitating combination of symptoms from each of four categories, 
which comprise criteria B-E. These symptoms include intrusive, mental
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Table 1
The Diagnostic Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in Adults
Criteria to be met (minimum to 
meet each)
Specific ways to meet each criterion
A Exposure to actual or 
threatened death, serious 
injury, or sexual violence 
(in at least one way)
1 Directly experiencing the event
2 Witnessing the event occurring to 
others (in person)
3 Learning the event occurred to a 
close family member/friend (where 
death-related event was violent or 
accidental)
4 Repeated or extreme exposure to 
aversive details of the event (but not 
via seeing photos etc., unless work-
related)
B Intrusion symptoms (at 
least one)
1 Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive 
distressing memories of the event
2 Recurrent distressing dreams in 
which the content and/or affect of 
the dream are related to the event
3 Dissociative reactions (e.g. 
flashbacks) in which the individual 
feels or acts as if the event were 
recurring
4 Intense or prolonged psychological 
distress at exposure to internal or 
external cues that symbolise or 
resemble an aspect of the event
5 Marked physiological reactions to 
internal or external cues that 
symbolise or resemble an aspect of 
the event
C Persistent avoidance of 
stimuli (in at least one 
way)
1 Avoidance of or efforts to avoid 
distressing memories, thoughts, or 
feelings about or closely associated 
with the event
!15
2 Avoidance of or efforts to avoid 
external reminders that arouse 
distressing memories, thoughts, or 
feelings about or closely associated 
with the event
D Negative alterations in 
cognitions and mood (in 
at least two ways)
1 Inability to remember an important 
aspect of the event
2 Persistent and exaggerated negative 
belief or expectations about oneself, 
others, or the world
3 Persistent, distorted cognitions 
about the cause or consequences of 
the event that lead to blaming 
oneself or others
4 Persistent negative emotional state
5 Markedly diminished interest or 
participation in significant activities
6 Feelings of detachment or 
estrangement from others
7 Persistent inability to experience 
positive emotions
E Marked alterations in 
arousal and reactivity (in 
at least two ways)
1 Irritable behaviour and angry 
outbursts (with little or no 
provocation) typically verbal or 
physical aggression towards people 
or objects
2 Reckless or self-destructive 
behaviour
3 Hypervigilance
4 Exaggerated startle response
5 Problems with concentration
6 Sleep disturbances
F Duration of meeting 
Criteria B through E 
exceeds 1 month
Note. These criteria were adapted from their description in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual, 5th edition (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Diagnosis also requires that the disturbance causes clinically significant distress 
or impairment, and that the disturbance is not due to the effects of a substance 
or other medical condition.
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re-experiencing of the event, avoidance of things associated with the event, 
negative alternations in mood and cognition, and hyperarousal. Following a 
traumatic experience, many people experience some of these symptoms of distress 
for a relatively short time, but a few people experience these symptoms 
persistently, and develop a disorder (APA, 2013; Breslau, Kessler, Chilcoat, 
Schultz, Davis, & Andreski, 1998; Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Murdock, & Walsh, 
1992). 
Since 1980, when PTSD was first officially recognised as a disorder by the 
APA, the criteria for diagnosis, and the specific experiences and symptoms that 
count towards meeting those criteria, have been revised (Galatzer-Levy & Bryant, 
2013). But some hallmark symptoms were recognised right from the start, such as 
intrusive memories of a negative experience, efforts to avoid reminders of the 
experience, and feelings of distress evoked by memories or reminders of it 
(Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). Note that these are, of course, the very 
symptoms trigger warnings are said to alleviate or exacerbate (for example, 
Jarvie, 2014; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015; Waldman, 2016). To understand how 
trigger warnings might alleviate or exacerbate them, we can turn to theories about 
why those symptoms arise. 
Central to multiple theories of PTSD is the idea that how the person 
remembers their traumatic experience is crucial (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 
1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008; Rubin, Dennis, & 
Beckham, 2011; for a review, see Brewin & Holmes, 2003). That is, the symptoms 
of PTSD—such as intrusive memories—arise as a result of how people remember 
the experience. 
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Processing theories of traumatic experiences. Some of these theories 
account for symptoms by positing that while people are experiencing a traumatic 
event, the way they process incoming information changes (Brewin et al., 1996; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000). For example, according to “dual representation theory,” 
people form a verbal memory of the trauma, which they can voluntarily recall. 
But in addition, people form a sensory memory of the trauma, that they can only 
access involuntarily, and which remains perfectly preserved. This second type of 
memory is cued by overlap between the current situation and the original 
situation, causing people to experience upsetting intrusions of the trauma. 
Reducing intrusions is achieved by creating new, verbal memories of the trauma 
that interfere with the retrieval of the sensory memory (Brewin et al., 1996; 
Brewin & Holmes, 2003). But these theories rest on the underlying assumption 
that these PTSD symptom-causing memories are formed by processes that operate 
only in relation to traumatic experiences, and there is evidence that memory for 
traumatic experiences is not “special” (Geraerts, Kozarić-Kovačić, Merckelbach, 
Peraica, Jelicic, & Candel, 2007; Porter & Birt, 2001; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). 
Autobiographical memory theory of traumatic experiences. By contrast, 
the “mnemonic model” takes a different view, positing that when people 
experience a traumatic event, no special processes operate (Berntsen, Rubin, & 
Bohni, 2008; Rubin, Berntsen et al., 2008; Rubin et al., 2011). Rather, people’s 
memory for an experience is formed by the same processes—regardless of 
valence—and so the same factors affect the qualities of memories for all types of 
experiences. What is known about factors affecting autobiographical memory can 
!18
therefore explain why some people develop PTSD symptoms following some 
experiences. Figure 1 depicts this model. 
 
Figure 1 
A mnemonic model of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A traumatic event 
happens; how people experience and encode that event is affected by a variety of 
factors. After a delay they have a memory of their experience—constructed anew 
each time it is retrieved; how people maintain and retrieve that memory is also 
affected by a variety of factors. These factors can in turn be influenced by the 
event and the memory of it. PTSD symptoms arise as a result of properties of this 
memory; these symptoms can in turn affect people’s memory for their experience 
(adapted from Rubin, Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008). 
Traumatic event and 






and retrieval of memory 
for experience
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What Figure 1 shows is that people experience intrusive memories of a 
trauma when their memory for it is “over-accessible,” which means it is easily 
cued (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Berntsen et al., 2008; Rubin, Berntsen et al., 2008; 
Rubin et al., 2011). Therefore, any factor that increases the accessibility of 
people’s memory for a negative experience will not simply make it easier to 
voluntarily retrieve that memory, but will increase their risk of developing PTSD 
symptoms. These factors include characteristics of the event, such as its emotional 
intensity (which should lead to better encoding), and individual differences, such 
as neuroticism (which should lead to greater intensity and more rehearsal). This 
model also suggests that “involuntarily” retrieved memories of the experience are 
more troubling than voluntarily retrieved ones, because people have less chance to 
regulate their emotional response. A growing body of evidence supports this 
model (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Berntsen et al., 2008; 
Ogle, Siegler, Beckham, & Rubin, 2017; Rubin, Berntsen, et al., 2008; Rubin, 
Boals, & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin et al., 2011). 
If the accessibility of a traumatic memory has a causal role in PTSD, it 
follows that resolving the symptoms of PTSD will mean reducing the accessibility 
of that traumatic memory, among other things. In line with that idea, two 
comprehensive reviews of treatments of PTSD have found evidence for the 
efficacy of exposure therapy and cognitive-behavioural therapy that target the 
traumatic memory (Bisson, Roberts, Andrew, Cooper, & Lewis, 2013; Committee 
on Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academies, 2008). It also follows that other interventions that change 
how accessible a negative memory is could change the rates of symptoms people 
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experience in relation to that memory. Further, if a particular cue becomes less 
able to prompt retrieval of that memory—as in the case of trigger warnings 
making negative material a less potent reminder—people should be less likely to 
experience symptoms. Likewise, if an intervention changes the properties of a 
negative memory when it comes to mind, people should find it less troubling. 
Reasons to Expect Trigger Warnings Would Be Helpful 
Several lines of research give us reason to expect that trigger warnings 
could ameliorate the symptoms of distress following exposure to negative 
material. For instance, trigger warnings could prompt people to regulate their 
emotions, or change how people believe they will respond to the material, thereby 
reducing people’s unpleasant, intrusive thoughts related to negative material, their 
avoidance of thoughts and reminders of the material, and their ensuing feelings of 
distress (Gross, 2015; Kirsch, 1997). There is also reason to expect that trigger 
warnings could have further positive effects—on learning-related outcomes. 
Trigger warnings may change what people judge the warned-about material to be 
like, and how well people comprehend other material presented to them after the 
negative material (Leavitt & Christenfeld, 2011; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). 
In short, people who first see a trigger warning before negative material may 
subsequently experience fewer symptoms, think the material is less negative, and 
be better able to understand material they encounter afterwards. 
Helping via emotion regulation. The first way in which trigger warnings 
might be helpful is if they prompt people to better regulate their emotions about 
the upcoming material. We know people use various strategies to regulate their 
emotions in an attempt to increase or decrease the degree or duration of negative 
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or positive affect they experience (Gross, 2015). The strategies are typically 
organised into five “families” primarily distinguished by when they are deployed 
in the time between encountering an emotion-provoking situation to experiencing 
an emotional response (for reviews, see Gross, 2015; Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
but see also, Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010).  
According to this model, many of these strategies are proactive—that is, 
people can deploy them in anticipation of an emotional response, rather that once 
they are already having that emotional response (Gross, 2015; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). For example, if people anticipate a situation is going to evoke 
emotions they do not want to experience, they can practice “situation selection” 
and take steps to avoid that situation, or vice versa (for example, Lang, 
Staudinger, & Carstensen, 1998). Similarly, people could choose to encounter the 
situation, but use “situation modification” to change its external aspects, in ways 
they think will make that situation less emotionally evocative (for example, 
McManus, Sacadura, & Clark, 2008).  
Further along the chronology towards experiencing an emotional response, 
people could choose to experience the situation, but work on changing internal 
factors. That is, they could, via “attentional deployment,” choose which aspects of 
the situation to pay attention to—focusing less on, say, the negative or positive 
aspects of the situation, and more on neutral aspects (depending on what sort of 
emotional response they are aiming to promote or avoid; for example, Bennett, 
Phelps, Brain, Hood, & Gray, 2007). Similarly, people could experience the 
situation but change internal aspects of the situation via “cognitive 
modification”—that is, reappraising their interpretation of the situation, which 
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could in turn change their emotional response to that situation (for example, 
Feinberg, Willer, Antonenko, & John, 2012).  
Finally, once people are already experiencing an emotional response, they 
can attempt to shorten the time course or intensity of that response by engaging in 
“response modulation” of how they are feeling or behaving (for example, Gross & 
Levenson, 1997). People use this type of strategy once they have already begun to 
experience an emotional response to the situation.  
One reason trigger warnings might be effective is they give people the 
opportunity to use any of these proactive strategies. For example, a trigger 
warning about negative course material might prompt a student to avoid the 
situation, and ask her professor for an alternative assignment. Second, the student 
might instead change external aspects of the situation, such as choosing to read (or 
watch) the negative material at home, rather than in the library. Third, while 
reading (or watching) the negative material, she could concentrate on the positive 
or neutral aspects of the material, distracting herself from the negative aspects. 
Fourth, she could reappraise the situation by, for instance, reminding herself that a 
particular assignment is a work of fiction. Effective use of any of these proactive 
strategies—helped along by a trigger warning—should mean people feel less 
negative affect, and judge the material to be less negative than they otherwise 
would (Gross, 2015); in fact, this outcome in itself would suggest trigger 
warnings were having one of their intended effects.  
But a reduction in negative affect should be helpful in at least two more 
ways—both related to intrusive symptoms. First, if people find the negative 
material less intensely emotional, their memory of it afterwards should be less 
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accessible, because in general more emotional things are encoded better and 
rehearsed more often (Hall & Berntsen, 2008; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004; for 
reviews, see also Christianson, 1992; Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). Then, if 
people’s memory of the negative material is less accessible, they should 
experience fewer intrusions related to the material itself. In line with this idea, in 
one study, people saw a series of emotional photos and rated each for how 
emotionally arousing it was (Hall & Berntsen, 2008). The more arousing people 
initially found a photo, the more frequently they experienced involuntary 
memories of that photo in the days afterward. 
Second, if people find negative material less negative, that material (and 
memories of it) should be less effective cues for people’s other negative memories
—namely, memories of previous traumatic experiences they have had—because 
involuntary memories are more likely to be retrieved when there is more overlap 
between the cue and the memory (Berntsen, Staugaard, & Sørensen, 2013). In line 
with this idea, in one study, people sometimes identified emotions as what had 
cued an involuntary memory they experienced (although other things, such as 
themes and objects, were more common cues; Berntsen & Hall, 2004).  
Moreover, if the negative material is both less negative itself, and a less 
effective reminder of previous negative experiences, people should be less 
inclined to try not to think about it. In this way, trigger warnings could also reduce 
avoidance symptoms. 
Helping via expectancies. A second way in which trigger warnings may be 
helpful is in relation to people’s beliefs to do with the negative material—
specifically, people’s beliefs about how they will respond when exposed to 
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negative material, and their beliefs about how being forewarned that this negative 
material is coming will change the response they have to that material. These 
beliefs are examples of response expectancies. 
Response expectancies are beliefs people hold about how they will respond 
to a given situation. People’s expectancies about how they will respond to a 
situation causally contribute to how they actually respond, leading them to have 
the experience or behave in the way they expected they would (Kirsch, 1985, 
1997). Yet people are not aware that their expectancies are what drive their 
responses—they attribute their response to the situation having set off automatic 
processes, out of their control (although people can access and report what they 
think their response would be in a given situation; Kirsch, 2004; Kirsch & Lynn, 
1999). The classic example of an expectancy effect is the placebo effect, in which 
people respond to an inert substance, or other treatment, because they expect that 
substance or treatment will produce that response—for example, reducing their 
symptoms (for a review, see Price, Finniss, & Benedetti, 2008).  
But expectancies have effects far broader than placebos (for reviews, see 
Michael, Garry, & Kirsch, 2012; Schwarz, Pfister, & Büchel, 2016). For example, 
people’s expectations about how they will respond to a given situation are thought 
to arise from a number of different sources: prior experiences, associative 
learning, or social suggestion (Faasse & Petrie, 2016; Kirsch, 1985, 1997; 
Michael et al., 2012; Rief, Glombiewski, Gollwitzer, Schubö, Schwarting, & 
Thorwart, 2015). Once people encounter a situation about which they hold an 
expectancy, they respond in accordance with it—this response then brings about 
the expected outcome (Kirsch, 1997; Kirsch & Lynn, 1999). This expectancy-
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induced response can take many forms, including observable physiological or 
behavioural changes—but can also include reported subjective changes, such as 
symptoms of mental disorders (Kirsch, 1997; Kirsch & Lynn, 1999; Rief et al., 
2015). 
Considered together, then, the literature suggests that if people hold the 
expectancy that trigger warnings make material less distressing, then seeing a 
trigger warning should lead people to experience fewer symptoms of distress 
(Kirsch, 1985, 1997). Thus, to the extent that people believe negative material will 
usually elicit involuntary memories, avoidance, and negative affect, and that prior 
warnings are helpful at reducing those symptoms, then people should experience 
decreases in these symptoms after seeing a trigger warning.  
In line with this prediction, some research suggests people’s beliefs about 
their ability to regulate their emotions matter (Catanzaro & Greenwood, 1994; 
Goldin et al., 2012). For example, in one study subjects reported how strongly 
they believed in their own ability to improve their negative moods, and the degree 
to which they had experienced symptoms of depression, at two time points 
(Catanzaro & Greenwood, 1994). At both times, the more subjects believed they 
could successfully regulate their negative moods, the fewer symptoms they 
reported experiencing, and what is more, change in the strength of their 
expectancy predicted change in their rate of symptoms. This research suggests 
that if trigger warnings lead people to expect they will be more successful at 
reducing the impact of subsequent negative material, we should see those people 
report feeling less negative.  
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What is more, some research suggests people’s metacognitive and meta-
memory beliefs (about how their own minds work, and what sorts of mental 
experiences are normal versus problematic) can lead them to interpret a given 
mental experience in one of several ways—and may lead them to be bothered by 
it, or not, depending on their beliefs. In one study, if people believed having 
involuntary memories was a worrying symptom, then a month later they were 
more likely to report having been bothered by unpleasant, intrusive memories 
following a negative experience (Takarangi, Smith, Strange, & Flowe, 2017; see 
also, Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2013). Therefore, if trigger warnings lead 
people to interpret any symptoms they do experience as less bothersome, or 
simply makes those symptoms less noteworthy, people should end up reporting 
lower frequencies of these symptoms.  
These studies point to an important role for people’s beliefs in the creation 
of, noting of, and experience of their response to negative material. This literature 
give further purchase to the idea that trigger warnings should be helpful, to the 
extent these warnings fit with or alter people’s beliefs about the material they 
precede, and people’s response to that material, in way that reduces how 
distressing it is. 
Helping via decreasing off-task thoughts. There is a third way that trigger 
warnings could be helpful. Research on mind-wandering shows that the more 
people’s minds veer away from a reading task they are meant to be doing, the 
worse their comprehension of that reading is (Baird, Smallwood, Fishman, 
Mrazek, & Schooler, 2013; Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; for a review, see 
Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013) The reason for this trade-off is most likely that 
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people have limited mental capacity to divide among concurrent tasks (Kane & 
McVay, 2012). If students who receive a trigger warning then experience less 
frequent distracting intrusions elicited by that material, then those students may be 
better able to comprehend other material they encounter soon afterwards, such as 
other readings. This helpful effect is one step removed from the primary purpose 
of trigger warnings, but nonetheless would have pedagogical benefit. 
In fact, this negative relationship between off-task thoughts and reading 
comprehension has been observed specifically in the context of unpleasant, 
intrusive thoughts: In one study, people were instructed to not think about their 
former romantic partner and then asked to read an unrelated, non-fiction passage 
(Baird et al., 2013). The more times people were “caught" thinking about their ex-
partner while reading, the worse their comprehension of that passage was. 
Similarly, in another study, people first viewed a film clip of a multi-fatality car 
crash, and then did an unrelated reading while they both self-reported and were 
intermittently asked about having off-task thoughts related to the clip (Takarangi, 
Strange, & Lindsay, 2014). The more of these intrusions subjects reported—
specifically, the more times they reported, when asked, that they were thinking 
about the clip (but not the more times they reported intrusions, unprompted)—the 
worse they did on a later test about the reading. 
Considered together, these studies suggest that if, while students are trying 
to read “ordinary,” more neutral class material, part of their mental resources are 
being used up by intrusions regarding traumatic experiences or previously 
encountered negative material, then their understanding of that class material is 
going to be hindered. Similarly, if they are distracted while reading (or watching) 
!28
negative material in class by intrusions about a traumatic experience, then their 
memory for that negative material might also be worse. But these studies further 
suggest that if trigger warnings reduce the incidence of these intrusive thoughts, 
then their comprehension of their primary reading task should be better.  
Helping via fluency. Finally, at least one other line of research points to 
another possible positive effect of trigger warnings. This research suggests that 
knowing what to expect in a story may make that story more enjoyable. More 
specifically, two studies found that getting story “spoilers” that gave away the plot 
twist near the end of a story—despite people saying they did not like knowing the 
ending of a story before they had read it—increased people’s reported enjoyment 
of that story, compared to people who read the story “unspoiled” (Leavitt & 
Christenfeld, 2011, 2013). One explanation for this effect is that knowing what is 
coming in a story leads reading it to feel more fluent, and fluency is generally 
associated with positive evaluations (Leavitt & Christenfeld, 2013; for a review, 
see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). It is possible that trigger warnings can act 
somewhat like these spoilers, creating a feeling of fluency by giving people more 
information about the content of the material ahead of time. The resulting 
positivity may counteract the negativity of the material, leading people who see a 
trigger warning to feel less negative, or to judge the material as less negative. 
Reasons to Expect Trigger Warnings Would Be Harmful 
Of course, we do not know if people use trigger warnings in any of these 
aforementioned helpful ways. In fact, there is also reason to expect trigger 
warnings could instead exacerbate symptoms of distress.  
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Harming via emotional (dys)regulation. First, people may not interpret 
trigger warnings as a prompt to down-regulate their negative emotions. Instead, 
they may interpret trigger warnings as an instruction that the negative aspects of 
the material are particularly noteworthy, and that a negative interpretation is the 
“correct” way to appraise the material. Put differently, trigger warnings may 
essentially lead people to adopt strategies that harmfully potentiate, or up-
regulate, rather than diminish their negative emotional response to the material 
that follows (Gross, 2015; see also, Gross & Jazaieri, 2014).  
If people interpret trigger warnings in this “negative focus” way, they may 
pay more attention to and better encode the negative aspects of the material. In 
line with this idea, some research has shown that knowing negative material is 
imminent can lead people to be more distracted by that material once they 
encounter it (Devue, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2011; see also Kleinsorge, 2007). 
For example, in one study, people scared of spiders were repeatedly asked to 
identify whether a target line was present among an array of shapes (Devue et al., 
2011). On some of these trials a task-irrelevant picture appeared on screen—and 
in some blocks these irrelevant pictures were spiders. In other blocks the 
distractors were other natural objects (such as butterflies, or leaves). When 
subjects knew a block of trials would contain spider pictures, when those pictures 
did appear the subjects were more distracted by them (that is, slower to respond) 
than when they knew the pictures would be of something else. This finding 
suggests that being able to anticipate a fearful situation led people to be more 
vigilant looking out for the feared object, so that when it did appear they devoted 
more attention to it than they would have. 
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If trigger warnings act in a similar way, then telling people to expect 
particular negative material may lead them to attend more to the negative aspects 
of the material when they come upon them. If warned people focus more on the 
negative aspects of the material they may find the material more upsetting, and 
better remember the negative aspects of the material, too (Devue et al., 2011; 
Gross, 2015; Hall & Berntsen, 2008). This increase in attention to the negative 
aspects, and increase in negative emotion felt may be particularly noticeable for 
people who are fearful about the negative content—such an effect would mean 
trigger warnings are particularly harmful to those who want them most. 
In a related vein, telling people upcoming material will be negative may 
then change how they interpret (or appraise) that material for the worse (Cantor, 
Ziemke, & Sparks, 1984; de Wied, Hoffman, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1997). In each 
of two studies specifically looking at the effects of forewarning people about the 
content of horror films (similar to broadcasting standards-mandated ratings of 
television shows), some people were told they would see disturbing footage and 
some were not, and then they were shown footage, such excerpts from a film 
about vampires (Cantor et al., 1984; de Wied et al., 1997). Finally, subjects made 
a number of ratings about the footage they had seen, which revealed that 
forewarned subjects thought the clips were more upsetting than did unwarned 
subjects. What is more, this effect was greater for a more specific warning 
(detailing what the negative events that were going to be depicted were, such as a 
man driving a stake through the heart of his wife-turned-vampire) than a more 
general one (such as simply saying there would be a gruesome scene; Cantor et 
al., 1984). The researchers suggested these effects occurred because the 
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forewarnings created in people a vigilant anticipation, and constrained 
interpretation of the material.  
Indeed, these findings fit more generally with classic work showing that 
prior information can affect which aspects of material people attend to and 
remember, and how they interpret it (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Pichert & 
Anderson, 1977). For example, in one study, people were either told they should 
read a story about a house from the point of view of either a prospective home-
buyer, or a prospective burglar, and later were asked to report everything they 
remembered about the house (Pichert & Anderson, 1977). Subjects in this study 
remembered more details relevant to the perspective they had adopted while they 
were reading about the event, suggesting the constraints on their perspective 
affected what information they took in (although a later study found that swapping 
perspectives led people to remember some additional details; Anderson & Pichert, 
1978). If trigger warnings act similarly, implicitly constraining people to look out 
for negative aspects of the material, and focus on those negative aspects when 
they do arise, warned people would end up with a more negative impression of the 
material. Moreover, this bias would persist in how they remember the material, to 
the extent that they retain a “trigger warning perspective” when the memory 
comes to mind. 
Other evidence also suggests that trigger warnings could continue to exert 
effects after the fact, by distorting or constraining people’s memory for their 
interpretation of the material: In one study, people were asked to nominate and 
make ratings about a negative experience they had had (Takarangi & Strange, 
2010). Then, regardless of how negative their experience actually was, everyone 
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received one of two forms of false feedback—either being told by experimenters 
that their event was far more negative than those other subjects had chosen to 
describe, or that it was far less negative than those other subjects had chosen to 
describe—or got no feedback. After a delay, when asked again about that same 
event, subjects who had been told their experience was overly negative rated it as 
more negative than other subjects rated theirs. This finding suggests the negative 
feedback led people to reappraise their memory of the event and come to 
remember it as worse than it was. Trigger warnings could have a similar effect: if 
they imply that the material to follow is more negative than what one would 
ordinarily encounter, then these warnings may not only lead people to better 
attend to negative aspects of material, and feel more negative emotions at the 
time, but also to remember it as even more negative afterward. 
Taken together, these lines of research might lead us to expect that—
although people could use trigger warnings as helpful prompts to reduce the 
negativity of their response—trigger warnings may instead lead people to feel 
worse after reading (or watching) the material, and to judge the material as more 
negative. These increases in negativity would then make it more likely for that 
material to crop up later, in the form of involuntary memories, and more likely to 
overlap with people’s previous traumatic experiences and cue intrusive memories 
about those as well (Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Hall & Berntsen, 2008). What is 
more, when people’s memories of traumatic events distort over time, those who 
come to remember things as worse (for example, a soldier who reported not 
having seen corpses immediately after returning from deployment, but several 
months later reports he did see corpses while deployed) also report an increased 
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rate of PTSD symptoms (Engelhard, van den Hout, & McNally, 2008; Southwick, 
Morgan, Nicolaou, & Charney, 1997). 
Harming via expectancies. A second way in which trigger warnings may 
be harmful, and increase rates of symptoms, is via expectancies (Kirsch, 1985, 
1997). Such an effect would be somewhat analogous to a nocebo effect—whereby 
when people expect that a substance or other treatment will have negative effects, 
that expectation leads people to generate responses to the treatment, producing 
those very effects (for a review, see Planès, Villier, & Malleret, 2016). 
In the case of trigger warnings, telling people that the material to follow is 
distressing may lead them to expect they will feel more negative and experience 
more symptoms of distress, increasing the rate of those symptoms they experience 
after exposure to the negative material (Kirsch, 1985, 1997). Such a possibility 
fits with research showing that telling patients the side effects that a treatment 
may have leads to increased rates of those side effects (for a review, see Wells & 
Kaptchuk, 2012). In other words, instead of playing into an expectancy that 
warnings reduce symptoms, seeing a trigger warning may instead create in people 
the belief that the material to follow is dangerous, and that they will feel upset and 
experience other symptoms of distress in response to it. More specifically, trigger 
warnings might create—or play into—an expectancy that when people encounter 
particularly negative material they are likely to feel bad, and have intrusive 
thoughts related to it, and want to avoid thinking about it. As a result, when 
people go on to encounter that negative material having seen a trigger warning, 
they would have a stronger negative response to it than they otherwise would. 
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Harming via thought suppression. A third way in which trigger warnings 
may be harmful is if they encourage people to try and suppress their thoughts 
related to the negative material. Research shows that particularly trying to not 
think about something can backfire and lead people to think about it more 
(Harvey & Bryant, 1998; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). One 
explanation for this effect is that in order to try not to think the unwanted thought, 
people have to keep in mind the very thought they do not want to be having (for a 
review, see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
If people take a trigger warning to mean that the material they are going to 
encounter will be unpleasant to think about, they may try to counter that 
negativity by increasing efforts to avoid thinking about it. This focus on trying not 
to think about the warned-about material may increase people's avoidance 
symptoms as well as increasing their intrusion symptoms. 
Harming via increasing off-task thoughts. Finally, a fourth way in which 
trigger warnings may do harm is via their effects on outcomes of educational 
relevance. If trigger warnings increase the rate of intrusion symptoms, students 
may be distracted by those thoughts, which would worsen their comprehension of 
class material (Baird et al., 2013; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Schooler et al., 
2004; Takarangi, Strange et al., 2014). Of course, we do not know if people 
interpret trigger warnings in any of these harmful ways, any more than we know 
they will interpret them in helpful ways.  
Reasons to Expect Trigger Warnings Would Be Unhelpful 
Trigger warnings may work in a helpful direction, or they may work in a 
harmful direction. But a third possibility also exists: No matter what the direction 
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of trigger warnings’ effects, the magnitude of those effects may mean that—in a 
practical sense—the warnings do nothing to people’s responses.  
Of course, not all small effects are meaningless (Abelson, 1985; Prentice & 
Miller, 1992; Rosenthal, 1990). It can be useful to know when the size of an effect 
is indistinguishable from zero—for example, in the case of ineffectual treatments. 
What is more, interventions that produce even a tiny effect may nevertheless be 
very important—if, for example, the effect influences mortality. If just one less 
person among thousands dies because of a given intervention, that effect is clearly 
meaningful (especially for that proverbial person). For other outcomes, the 
smallest effect size of clinical or practical significance can be harder to determine. 
For example, does a one-point reduction on a scale measuring degree of 
depression symptoms make a noticeable difference to a depressed person’s life 
(Cuijpers, Turner, Koole, van Dijke, & Smit, 2014)?  
In the absence of an answer to this question, with regard to outcomes that 
trigger warnings may affect, subjectivity remains regarding how big an effect 
trigger warnings would need to have for us to consider it meaningful. One 
suggested guideline for the minimum size an effect must be, to be considered 
practically meaningful, is a standardised mean difference of 0.41 (Ferguson, 
2009). This criterion seems a reasonable place for us to start. 
But there is reason to suspect that trigger warnings may yield effects too 
small to be considered meaningful. For example, people often fall prey to 
unwanted influences on their cognition and behaviour (such as the distress and 
intrusive thoughts that follow an encounter with negative material). But for a 
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variety of reasons those same people are sometimes unable to successfully correct 
for those influences (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).  
Perhaps the difficulty arises because there are multiple ways in which the 
correction process can go awry (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). For one, sometimes 
people are unaware of the unwanted influence, in which case they cannot counter 
those influences. If people are aware of the influence but do not accurately know 
the direction or magnitude of its effect, then they cannot counter it. For another, if 
people do not have the desire to, or ability to do the countering, then they will fail 
to counter those influences. Trigger warnings may make people aware of the 
influence, but to the extent that trigger warnings are insufficiently informative, or 
the unwanted effects that trigger warnings are intended to counter are beyond 
people’s ability to control, then trigger warnings will be ineffective. 
Overview of Experiments  
Trigger warnings are a contentious issue, yet no empirical research has 
investigated their effects. We aimed to address that gap in the literature. The 
literature gives us reason to expect that trigger warnings would reduce distress 
elicited by negative material, yet also gives us reason to expect trigger warnings 
may do very little in the way of meaningfully altering people’s distress. Still other 
literature leads us to expect that trigger warnings could even increase the very 
distress they are meant to alleviate. What we do not know, then, is how previous 
research translates into this real-world situation. 
Of course, one challenge with attempting to elucidate the “true” effects of 
trigger warnings is that many aspects of these warnings and their use are 
heterogeneous (Friedersdorf, 2016; Jarvie, 2014; Wilson, 2015): No widely agreed 
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upon set of defining criteria for trigger warnings exists, nor do instructions for 
when and how they should be used, nor is there consensus about trigger warnings’ 
target population. Moreover, there is no constrained list of the warnings’ intended 
effects, and concerns about the unintended consequences of trigger warnings are 
varied, too. In short, these variables mean there are many possible forms an initial 
empirical investigation could take.  
We chose to begin the empirical enquiry by examining the direction and 
magnitude of trigger warnings’ immediate effects on the wellbeing and learning of 
non-clinical populations. More specifically, our primary research question was: to 
what extent does a trigger warning affect the symptoms of distress people 
experience soon after exposure to “warned about” material? To address this 
question, we ran six experiments in which subjects did or did not see a trigger 
warning, were then exposed to negative material, and then reported their 
symptoms of distress. Table 2 outlines some of the key attributes of each of these 
experiments. 
Subjects. As the second column of the table shows, we drew our samples 
from two populations. Each of these populations is comprised of people likely to 
often come across trigger warnings—for some experiments we recruited 
university students, and for others we recruited internet users. We did not recruit 
from populations of people known to be currently suffering from PTSD. Although 
trigger warnings are aimed by some at people who have diagnosed disorders, 
others use them or cite them as being used to minimise distress for everybody 
(AAUP, 2014; Friedersdorf, 2016; Gust, 2016; Manning & Wace, 2016; NCAC, 
2015; UCSBASS, 2014). But even if trigger warnings were only for the benefit of 
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the minority of students with a disorder, all students still see them. For both of 
these reasons, it is therefore important to examine what effects trigger warnings 
Table 2



























3 MTurkers Trigger warning Film
Expected negativity 
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4 MTurkers Trigger warning Film History of trauma




Note. Students were introductory psychology students at Victoria University 
of Wellington; MTurkers were members of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online 
crowdsourcing platform. “Trigger warning” means we manipulated the 
presence of a trigger warning; “Negativity” means we manipulated the 
negativity of the (film) material subjects were shown.
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have on the majority of people. Moreover, to the extent that the same cognitive 
processes operate to produce symptoms of PTSD in people without and without 
the disorder—albeit producing these symptoms to different degrees—then we can 
make preliminary inferences from the effects trigger warnings have on these 
populations to the effects such warnings might have on clinical populations 
(Rubin, Boals et al., 2008; Rubin et al., 2011).  
Trigger warnings and negative material. As the third column of the table 
shows, in each experiment we manipulated whether subjects received a trigger 
warning about the material all of them then saw. We used trigger warnings of the 
kind people might encounter online in everyday life, or during the course of their 
university studies. In the later experiments, as the third column of the table further 
shows, we also manipulated the negativity of the material we showed subjects 
after they were (or were not) warned about it.  
As the fourth column of the table shows, the material that subjects in some 
experiments saw was a short story, whereas in other experiments it was a short 
film clip (of greater or lesser negativity). By using a range of materials, we can 
assess the effects of trigger warnings across a variety of circumstances.  
The materials we warned subjects about were akin to materials for which 
people in real-world situations have requested and used trigger warnings. For 
example, humanities students have requested that warnings accompany some 
novels they are assigned to read (Wythe, 2014). Further, we chose these materials 
based on norming studies, in which we collected data about multiple stories and 
films. 
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 Measures of distress and related outcomes. After subjects had read the 
story or watched the film, about which some of them had been warned, they then 
completed a variety of tasks, as indicated in the fifth column of the table. Broadly, 
the tasks that appeared across experiments measured how negative subjects were 
feeling in the wake of the material, how negative they judged that material to be, 
and the frequency with which they had experienced intrusion and avoidance 
symptoms since exposure to the material.  
More specifically, we first asked subjects to rate the degree of negative 
affect they were currently feeling, after reading (or watching) the material. If 
trigger warnings are helpful at reducing how distressing people find negative 
material, then warned subjects should report feeling less negative than those who 
got no warning (or, conversely, if trigger warnings are harmful, “warning” 
subjects should report feeling more negative than “no warning” subjects).  
Next, we asked subjects to read a short, non-fiction article—unrelated to the 
earlier material—and report intrusions related to the story or film that they 
experienced while reading this article. Because we used non-clinical samples, 
many of these intrusions are likely to be more related to the negative material 
itself than to our subjects’ prior traumatic experiences. Still, the more negative the 
material seems, the more it might overlap with people’s previous negative 
experiences, also cuing memories of those. Further, the more negative the material 
seems, the less people might try not to think about it. Thus, to the extent that 
trigger warnings affect how negative the material seems, or people’s ability or 
desire to not think about it, this tally of intrusions should be informative. 
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We then asked subjects to rate the frequency of intrusion and avoidance 
symptoms they had experienced in the short time since exposure to the story or 
film. As for the intrusions-tally measure above, the better trigger warnings are at 
helping people reduce the degree of intrusions and avoidance symptoms they 
experience, the lower the ratings of the “warning” group should be relative to the 
“no warning” group (or, the more harmful trigger warnings are, the higher those 
ratings should be).  
Next, we tested subjects’ comprehension of the non-fiction article. Their 
performance on this test is relevant for two reasons: First, the more unnoticed 
intrusions subjects have—ones which, by definition, they cannot report in their 
intrusion-tally task, but would nonetheless hurt their ability to comprehend the 
content of the article—the worse their comprehension should be. Thus, this 
measure should give us some insight into non-self-reported intrusions, and how 
those are affected by trigger warnings. Second, if trigger warnings are somehow 
useful (or preoccupying) in a way that continues to affect students’ learning after 
they have moved on from the warned-about material itself, we should see that 
“warning” subjects have different comprehension than “no warning” subjects—an 
effect that would be worthy of further investigation.  
Finally, we asked subjects questions about the negative material itself, such 
as asking them to rate how negative they thought it was. If trigger warnings 
change what people think the material that follows is going to be like, trigger 
warnings may also change what people then judge that material was like. In the 
initial experiments, we also asked subjects questions about the negative stories, to 
see if trigger warnings affected how well people could remember the negative 
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material itself. In later experiments, we added additional measures to help gather 
evidence regarding possible explanations for the effects we observed. 
Analyses. We adopted the recommended “New Statistics” approach as our 
primary form of analysis (American Psychological Association, 2009; Cumming, 
2012; Eich, 2014). We present all our results for each experiment in terms of 
effect sizes and the confidence intervals around them. But we also carried out 
traditional Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) analyses for some of our 
key comparisons, and report those as well. Finally, we carried out mini meta-





Subjects. We aimed to recruit as many subjects as we could, within the 
constraints of departmental subject-hour allocations for the semester. We collected 
data from 254 introductory psychology students at Victoria University of 
Wellington, who participated in partial fulfilment of course requirements. Of the 
240 whose data we retained for analysis (see below for details of the exclusion 
criteria), 75% were female and 25% male, and their ages ranged from 16-50, 
Median = 18, M = 18.68, 95% CI [18.36, 19.00]. 
Design. We used a two-group design, manipulating Presence of Trigger 
Warning (warning, no warning) between subjects. 
Procedure. On consent forms, we told subjects we were interested in 
examining factors that affect the comprehension of different writing styles—we 
gave this cover story so as not to alert subjects that they may be exposed to 
negative material, prior to only some of them seeing a trigger warning. We gave 
subjects a full debriefing at the end of the semester. This methodology was 
approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee at Victoria 
University of Wellington. 
Subjects participated in small groups, seated at individual computers in a 
lab. We used Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, 2018) to run the experiment, 
presenting all materials to subjects in a web browser window. The experiment had 
three phases. Figure 2 gives a general overview of these phases, which carried 
across each of our experiments. 
!44
Figure 2. 
Overview of the general method. These boxes summarise key components of the 
procedure, divided into three phases, for each of our experiments. 






1. Negative affect after material
2. Number of intrusions while reading 
unrelated article
3. Frequency of intrusions and 
avoidance symptoms
4. Comprehension of unrelated article
5. Negativity of material
Read story material
or







Phase one. To measure their baseline negative affect, subjects first 
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded form (PANAS-
X; Watson & Clark, 1999). On this measure, subjects rate several affect-related 
words (such as “distressed”) according to how much they feel that way “right 
now,” from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Ratings for the 10 items 
comprising the negative affect subscale are summed, yielding a total between 
10-50. The negative subscale, rated regarding “the present moment,” is internally 
consistent, with Cronbach’s alpha of .85; has reasonable test-retest reliability 
across two months, with a correlation of .45; and has good external validity, 
correlating with the Hopkins Symptom Checklist, a measure of general distress 
over the past week, at 0.65 when rated regarding “today”; further, within-subject 
changes in ratings across a day regarding the present moment correlate with 
ratings of current stress (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Taken together, these 
psychometric properties suggest this scale is suitable for measuring how much 
negative affect subjects were feeling at various points during the experimental 
session. 
Phase two. Next, subjects either saw a trigger warning, or did not see a 
trigger warning. We developed the warning subjects saw by looking at examples 
online, and at guidelines issued by student associations regarding the use of 
trigger warnings. Subjects in the “warning” condition read: “TRIGGER 
WARNING: The following story contains violence and death.” Subjects in the “no 
warning” condition skipped this step.  
Subjects were then randomly assigned to read one of two negative, fictional 
short stories. We chose to use stories because trigger warnings are often used or 
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requested prior to such material (for example, Wythe, 2014). The two stories we 
used were “A Dark Brown Dog” by Stephen Crane (of length 2356 words), and an 
abridged version of “The Veldt” by Ray Bradbury (which was originally of length 
4603 words, but we edited it down to 3198 words in order to make reading time 
across story counterbalances more similar). These stories include animal and child 
abuse, and murder—topics of the kind for which warnings are issued or requested. 
We chose these particular stories based on norming data we gathered.  
Norming of stories. To collect these norming data, we asked 120 
introductory psychology students at Victoria University of Wellington to read one 
of eight possible stories (for a total of 15 responses about each story) and answer a 
variety of questions related to it. More specifically, we first asked subjects to 
complete the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1999) with regard to how they were 
feeling “right now.” Next, they read one short story; we timed how long they 
spent on this survey page. Afterwards, they completed the PANAS-X a second 
time—again, regarding how they were feeling “right now”; rated the story for 
how negative, positive, surprising, and interesting it was from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely); listed things in the story they or others might find disturbing or 
upsetting, and pleasant or amusing; indicated if they thought the story had a plot 
twist and, if so, what and where it was; and reported if they had read the story 
before, prior to the study. We then examined subjects’ responses to each story, 
focusing on: change in the degree of negative affect that subjects reported feeling, 
and how negatively they rated the story, how long they took to read the story, and 
if they had previously read the story.  
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With regard to “A Dark Brown Dog,” we found that, in norming, students 
rated this story as very negative (M = 5.60, 95% CI [5.10, 6.10], on the 1-7 scale), 
and likewise their degree of current negative affect increased from before to after 
reading this story (Mdiff = 3.87, 95% CIdiff [0.81, 6.92]; although, given a 
maximum possible change of 40, this increase is slight). Further, students took 
approximately 10 minutes to read this story (M = 573 s, 95% CI [489, 657], 
Median = 620 s). Finally, none of the students had previously read this story. 
With regard to “The Veldt,” we found that, in norming, students rated the 
full-length version of this story as very negative (M = 5.27, 95% CI [4.62, 5.91]), 
and their degree of current negative affect very slightly increased from before to 
after reading this story (Mdiff = 1.87, 95% CIdiff [-0.64, 4.37]). Further, students 
took approximately 15 minutes to read this story (M = 860 s, 95% CI [782, 938], 
Median = 857 s), and none of them had previously read it. 
Phase three. After subjects in Experiment 1a had read one of those two 
stories, we measured three symptoms of distress—negative affect, intrusive 
cognitions, and avoidance—and subjects’ memory of the story, using four tasks. 
First, to measure negative affect, subjects completed the PANAS-X a second time, 
again answering regarding how they were feeling “right now.”  
Second, to measure intrusions related to the negative story they had read, we 
next told subjects to focus on reading one of two randomly assigned non-fiction 
articles, unrelated to either story (specifically, these were 1022- and 1119-word 
excerpts from Bill Bryson’s “A Short History of Nearly Everything,” about atoms 
and cells, respectively—as used by Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009), but to 
press the ‘x’ key on their keyboard each time “you notice that you are 
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experiencing an intrusive memory or thought about the story that you just 
read” (instructions adapted from Takarangi, Strange et al., 2014). These presses 
yielded a tally of intrusions. Subjects spent approximately 4 minutes reading their 
assigned non-fiction article and noting intrusions (M = 229.19 s, 95% CI [217.71, 
240.66], Median = 213.13 s). Subjects then rated their adherence to the noting 
intrusions task, from 0 (not at all well) to 10 (extremely well; scale taken from 
Takarangi, Strange et al., 2014). 
Third, to measure the frequency of their intrusions and avoidance 
symptoms, subjects completed the Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz et al., 
1979). On this measure, subjects rate how frequently items (such as “Pictures 
about it popped into my mind” and “I thought about it when I didn't mean to”) 
have been true for them following a stressful event—here, reading the story—on a 
four-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (often); ratings are then summed. We 
omitted two non-relevant items (relating to sleep disturbances), so the possible 
range for the intrusion subscale scores was 0-25, and for the avoidance subscale it 
was 0-40. Each subscale has good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas of 
0.86 for intrusions and 0.82 for avoidance; and good external validity, each 
showing moderate to strong correlations with other measures of distress and 
PTSD (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002). These psychometric properties suggest this 
scale is suitable for measuring the frequency with which subjects have 
experienced intrusion and avoidance symptoms. 
Fourth, to measure comprehension of the non-fiction article subjects read 
after they had read a negative story—and indirectly index intrusions they 
experienced while reading that article—subjects answered five four-alternative 
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forced-choice questions about it (these questions were those used by Smallwood 
et al., 2009). Subjects also answered five questions that tested their memory of the 
negative story they had read, also in four-alternative forced-choice format. We 
chose these questions about the stories based on norming data.  
Norming of story questions. In order to arrive at the questions about the 
short stories, we first created a pool of 20 questions about each of the two stories 
we used. We then normed these 40 questions by giving 32 introductory 
psychology students one of the stories to read, and asking them all 20 questions 
about that story in a randomised order, such that 16 subjects saw each story and 
then answered questions about it. Next, for each question, we examined its 
difficulty (that is, the proportion of subjects who answered it correctly), and its 
reliability (that is, the strength of the correlation between whether subjects got that 
question correct and the overall number of questions they answered correctly). 
Based on those data we selected five questions for each story that, collectively, 
covered a range of aspects of the story and required a mixture of straightforward 
recall of details and a deeper understanding of the story. For both sets of five 
questions we chose, item difficulty ranged from 0.63 to 0.88. Item reliability for 
the chosen questions about “A Dark Brown Dog” ranged from 0.64 to 0.75; 
similarly, for the chosen questions about “The Veldt,” item reliability ranged from 
0.62 to 0.81. These 10 chosen questions are listed in Appendix A. 
At the end of Experiment 1a, subjects answered a few questions to establish 
whether their data should be excluded (such as asking if they had read either the 
story or the article before, and if they recalled seeing the trigger warning) and 
reported their demographics. The full list of exclusion criteria appears below. 
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Appendix B details the wording of all of the end-of-experiment questions we 
asked subjects drawn from a student population. 
Results & Discussion. 
Transformations. When we inspected the distributions of our measures, we 
saw that some of them had skewed distributions (mainly because many subjects 
reported relatively low absolute levels of symptoms). For each skewed measure, 
we investigated whether transformations helped to normalise the distribution; but 
they made little difference. As a result, unless otherwise noted, we analysed and 
reported untransformed data, here and for the experiments to follow. 
Exclusions. We first excluded subjects who reported having previously read 
the story (n = 4), because they would have known what the story was about, 
regardless of if they saw a trigger warning. We also excluded subjects who had 
not correctly completed one or more critical tasks. Specifically, we excluded those 
who were not able to complete the experiment because they ran out of time, or 
who reported pressing the wrong key to note their intrusions, meaning their key 
presses were not able to be counted. In addition, we excluded four subjects 
because an earthquake disrupted their data collection. Altogether, we excluded 14 
subjects (6%), leaving us with 240 subjects—121 in the warning condition, and 
119 in the no warning condition. 
Manipulation check. Before addressing our research question, we carried 
out a manipulation check. We calculated the percentage of “warning” subjects 
who, at the end of the experiment, reported that they remembered seeing the 
trigger warning before they read the negative story—95% of them reported they 
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did. This result suggests the vast majority of those subjects took note of our 
manipulation. 
Memory of material. How well did subjects understand and remember the 
negative story they read, and to what extent did trigger warnings affect subjects’ 
memory for that story? To answer that question, we calculated the proportion of 
questions subjects answered correctly about the story they read, classified by if 
they had seen a trigger warning beforehand or not. In both conditions the 
proportion of questions subjects got correct was high (MWarning = 0.79, 95% CI 
[0.74, 0.83], MNoWarning = 0.81, 95% CI [0.77, 0.85]), suggesting subjects attended 
to the stories and understood them well. Further, although “warning” subjects got 
a higher proportion of these questions right than did “no warning” subjects, the 
difference between the conditions was negligible—the maximum difference is 1, 
and so this difference represents a 2% movement on this measure. Moreover, the 
95% CI around this difference is [-0.03, 0.08], which suggests that the true raw 
effect size of a trigger warning may plausibly be bigger (but only by a little), or it 
could be slightly in the opposite direction, or it could even be zero (Cumming, 
2012). In NHST terms, this difference was not statistically significant, t(238) = 
0.93, p  = .35. These results suggest trigger warnings had little effect—and 
plausibly none at all—on how well subjects remembered the negative story they 
went on to read. 
Negative affect. To what extent did trigger warnings influence how negative 
subjects felt after reading a negative story? We first checked that subjects’ 
baseline negative affect levels (that is, their ratings on the first administration of 
the PANAS-X) were similar across those subsequently assigned to see a warning, 
!52
and those not. As the mean difference (and 95% CI around it) displayed in Table 3 
shows, these groups were indeed very similar, suggesting that at the start of the 
experiment, those subjects randomly assigned to see a warning, and those not, 
were comparable with regard to how negative they felt.  
Then, to answer our research question, we turned to subjects’ ratings of their 
negative affect after they had read their assigned story. We display these mean 
ratings of negative affect for “warning” and “no warning” subjects (and the 95% 
CIs around them) in Table 4, and the mean difference between those groups of 
subjects (and the 95% CI around that difference) in Table 5. As those tables show, 
after reading a negative story, “warning” subjects felt only very slightly more 
negative than did their “no warning” counterparts. The maximum difference on 
this scale is 40, and so this difference is very small—a 3% movement on this  
Table 3
Differences in Baseline Negative Affect Between Warning Conditions
Experiment











1a 1.07 -0.52 2.66
1b 1.06 -0.79 2.92
2a -1.42 -4.16 1.33 -0.50 -4.30 3.30
2b -1.16 -3.06 0.75 -0.63 -2.20 0.94
3 0.50 -1.25 2.25 -1.11 -2.78 0.55
4 -0.54 -2.62 1.54 0.45 -1.48 2.37
Note. Negative affect measured using the Positive And Negative Affect 
Schedule (Watson & Clark, 1999; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), 
prior to the introduction of manipulations. Differences calculated by 
subtracting the mean baseline negative affect of subjects who would not 
go on to see a warning from the mean baseline negative affect of those 
who would, separately for those who would go on to see a negative film 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Raw Effect Sizes of Presence of Warning on Key Measures of Distress
Measure Experiment
Effect of warning on 
negative material














1a – – –
1b 0.05 -0.26 0.37
2a 0.22 -0.34 0.79 -0.18 -1.08 0.73
2b -0.15 -0.46 0.15 -0.25 -0.87 0.38
3 -0.32 -0.69 0.06 -0.65 -1.16 -0.13
4 -0.12 -0.49 0.25 -0.22 -0.79 0.34
PANAS 
negativea
1a 1.08 -0.83 2.99
1b 1.31 -1.10 3.71
2a -0.92 -4.77 2.93 -0.14 -4.09 3.80
2b -1.14 -4.02 1.75 0.10 -1.69 1.88
3 -0.86 -3.58 1.86 -0.53 -2.66 1.61
4 -1.00 -3.92 1.93 1.89 -0.20 3.97
Intrusions 
tally
1a -0.20 -1.54 1.15
1b -0.73 -2.50 1.04
2a 2.67 -2.67 8.01 -1.63 -5.45 2.18
2b -0.48 -2.63 1.66 0.18 -1.59 1.94
3 1.72 -0.28 3.72 -0.90 -2.71 0.91
4 -0.64 -2.64 1.36 -0.96 -2.77 0.85
IES 
intrusionsb
1a -0.47 -2.16 1.23
1b -0.72 -3.16 1.73
2a -2.74 -6.06 0.58 1.46 -1.89 4.82
2b -2.26 -4.58 0.06 -0.85 -2.99 1.29
3 -1.50 -3.73 0.73 -1.34 -3.61 0.92
4 -0.25 -2.62 2.12 0.19 -1.98 2.36
Compre-
hension
1a -0.03 -0.09 0.04
1b 0.06 -0.03 0.15
2a 0.22 0.08 0.37 0.16 0.01 0.31
2b 0.00 -0.09 0.10 0.04 -0.06 0.14
3 0.03 -0.05 0.11 -0.01 -0.10 0.09
4 -0.03 -0.13 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.13
IES 
avoidanceb
1a -0.36 -2.52 1.80
1b 1.67 -1.63 4.98
2a -2.46 -6.76 1.85 0.75 -3.95 5.45
2b -1.54 -4.29 1.21 -1.15 -4.47 2.17
3 -1.97 -4.99 1.04 -0.57 -3.78 2.63
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scale. Moreover, the confidence interval around the difference includes both 0 and 
values in the opposite direction among the plausible values for the true difference. 
In NHST terms, there was no significant effect of warning on how negative 
subjects felt after the story, t(238) = 1.11, p = .27. These results suggest that 
trigger warnings did very little either to exacerbate or mitigate how negative 
subjects felt immediately following a negative story. 
We also analysed the degree of change in subjects’ negative affect from 
before to after reading a negative story, by conducting a 2(warning, no warning) x 
2(baseline rating, rating after) mixed ANOVA on subjects’ negative affect. This 
analysis yielded no significant interaction between warning and time, F(1, 238) < 
0.01, p = .99, and no main effect of warning, F(1, 238) = 1.77, p = .18, but there 
was a main effect of time, F(1, 238) = 64.95, p < .001. In short, this analysis 
suggests that subjects felt more negative after reading a negative story, regardless 
of if they had seen a trigger warning. 
Intrusions. We now turn to a second symptom of distress: intrusive 
thoughts, which we measured in three ways. We first examined subjects’ reported 
tally of intrusive thoughts. Subjects reported high adherence to noting intrusions 
4 -0.38 -3.16 2.41 0.98 -1.94 3.90
Note. The effects of presence of a trigger warning (for each type of 
material) were calculated by subtracting “no warning” subjects’ means from 
“warning” subjects’ means; positive differences indicate higher scores for 
subjects who saw a trigger warning. Dashes indicate subjects in Experiment 
1a did not rate how negative the story was.
aPositive And Negative Affect Schedule negative subscale scores, from 
ratings made after exposure to the material (Watson & Clark, 1999; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). bImpact of Event Scale intrusions and avoidance 
subscale scores (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979).
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(M = 7.30, 95% CI [7.06, 7.55], on a 0-10 scale) indicating they took this task 
seriously. Nonetheless, there were a small number of very high tallies (maximum 
in this experiment = 59 intrusions) and so in this experiment, and each one to 
follow, we Winsorised the intrusions tally data such that the value of any tally 
exceeding the 95th percentile for that condition was replaced with the value of the 
95th percentile of that condition (Sheskin, 2003; this technique reduces the 
skewing effect of extreme values in a distribution without having to remove those 
data points entirely). We then examined the mean number of intrusions subjects 
reported, according to whether they had seen a trigger warning or not, and the 
difference between those means—these means, and the mean difference are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
As those tables show, subjects in both conditions reported having some 
intrusive thoughts related to the story they had read, while they were reading the 
article, and “warning” subjects experienced slightly fewer intrusions than “no 
warning” subjects. But the difference between conditions is small—a difference of 
a fifth of a thought. Moreover, the confidence interval around the difference spans 
a range of small values, including 0. In NHST terms, there was no significant 
effect of warning, t(238) = 0.29, p = .77. These results suggest trigger warnings 
had little, if any, effect on the number of intrusions subjects experienced. 
We next examined the second measure of intrusions: subjects’ ratings on the 
IES subscale regarding the frequency of their intrusion symptoms. As for the 
measures above, we calculated the mean scores for “warning” and “no warning” 
subjects, and the mean difference between those conditions, and display those 
data in Tables 4 and 5. As the tables show, subjects in both conditions reported 
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experiencing moderately frequent intrusion symptoms since reading the story, 
with “warning” subjects reporting a lower frequency than “no warning” subjects. 
But again, the difference was small—the maximum difference on this scale is 25, 
and so this difference represents a 2% movement. Further, the 95% CI around this 
difference spans a range of small values, including 0. In NHST terms, there was 
no significant effect of warning, t(238) = 0.54, p = .59. These results suggest that 
trigger warnings had little, if any, effect on the frequency of subjects’ intrusion 
symptoms. 
We then examined the third, indirect, measure of subjects’ intrusions: their 
performance on the comprehension test about the article they read. Recall that the 
more off-task, intrusive thoughts subjects have while they are attempting to read 
the article—particularly those they do not “catch” themselves having, and report 
via key-press—the worse their comprehension should be (Baird et al., 2013; 
Takarangi, Strange et al., 2014). We calculated the proportion of questions about 
the article subjects read that they answered correctly, classified by if they got a 
trigger warning or not, and display these means and the difference between them 
in Tables 4 and 5. As the tables show, subjects in both conditions did quite poorly 
on these questions, with “warning” subjects getting a smaller proportion of 
questions correct than “no warning” subjects. But the difference between 
conditions is very small—given the maximum difference on this measure is 1, this 
difference represents a 3% movement. Further, the 95% CI around this difference 
spans a range of small values, including 0. In NHST terms, there was no 
significant effect of warning, t(238) = 0.79, p = .43. These results suggest that 
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trigger warnings had little effect, and plausibly none, on how well subjects were 
able to comprehend an article they read, following a negative story. 
Taken together, these three measures show that most subjects experienced 
some intrusion symptoms related to the negative story they read. But getting a 
trigger warning beforehand had only very slight effects on the frequency of those 
intrusions.  
Avoidance. Finally, we turn to subjects’ ratings on the IES subscale 
regarding the frequency of their avoidance symptoms. We once again examined 
the mean scores for “warning” and “no warning” subjects, and the difference 
between their scores, and display those data in Tables 4 and 5. As the tables show, 
subjects in both conditions reported experiencing avoidance symptoms with low 
to moderate frequency since reading the story, and “warning” subjects reported a 
lower frequency than did “no warning” subjects. But again, the effect was small—
considering the maximum difference of 40 on this scale, this mean difference 
represents a 1% movement. Again, the 95% CI around this difference spanned a 
range of small values, including 0. In NHST terms, there was no significant effect 
of warning, t(238) = 0.33, p = .74. These results suggest that trigger warnings had 
little, if any, effect on subjects’ avoidance symptoms. 
Considering together the results for each of these measures, this experiment 
suggests that giving people a trigger warning prior to them reading a negative 
story has little effect. We found trigger warnings made little difference to how 
well subjects remembered the story, or to how frequently they experienced of 
symptoms of distress in relation to it afterward. Although many of the differences 
between subjects who did and did not see a warning were numerically in the 
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direction of trigger warnings being helpful, that is, reducing the frequency of 
symptoms, the absolute sizes of these effects were too small to be of practical 
significance. Moreover, the confidence intervals around the differences were 
relatively narrow, indicating the true population means were being estimated with 
reasonable precision, and yet these confidence intervals all included 0 within the 
range of values they spanned, indicating that trigger warnings may plausibly have 
no effect at all (Cumming, 2012).  
If trigger warnings really have little or no effect on people’s memory for the 
negative material, or on comprehension of material presented subsequently, that is 
good news for educators who want to use these warnings—these data suggest 
such warnings would not alter students’ learning. It is possible that even if the true 
effect of trigger warnings on how well people remember details about the negative 
material (and on the symptoms they experience) is minuscule, warnings may 
nonetheless alter how negative subjects report the material to be. That is, seeing a 
trigger warning may lead people to reappraise the material and judge it to be more 
negative—such a finding would fit with research showing that false feedback 
given after an experience can lead people to report that that experience was more 
negative (Takarangi & Strange, 2010). To address this possibility, in our next 
experiment we made an addition to the end of the procedure: we asked subjects to 
rate how negative the story they read was. 
Experiment 1b 
The main purpose of this experiment was to replicate Experiment 1a. 




Subjects. We used Amazon’s online crowdsourcing service, Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk; https://www.mturk.com/), to recruit 203 MTurk members, who 
received USD0.75 for completing the study remotely. We aimed to collect data 
from enough subjects that we could exclude up to 30% of our sample for failing 
our compliance checks (as per the highest rate of exclusions reported by 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) and still have 70 subjects per warning 
condition. The Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals’ (ESCI; Cumming, 
2012) “precision for planning” feature shows that to compare two groups, with 
99% assurance of achieving a margin of error of 0.35 around a standardised mean 
difference of 0.4—thereby allowing exclusion of 0 as a plausible value for the 
difference—the target n should be 69 subjects per group (recall that Ferguson, 
2009, recommended a threshold of 0.41 for considering such an effect practically 
significant). We retained data from 144 subjects for analysis (our exclusion 
criteria are detailed below). Of those subjects, 56% were female and 44% male; 
their ages ranged from 19-71, Median = 35, M = 38.33, 95% CI [36.21, 40.46]; 
99% of them reported that they were citizens of the US; and 99% of them reported 
that English was their first language. 
Procedure. Prior to running this experiment, we collected more norming 
data about several negative stories. This time, we used a sample drawn from 
MTurk, in order to determine if the same stories would be suitable for use with 
this population—they were. 
Norming of stories. To collect these norming data, we asked 150 MTurk 
members to read one of ten possible stories (two of these stories were abridged 
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versions of “The Veldt,” the shortest of which we used in both Experiments 1a 
and 1b; see below). We then asked them the same questions as we asked when we 
collected norming data from a student sample.  
Because MTurk subjects do not complete studies under controlled 
laboratory conditions, we included several attention checks throughout this 
norming study, and at the end we asked subjects questions about their compliance 
with instructions, and about the conditions under which they completed the study. 
We excluded and replaced responses from subjects who failed our attention 
checks, reported that they did not carefully read the entire story, or had a story-
reading speed (calculated by dividing the story word count by the time they spent 
on the story survey page) of more than 600 words per minute. We then examined 
subjects’ responses to each story, focusing—as we did for the student sample—on 
how negatively they rated the story, change in the degree of negative affect they 
reported feeling, how long they took to read the story, and if they had read the 
story before. 
With regard to “A Dark Brown Dog,” we found that, in norming, MTurk 
subjects rated this story as very negative, (M = 6.27, 95% CI [5.73, 6.80]), and 
likewise their degree of current negative affect increased from before to after 
reading this story (Mdiff = 9.80, 95% CIdiff [5.06, 14.54]). Further, MTurk subjects 
took approximately 10 minutes to read this story (M = 610 s, 95% CI [402, 817], 
Median = 596 s). Finally, none of the MTurk subjects had previously read this 
story. 
With regard to the shortest version of “The Veldt,” we found that, in 
norming, MTurk subjects rated this story as very negative (M = 5.40, 95% CI 
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[4.52, 6.28]), and likewise their degree of current negative affect somewhat 
increased from before to after reading this story (Mdiff = 2.93, 95% CIdiff [0.44, 
5.43]). Further, MTurk subjects took approximately 12 minutes to read this story 
(M = 731 s, 95% CI [527, 934], Median = 661 s). Finally, only one of the MTurk 
subjects reported previously having read this story. 
On the basis of these data, we asked subjects in Experiment 1b to read one 
or other of the same negative short stories as in Experiment 1a. After reading one 
of these stories, subjects completed the same four tasks as in Experiment 1a to 
measure their symptoms of distress, and their memory for the negative material. 
These subjects spent approximately 3 minutes reading the non-fiction article and 
noting their intrusions related to the negative story they had read (M = 206.26 s, 
95% CI [184.78, 227.74], Median = 174.64 s).  
But there were several changes to the procedure of this experiment from that 
of Experiment 1a. First, although subjects read the same negative stories, some of 
the four-alternative forced-choice questions we asked them about those stories 
were different. We used different questions because when we collected norming 
data about these questions using another MTurk sample, the item statistics were 
different than those from our student sample.  
Norming of story questions. We followed a similar process to choose 
questions for use with an MTurk sample as we did for the student sample. We 
used data from 30 MTurk members (who completed the survey, passed attention 
checks, and reported they complied with our instructions) to examine item 
difficulty and reliability, and ultimately choose five questions about each story. 
For the chosen questions about “A Dark Brown Dog,” item difficulty ranged from 
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0.67 to 0.93, and item reliability ranged from 0.41 to 0.57; for the chosen 
questions about the shortened version of “The Veldt,” difficulty ranged from 0.73 
to 0.93, and reliability ranged from 0.55 to 0.85. These 10 chosen questions 
appear in Appendix A. 
The second change to the procedure of Experiment 1b was that subjects 
completed an additional task to measure how they experienced the story. 
Specifically, their final task in the experiment proper was to rate the story they 
had read for how negative, positive, surprising, and interesting it was, on 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (extremely) scales. 
We also made some other changes to the procedure of Experiment 1b, due 
to these subjects participating remotely. These changes fell in three places: Before 
the experiment proper, we gave subjects instructions intended to ensure the 
quality of their data (for example, we told them they should not engage in other 
tasks during the experiment, and that they should complete the experiment in an 
environment free of noise and distraction). During the experiment, we 
incorporated several attention checks to encourage subjects to pay close attention 
(for example, in the PANAS-X there was an additional item that looked the same 
as the others but said “choose option 2”; Oppenheimer et al., 2009), although we 
paid subjects who reached the end of the experiment regardless of if they 
responded to those questions correctly. Finally, after the experiment, we included 
additional questions to check subjects’ compliance with our instructions (for 
example, we asked subjects if they had read the entire story, and if they had 
completed the experiment in an environment free of noise and distractions); to 
encourage honesty we told subjects we would pay them no matter how they 
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responded to these questions. Appendix C details the complete wording of the 
instructions, attention checks, and compliance checks we used for samples 
recruited from MTurk. 
Results & Discussion. 
Exclusions. We first excluded subjects who reported having previously read 
the story (n = 12), or who had not correctly completed one or more critical tasks
—specifically, those who had a story-reading speed greater than 1000 words per 
minute (calculated using the time they spent on that survey page) indicating they 
probably did not read the story closely, or who reported they did not read the 
entire story, or reported that they not did not read the entire article, or reported 
pressing the wrong key to note their intrusions. Altogether, we excluded 59 
subjects (29%), leaving us with complete data from 144 subjects for analysis, who 
were somewhat unevenly distributed across conditions: nWarning = 77, nNoWarning = 
67. 
Manipulation check. Next, we carried out a manipulation check. At the end 
of the experiment, 97% of “warning” subjects reported they remembered seeing 
the trigger warning. This finding suggests that, again, subjects in the “warning” 
condition took note of our manipulation. We then turned to our research question. 
Memory and ratings of material. Recall that in this experiment, we added a 
task in which we asked subjects to make several ratings about the story they had 
read. To gauge the extent to which trigger warnings affected how negative 
subjects judged that material to be, we calculated their mean rating for how 
negative the story was, classified by if they saw a warning about it or not, and 
display those results in Table 4. We conducted the same calculations for the other 
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ratings, too; those results appear in Appendix D as Table S1. Next, we calculated 
the difference between these mean ratings of negativity, and display that result in 
Table 5. As Table 4 shows, subjects in both conditions rated the stories as very 
negative. But, as Table 5 shows, although “warning” subjects rated the stories as 
more negative than "no warning” subjects, the difference between conditions was 
very small—a movement of approximately 1% on this scale, with its maximum 
difference of 6. The confidence interval around the difference spans a range of 
small values, including 0, and there was no statistically significant effect of 
warning, t(142) = 0.32, p = .75. In an echo of the conclusions in Experiment 1a, 
these results suggest that trigger warnings had only a very small effect on how 
negative subjects judged the stories to be—suggesting, once again, that educators 
who use trigger warnings are doing little to change the negativity of their students’ 
experience. 
Next, we examined the effect of trigger warnings on how well subjects 
remembered the story they read. We calculated the proportion of questions about 
the stories that subjects answered correctly, classified by if they had seen a 
warning beforehand or not. In both conditions the proportion of questions subjects 
got correct was high (MWarning = 0.75, 95% CI [0.70, 0.80], MNoWarning = 0.78, 95% 
CI [0.72, 0.83]). But the difference between conditions was negligible—a 3% 
movement. What is more, the 95% confidence interval around the difference is 
[-0.05, 0.10]; thus, it spans a range of small values, including 0. Put in NHST 
terms, the effect of warnings was not significant, t(142) = 0.62, p = .54. As in 
Experiment 1a, these results suggest that trigger warnings had little effect on 
subjects’ memory for the story. 
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Negative affect. We again found that baseline negative affect was similar for 
subjects later randomly assigned to see a warning as those who were not, as Table 
3 shows. As for how negative subjects felt after reading the negative story, we 
display “warning” and “no warning” subjects’ mean ratings in Table 4, and the 
mean difference between them in Table 5. Those tables show that “warning” 
subjects felt only very slightly more negative than their “no warning” counterparts 
did after reading a negative story—a movement of 3%—and that the confidence 
interval around the range of plausible differences spans 0, and values in the 
opposite direction. There was no significant effect of warning on how negative 
subjects felt after the story, t(142) = 1.07, p = .29.  
Moreover, a 2(warning, no warning) x 2(baseline rating, rating after) mixed 
ANOVA on subjects’ negative affect yielded no significant interaction between 
warning and time, F(1, 142) = 0.06, p = .80, and no main effect of warning, F(1, 
142) = 1.48, p = .23, but there was a main effect of time, F(1, 142) = 74.41, p < .
001. These results suggest that, as in Experiment 1a, trigger warnings had little 
effect on how much more negative subjects felt after reading a negative story. 
Intrusions. Then, we examined the effect of trigger warnings on our three 
measures of intrusions by calculating, on each measure, “warning” and “no 
warning” subjects’ means, and the mean difference between them (and the 95% 
CIs around these raw effect sizes). First, we compared the number of intrusions 
subjects reported while reading the article (maximum tally = 283, before we 
Winsorised them). Subjects reported high adherence to noting intrusions, M = 
8.75, 95% CI [8.47, 9.03], indicating they took this task seriously. As Table 4 
shows, both “warning” and “no warning” subjects experienced intrusions related 
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to the story. But, as Table 5 shows, the difference between their means is small—a 
difference of approximately three-quarters of a thought—and the true effect may 
plausibly be 0, or in the opposite direction. Further, there was no significant effect 
of warning, t(142) = 0.82, p = .42. Second, we made the same comparisons for 
subjects’ ratings on the IES subscale regarding the frequency of their intrusion 
symptoms. As Tables 4 and 5 show, these data tell a similar story as the intrusion 
tally: Subjects in both conditions reported intrusive symptoms, but the difference 
between the conditions was small—a movement on this scale of only 3%—and 
the true effect may plausibly be 0, or in the opposite direction. There was no 
significant effect of warning on this measure, t(142) = 0.58, p = .56. Third, we 
made the same comparisons for subjects’ performance on the comprehension test 
about the article they read, following the negative story. As Tables 4 and 5 show, 
subjects in both conditions did moderately well on these questions, but the 
difference between conditions was very small—a 6% movement—and the true 
effect may plausibly be 0, or slightly in the opposite direction; and there was no 
significant effect of warning, t(142) = 1.35, p = .18. Taken together, these results 
suggest trigger warnings had little effect on subjects’ intrusion symptoms. 
Avoidance. Finally, we examined the effect of trigger warnings on subjects’ 
ratings on the IES subscale regarding the frequency of their avoidance symptoms, 
calculating the same statistics as before. Tables 4 and 5 show that—as for the 
measures of other symptoms—subjects in both conditions reported moderate 
levels of avoidance symptoms, but the difference between “warning” and “no 
warning” subjects was small—a 4% movement—and plausibly 0, or in the 
opposite direction. Further, there was no significant effect of warning, t(142) = 
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1.00, p = .32. That is, trigger warnings had little effect on the frequency of 
subjects’ avoidance symptoms. 
The results of Experiment 1b replicate the main findings of Experiment 1a. 
In Experiment 1b, trigger warnings had minimal effects on any of our measures, 
regarding how well subjects remembered the negative stories and the degree of 
distress those stories evoked in them, and warnings had similarly little effect on 
how negative subjects judged those stories to be.  
It is possible that trigger warnings truly have a negligibly small effect on 
people’s symptoms of distress, or on people’s experience of and memory for the 
negative material and material presented afterward. But one alternative 
explanation for our observing very little effect of warnings is that our trigger 
warnings, or our negative materials, were not best suited for detecting these 
effects. There are several possible issues with the materials we used. 
For a start, the wording of our trigger warnings may not have been specific 
enough for people to find them useful. It stands to reason that people should be 
better able to correct for unwanted mental influences—to the extent they are able
—if they have more detailed information about what they are trying to correct for 
(Wilson & Brekke, 1994). In the rest of our experiments we therefore made our 
trigger warnings somewhat more explicit, while still retaining the form of those 
used in real-world situations. We changed our warnings so that they described the 
negative content in more detail, and also specified that people may have a 
negative response when exposed to that negative content. 
What is more, the negative materials we used might not have been sufficient 
to evoke symptoms to a great enough degree for trigger warnings’ effects to 
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become clear. That is, if trigger warnings reduce the rates of symptoms, but our 
story materials made “no warning” subjects only somewhat symptomatic, the 
“warning” subjects’ symptoms could not get much lower, thereby masking any 
helpful effects—a problem sometimes referred to as a “floor effect.” Conversely, 
if trigger warnings potentiate the negativity of material and the ensuing 
symptoms, but these stories were not negative enough to give trigger warnings 
enough negative content to potentiate, then any harmful effects of trigger 
warnings would similarly be masked.  
In our subsequent experiments we therefore turned to using film clips as our 
warned-about material, instead of negative stories. Negative film clips are often 
used as trauma-analogues in research, and so we should be able to use such clips 
to generate sufficient symptoms of distress (for reviews of the trauma film 
paradigm, see Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James, Lau-Zhu, Clark, Visser, 
Hagenaars, & Holmes, 2016).  
Moreover we used film clips with two versions, one very negative and the 
other—as a comparison, or control—far less negative, so that the effects of trigger 
warnings would become clearer. We expected that subjects in the negative 
condition would experience greater rates of symptoms than those in the control 
condition (Hall & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Boals, et al., 2008). Therefore, if trigger 
warnings need a certain amount of negativity and the ensuing high rates of 
symptoms to act on at a detectable level, then we should see bigger effects of 
trigger warnings when they precede the more negative film clips rather than the 
less negative, control film clips. Further, if subjects report lower levels of 
symptoms after seeing a control film clip than after seeing a negative clip, it 
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would suggest that “negative film” subjects’ symptoms are not “at floor,” making 
floor effects a less likely counterexplanation for why trigger warnings exerted 
little effect in our experiments. 
Experiment 2a 
Method. 
Subjects. We aimed to recruit as many subjects as we could, within the 
constraints of departmental subject-hour allocations for the semester. We collected 
data from 130 introductory psychology students at Victoria University of 
Wellington, who participated in partial fulfilment of course requirements. Of the 
108 whose data we retained for analysis (see below for the details of our exclusion 
criteria), 65% were female and 35% male, and their ages ranged from 17-37, 
Median = 19, M = 19.88, 95% CI [19.21, 20.55]. 
Design. We used a 2 x 2 factorial design, manipulating both Presence of 
Warning (warning, no warning) and Negativity of Material (negative film clip, 
control film clip) between subjects. 
Procedure. The procedure of this experiment was the same as that of 
Experiment 1a, except for the following changes. On consent forms, we told 
subjects we were interested in examining visual and verbal learning, again using a 
cover story so as not to alert subjects that they may be exposed to negative 
material (prior to only some of them seeing a trigger warning regarding this 
material).  
To measure their negative affect, subjects completed the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) as their first task, and a 
second time after exposure to the film clip. This measure is a shorter version of 
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the PANAS-X, and so quicker to complete; but the items that are used to calculate 
a score on the negative subscale are identical across these two versions of the 
scale. 
Subjects who were assigned to get a trigger warning read the more specific 
(compared to the warnings in previous experiments) wording “TRIGGER 
WARNING: The following video may contain graphic footage of [a fatal car crash 
/ violent domestic abuse]. You might find this content disturbing.” The brackets 
indicate differences depending on which film clip counterbalance subjects were 
assigned to see, as described below. The “no warning” subjects skipped this step. 
Next, all subjects were randomly assigned to watch one of four short film 
clips; two of these clips showed negative events, and the other two were the 
controls. The control clips each showed an event that was very similar to the one 
depicted in its negative clip counterpart, but which unfolded in a less negative 
way. All these film clips were taken from public service announcement 
campaigns.  
More specifically, one pair of clips we used was from a 2010 TV advert 
campaign against speeding, by Australia’s Queensland Government Department 
of Transport and Main Roads, called “Pram.” We retrieved two clips, called 
“Pram1” and “Pram2,” from their website (https://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/Safety/
Safety-campaigns.aspx, but note that the clips are no longer hosted on that 
website). In Pram1, a man is speeding and can’t stop in time to avoid hitting 
another vehicle, so he instead swerves, and hits a woman pushing a pram; we then 
see her lifeless body and her crying, bloodied baby. Pram2 depicts the man being 
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able to stop in time to avoid hitting the other vehicle; the woman walks by with 
her pram, unaffected.  
The other pair of clips we used was from a 2013 cinema advert against 
domestic abuse, by the UK’s Women’s Aid charity, called “Blind Eye.” Its two 
versions were designed for simultaneous projection to an audience wearing 3D 
glasses—delivering a different version to each eye. The versions respectively 
show a woman preparing dinner while being physically and verbally abused by 
her husband, and the woman carrying out a very similar sequence of actions, 
while alone. We obtained the footage directly from the charity, but their website 
contains an excerpt that alternates between the versions, giving a flavour of the 
contents of each (see https://www.womensaid.org.uk/what-we-do/blind-eye/).  
We edited these clips to remove logos and make the content more similar 
across different clip versions. Our edited versions were all under a minute in 
length (Pram-negative = 52 s; Pram-control = 40 s; Blind Eye-negative = 43 s; 
Blind Eye-control = 45 s).  
Thus, the (negative) films involved topics of the kind for which warnings 
are issued or requested. What is more, they depicted events which (if they really 
happened) would meet Criterion A for diagnosis with PTSD (see Table 1). Indeed, 
traffic accidents and domestic altercations are relatively common occurrences, and 
so should be likely to cue intrusive thoughts of any related personal experiences—
as well as be generally unpleasant to watch. After all, public service campaigns 
are intended to reach and be relatable to wide swathes of the population. We chose 
to use these particular clips based on norming data. 
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Norming of film clips. We collected norming data about 10 negative and 
control film clips in a similar manner as we had about the short stories. We chose 
clips that came in pairs, taking them from public service announcement 
campaigns that used two different versions of the same event—one with a more 
negative or more graphic outcome than the other—to convey a common message. 
As described above, before norming the clips we lightly edited some of them, to 
remove logos and verbal campaign appeals, and in some cases we added or 
removed footage from within a pair to make the two clips more equivalent to one 
another in length. We showed a sample of introductory psychology students at 
Victoria University of Wellington one of the 10 clips, to obtain a total of 15 
complete responses per clip. We excluded and replaced data from subjects who 
were observed replaying their assigned clip. 
These norming subjects first completed the PANAS-X, then watched one 
film clip. Afterwards, they completed the PANAS-X a second time; rated how 
negative, positive, surprising, interesting, unpleasant, distressing, and disgusting 
the clip was; listed disturbing and pleasant details in the clip, summarised the 
storyline and message conveyed (if any); and indicated if they had seen the clip 
before. Given that we had edited the clips, we decided to also check subjects’ 
feelings of transportation (that is, their feelings of absorption in a narrative) and of 
comprehension, so that we could pick pairs of negative and control clips that were 
at least moderately transporting and comprehensible. To assess those properties, 
subjects also rated nine items with regard to how transported they were while 
watching the clip (for example, “I was mentally involved in the video while 
watching it”), from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much); and rated four items with 
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regard to how well they understood what happened in the clip, how 
comprehensible the order of events was, how realistic the storyline was, and how 
coherent a story it was, respectively (also on 1-7 scales); we then summed each of 
these two groups of items (which were variously adapted from: Glenberg, 
Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982; Green & Brock, 2000; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & 
Raye, 1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). For each pair of clips, we then 
examined subjects’ responses. We primarily focused on change in the degree of 
negative affect that subjects reported feeling; how negative, unpleasant, 
disturbing, and disgusting they rated the clips as being; how transporting and 
comprehensible they rated the clips as being; and if subjects had seen the clips 
before.  
The results of our norming for the “Pram” clips showed that, with regard to 
the negative version, subjects rated it as very negative on the four related items: 
Mnegative = 5.87, 95% CI [5.32, 6.42]; Munpleasant = 5.40, 95% CI [4.26, 6.54]; 
Mdistressing = 5.47, 95% CI [4.61, 6.33]; Mdisgusting = 4.47, 95% CI [3.38, 5.55]; 
whereas they rated the control version considerably lower on those items: Mnegative 
= 3.67, 95% CI [2.76, 4.57], Mdiff = 2.20, 95% CIdiff [1.19, 3.21]; Munpleasant = 3.20, 
95% CI [2.11, 4.29], Mdiff = 2.20, 95% CIdiff [0.69, 3.71]; Mdistressing = 3.53, 95% 
CI [2.37, 4.70], Mdiff = 1.93, 95% CIdiff [0.55, 3.31]; Mdisgusting = 1.93, 95% CI 
[1.06, 2.81], Mdiff = 2.53, 95% CIdiff [1.20, 3.86]. Similarly, subjects’ degree of 
current negative affect increased from before to after watching the negative 
version: Mdiff = 4.53, 95% CIdiff [1.99, 7.08]. This increase is bigger than those 
observed in the norming of the negative stories but, considering the maximum 
possible change score is 40, it is still only a modest change. Nevertheless, 
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subjects’ degree of current negative affect was only trivially different before 
versus after watching the control version: Mdiff = 1.27, 95% CIdiff [-1.15, 3.68]. 
Further, subjects rated both the negative and control versions as moderately 
transporting, considering the possible range of summed scores was 9-63 (Mnegative 
= 39.60, 95% CI [34.41, 44.79], Mcontrol = 38.67, 95% CI [34.90, 42.43]), and as 
highly comprehensible, considering the possible range of summed scores was 
4-28 (Mnegative = 25.53, 95% CI [24.32, 26.75], Mcontrol = 20.80, 95% CI [17.83, 
23.77]). Finally, no subjects reported having previously seen either of these clips. 
The results of our norming for the “Blind Eye” clips showed that, with 
regard to the negative version, subjects rated it as very negative on the four related 
items: Mnegative = 6.47, 95% CI [6.06, 6.88]; Munpleasant = 5.33, 95% CI [4.68, 5.98]; 
Mdistressing = 4.87, 95% CI [4.09, 5.65]; Mdisgusting = 5.47, 95% CI [4.58, 6.35]; 
whereas they rated the control version considerably lower: Mnegative = 2.07, 95% 
CI [1.49, 2.64], Mdiff = 4.40, 95% CIdiff [3.73, 5.07]; Munpleasant = 1.93, 95% CI 
[1.17, 2.70], Mdiff = 3.40, 95% CIdiff [2.44, 4.36]; Mdistressing = 1.87, 95% CI [1.06, 
2.67], Mdiff = 3.00, 95% CIdiff [1.93, 4.07]; Mdisgusting = 1.40, 95% CI [0.94, 1.86], 
Mdiff = 4.07, 95% CIdiff [3.11, 5.02]. Similarly, subjects’ degree of current negative 
affect increased from before to after watching the negative version, Mdiff = 3.47, 
95% CIdiff [-0.74, 7.68], but trivially decreased from before to after watching the 
control version: Mdiff = -1.13, 95% CIdiff [-2.16, -0.11]. Further, subjects rated both 
versions as moderately transporting (Mnegative = 37.07, 95% CI [32.85, 41.29], 
Mcontrol = 36.13, 95% CI [33.02, 39.24]), and highly comprehensible (Mnegative = 
21.60, 95% CI [18.95, 24.25], Mcontrol = 20.47, 95% CI [17.41, 23.52]). Finally, no 
subjects reported having previously seen either of these clips. 
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After subjects in Experiment 2a had watched one of these four film clips, 
we then measured their experience of the film material and their symptoms of 
distress, in a similar manner as in the previous experiments. Subjects spent 
approximately 4 minutes reading the unrelated, non-fiction article and noting 
intrusions related to the film clip they had seen (M = 234.17 s, 95% CI [217.82, 
250.53], Median = 230.91 s). They later answered comprehension questions about 
that article, but we did not ask subjects additional questions testing how well they 
remembered the film clip they had seen. At the end of the experiment we did, 
however, ask subjects to make ratings about the film clip they had seen: subjects 
rated how negative, positive, surprising, interesting, unpleasant, distressing, and 
disgusting they found the clip, on 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) scales. 
After the experiment proper, subjects answered a few questions to establish 
whether they should be excluded (such as if they had seen the film clip before) 
and reported their demographics. These questions were essentially the same as the 
ones we asked at the end of Experiment 1a, but their wording was adapted where 
needed in order to be about film clips. The full list of exclusion criteria appears 
below. Appendix B details the wording of all of the end-of-experiment questions 
we asked subjects drawn from a student population. 
Results & Discussion. 
Exclusions. We excluded subjects who reported having previously seen the 
film clip (n = 4), or who had not correctly completed one or more critical tasks. 
Specifically, we excluded data from subjects who were not able to complete the 
experiment because they ran out of time, or who reported or were observed 
playing the film clip more than once, or reported looking away from the film clip, 
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or pressing the wrong key to note their intrusions.We also excluded two subjects 
for, respectively, having a disability such that the experimenter needed to operate 
the computer on that subject’s behalf, and overhearing this exchange. Altogether, 
we excluded 22 subjects (17%), leaving us with data for analysis from 108 
subjects, distributed fairly evenly across conditions: nWarningNegative = 25, 
nNoWarningNegative = 27, nWarningControl = 28, nNoWarningControl = 28. 
Manipulation check. Our manipulation check revealed that, at the end of 
the experiment, 81% of “warning” subjects reported they remembered seeing the 
trigger warning. This result suggests most subjects in the “warning” condition 
took note of our manipulation. 
Ratings of material. How much did trigger warnings affect how negative 
subjects thought the material was? To address this question, we first calculated 
subjects’ mean rating for how negative the film clip they saw was, classified by if 
they got a trigger warning about it beforehand or not, and by whether they had 
seen a negative film clip or a control film clip. We display those results in Table 4 
(and the equivalent results for the other ratings can be found in Appendix D, in 
Table S1). We then calculated the mean difference between “warning” and “no 
warning” subjects’ ratings of negativity for those who had seen a negative film, 
and did the same for those who had seen a control film. We display those results 
in Table 5. Similarly, we calculated the differences between “negative film” and 
“control film” subjects’ ratings, for subjects who got a warning and for subjects 
who got no warning. We display those results in Table 6. Thus, Table 5 shows the 
effects of the trigger warning manipulation, and Table 6 shows the effects of the 
film negativity manipulation. 
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Table 6
Raw Effect Sizes of Negativity of Material on Key Measures of Distress
Measure Experiment
Effect of negativity 
after warning
















2a 3.56 2.78 4.33 3.15 2.39 3.92
2b 3.68 3.19 4.16 3.58 3.10 4.07
3 4.21 3.79 4.63 3.88 3.42 4.34





2a 3.88 0.27 7.50 4.66 0.50 8.82
2b 7.15 4.71 9.59 8.39 5.99 10.78
3 6.19 3.71 8.67 6.52 4.04 9.00





2a 3.75 -1.40 8.91 -0.55 -4.54 3.44
2b 2.05 0.01 4.08 2.71 0.80 4.62
3 2.76 0.72 4.80 0.13 -1.63 1.89





2a 0.37 -2.94 3.68 4.58 1.21 7.95
2b 3.98 1.81 6.15 5.39 3.11 7.67
3 3.61 1.32 5.90 3.76 1.57 5.96





2a 0.03 -0.12 0.18 -0.04 -0.18 0.11
2b 0.03 -0.07 0.12 0.07 -0.03 0.16
3 -0.01 -0.09 0.08 -0.04 -0.13 0.04





2a 0.20 -4.94 5.34 3.40 -0.47 7.28
2b 3.86 0.82 6.90 4.25 1.23 7.27
3 2.98 -0.17 6.14 4.38 1.35 7.42
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As Table 5 shows, “warning” subjects who saw a negative film rated it as 
only very slightly more negative than their “no warning” counterparts. Similarly, 
“warning” subjects who saw a control film rated it as only very slightly less 
negative than their “no warning” counterparts. In other words, the differences 
between warning conditions were very small, for either type of film—movements 
of 4% for the “negative film” subjects, and 3% for the “control film” subjects. 
Further, the confidence intervals around those differences include a range of small 
values as plausible, spanning 0, and values in the opposite direction. 
Although the effects of trigger warnings were small, the effect of film 
negativity was clear. As Table 6 shows, regardless of if they saw a warning first, 
subjects who saw a negative film rated it as much more negative than did subjects 
who saw a control film—movements of 59% for “warning” subjects, and 53% for 
“no warning” subjects.  
Put in NHST terms, there was no significant interaction between presence of 
warning and negativity of material on ratings of negativity, F(1, 104) = 0.55, p = .
46; and there was no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 104) = 0.01, p = .93; 
but there was a significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 104) = 152.87, p < .
4 4.01 0.96 7.07 5.37 2.72 8.02
Note. Negativity of material was only manipulated in experiments that used 
film materials. The effects of film negativity (in each warning condition) 
were calculated by subtracting “control” subjects’ means from “negative” 
subjects’ means; positive differences indicate higher scores for subjects who 
watched a negative film.
aPositive And Negative Affect Schedule negative subscale scores, from 
ratings made after exposure to the material (Watson & Clark, 1999; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). bImpact of Event Scale intrusions and avoidance 
subscale scores (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979).
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001, whereby subjects who saw a negative film clip rated it as more negative than 
those who saw a control one. Thus, these new, film materials performed as 
expected, even as trigger warnings again had little effect on how negative subjects 
judged material to be. 
Negative affect. How much did trigger warnings affect how negative 
subjects felt? As for previous experiments, to answer this question we first 
established that baseline negative affect was similar across conditions; it was—see 
Table 3. Then, we calculated subjects’ mean rating of negative affect after 
watching a film clip, classified by if they saw a trigger warning or not and 
whether they saw a negative or control film, and display those in Table 4, Further, 
we calculated the mean differences between the negative affect of “warning” and 
“no warning” subjects, and display those in Table 5, and the mean differences 
between “negative” and “control” subjects in Table 6.  
As Table 5 shows, the answer to this question is: not much. “Warning” 
subjects felt only very slightly less negative than their “no warning” counterparts 
after watching a negative film clip—a 2% movement—and similarly so after 
watching a control film clip—a movement of less than 1%. Further, the 
confidence intervals around both effects are wide, spanning 0, and values in the 
opposite direction.  
Looking at Table 6, we can also see that, regardless of whether they had 
seen a warning, “negative” subjects reported feeling more negative affect after 
watching their allotted film clip than did “control” subjects—movements of 10% 
for “warning” subjects, and 12% for “no warning” subjects.  
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Moreover, a 2(warning, no warning) x 2(negative film, control film) x 
2(baseline rating, rating after) mixed ANOVA on subjects’ negative affect yielded 
no significant interaction between warning, film negativity, and time, F(1, 104) = 
0.01, p = .94, or between warning and film negativity, F(1, 104) = 0.13, p = .72, or 
between warning and time, F(1, 104) = 0.22, p = .64. But there was a significant 
interaction between film negativity and time, F(1, 104) = 40.33, p < .001, 
whereby subjects who saw a negative film clip reported a greater increase in 
negative affect than did subjects who watched a control film clip. There was also a 
significant main effect of time, F(1, 104) = 43.34, p < .001, such that subjects 
overall felt worse after watching a clip. But there were no significant main effects 
of warning, F(1, 104) = 0.39, p = .54, or of film negativity, F(1, 104) = 1.27, p = .
26. Together, these findings suggest that manipulating the negativity of the film 
subjects saw had the expected effect on how negative they felt, whereas trigger 
warnings once again had little effect. 
Intrusions. How much did trigger warnings affect how many intrusions 
subjects experienced? We answered this question in three ways. First, we 
calculated the mean number of intrusions subjects reported while reading the non-
fiction article (maximum tally = 55, before we Winsorised them), classified by if 
they saw a trigger warning or not, and whether they saw a negative or control 
film, and display those means in Table 4. Subjects reported high adherence to 
noting these intrusions, M = 7.81, 95% CI [7.43, 8.20], indicating they took this 
task seriously. We then calculated the mean differences between the tallies of 
intrusions reported by “warning” and “no warning” subjects, and display those in 
Table 5, and between “negative” and “control” subjects, and display those in 
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Table 6. Second, we conducted these same calculations for subjects’ rating of the 
frequency of their intrusion symptoms. Third, we conducted these same 
calculations for subjects’ performance on the comprehension questions about the 
non-fiction article. 
As Table 5 shows, “warning” subjects reported a higher number of 
intrusions than “no warning” subjects—approximately two and two-thirds of a 
thought more—after a negative film clip, and a lower number of intrusions—
approximately one and two-thirds of a thought fewer—after a control film clip. 
Yet, importantly, the confidence intervals around both these differences are very 
wide, spanning a range of plausible values, including 0 and values in the opposite 
direction. Table 5 further shows that, conversely, “warning” subjects rated their 
intrusions as less frequent than “no warning” subjects after watching a negative 
film clip—an 11% movement—but as little more frequent after watching a control 
film clip—a 6% movement. But, again, the confidence intervals around these 
differences span a wide range of plausible values, including 0 and values in the 
opposite direction. As for comprehension, Table 5 shows that “warning” subjects 
correctly answered a similarly higher proportion of questions about the article 
they had read than did “no warning” subjects in both film conditions—a 22% 
movement for “negative” subjects, and a 16% movement for “control” subjects. 
Although the confidence intervals around those differences do not quite include 0 
as a plausible value for the difference, they are nonetheless very wide, spanning a 
range of values from trivial to notable. Considered together, these results suggest 
trigger warnings affected subjects self-reported intrusions very little, but may 
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have reduced the incidence of intrusions of which subjects were not meta-aware. 
But, given the imprecision of these estimates, this result requires replication. 
Turning next to Table 6, to examine the effect of film negativity, reveals that 
“negative” subjects reported a higher number of intrusive thoughts than “control” 
subjects after a trigger warning—three and three-quarters of a thought more—but 
a lower number without having seen a trigger warning—approximately half a 
thought less. Further, “negative” subjects reported a higher frequency of intrusive 
symptoms than “control” subjects—a 1% movement for “warning” subjects, and 
an 18% movement for “no warning” subjects. And finally, “negative” subjects 
performed slightly better than “control” subjects after a trigger warning—a 3% 
movement—but slightly worse without a trigger warning—a 4% movement. But, 
again, the confidence intervals around these differences are very wide, and most 
include 0, indicating the estimates of these effects are not very precise. 
We also conducted NHST analyses on these three measures. With regard to 
the effect on the number of intrusions subjects reported, there was no significant 
interaction between presence of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 104) = 
1.77, p = .19; there was no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 104) = 0.10, p 
= .75; and no significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 104) = 0.98, p = .32. 
For subjects’ ratings of the frequency of intrusions, there was no significant 
interaction between presence of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 104) = 
3.18, p = .08; and there was no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 104) = 
0.29, p = .59; but there was a significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 104) 
= 4.41, p = .04, such that subjects who saw a negative film clip reported more 
frequent intrusions than those who saw a control clip. Finally, for subjects’ 
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performance on the comprehension questions about the article, there was no 
significant interaction between presence of warning and negativity of material, 
F(1, 104) = 0.40, p = .53; there was a significant main effect of warning, F(1, 104) 
= 13.00, p < .01, whereby subjects who saw a trigger warning got more questions 
right than those who saw no warning; but there was no significant main effect of 
film negativity, F(1, 104) < 0.01, p = .97. The inconsistent results across these 
three measures, regarding the effects of our manipulations, are best understood in 
the context of how wide the confidence intervals around them are. Those intervals 
all suggest these results provide us with poor estimates of the true effect sizes. 
Avoidance. How much did trigger warnings affect how avoidant people 
were? To answer this question, we calculated the mean frequency of subjects’ 
avoidance symptoms after watching a film clip, classified by if they saw a trigger 
warning or not and whether they saw a negative or control film. We display those 
means in Table 4. We also calculated the mean differences between the avoidance 
symptom frequency of “warning” and “no warning” subjects, and display those in 
Table 5, and between “negative” and “control” subjects, and display those in 
Table 6.  
Table 5 shows that the answer is not much: “warning” subjects were 
similarly avoidant as their “no warning” counterparts, a little less after watching a 
negative film clip—a 6% movement—and a very little more after watching a 
control film clip—a 2% movement. But, as for the other measures in this 
experiment, the confidence intervals around these differences are wide, spanning 
0 and including values in the opposite direction. 
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Table 6 shows that subjects who saw a negative film reported slightly more 
frequent avoidance symptoms than subjects who saw a control film—movements 
of 1% for “warning” subjects, and 9% for “no warning” subjects. But, once again, 
the confidence intervals around these estimates are wide. 
Put in NHST terms, there was no significant interaction between presence of 
warning and negativity of material on subjects’ reported frequency of avoidance, 
F(1, 104) = 1.01, p = .32; nor was there a significant main effect of warning, F(1, 
104) = 0.29, p = .59; nor was there a significant main effect of film negativity, 
F(1, 104) = 1.27, p = .26. 
Looking across all our measures in this experiment tells a fairly consistent 
story: More negative materials mostly produced greater rates of symptoms of 
distress whereas trigger warnings had little effect on those rates, but the 
confidence intervals around many of those effect sizes were very wide. The wide 
confidence intervals suggest that we estimated the effects of both trigger warnings 
and negativity of material with very low precision, meaning we cannot be sure of 
their true sizes. What is more, many of the confidence intervals spanned positive 
values, zero, and negative values, meaning we cannot even be sure of the direction 
of those effects.  
A key reason for this lack of precision is our low sample size. Although we 
collected as many subjects as we could, an administrative problem with the 
allocation of student subject pool hours that semester meant that we were able to 
recruit relatively few subjects. We therefore replicated this experiment, but 
collected data from a larger sample to increase the precision of our estimates. 
Experiment 2b 
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The purpose of this experiment was to replicate Experiment 2a. It therefore 
followed the same method as Experiment 2a, apart from the changes as noted 
below. 
Method. 
Subjects. We used MTurk to collect data from 395 subjects, who received 
USD0.25 for completing the study online. As for Experiment 1b, we aimed to 
recruit enough subjects that we could exclude up to 30% of our sample yet still 
have 70 subjects in each of the four conditions—a number in line with the result 
from ESCI software’s precision for planning feature, as described above 
(Cumming, 2012). We retained data from 279 subjects for analysis (our exclusion 
criteria are detailed below). Of those subjects, 56% were female and 44% male; 
their ages ranged from 19-76, Median = 33, M = 37.14, 95% CI [35.60, 38.68]; 
94% of them reported that they were citizens of the US; and 97% of them reported 
that English was their first language. 
Procedure. Prior to running this experiment, we collected norming data 
about the same film clips from a MTurk sample, in order to decide whether we 
would use the same clips as in Experiment 2a. Indeed, we did. 
Norming of film clips. We showed 150 MTurk members one of 10 film clips, 
obtaining a total of 15 complete responses per clip. These subjects completed the 
same measures as the student norming sample. But these subjects also got several 
attention checks during the survey, and at the end answered several other 
questions about their compliance with instructions and the conditions under which 
they completed the study. We excluded and replaced data from MTurk subjects 
who failed our attention checks, reported that they did not carefully watch the 
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entire film clip, that they paused or replayed the clip, or that they had technical 
issues playing it. As before, in examining these norming data to choose our clips, 
we primarily focused on change in the degree of negative affect that subjects 
reported; how negative, unpleasant, disturbing, and disgusting they rated the clips 
as being; how transporting and comprehensible they rated the clips as being; and 
if they had previously seen the clips. Based on these data, we again chose the 
“Pram” and “Blind Eye” clips. 
The results of this norming of the “Pram” clips showed that subjects rated 
the negative version as very negative on the four related items: Mnegative = 6.40, 
95% CI [6.05, 6.75]; Munpleasant = 6.40, 95% CI [5.99, 6.81]; Mdistressing = 6.40, 95% 
CI [5.94, 6.86]; Mdisgusting = 4.73, 95% CI [3.72, 5.75]; whereas they rated the 
control version lower on those items: Mnegative = 3.73, 95% CI [2.97, 4.50], Mdiff = 
2.67, 95% CIdiff [1.86, 3.47]; Munpleasant = 3.80, 95% CI [2.86, 4.74], Mdiff = 2.60, 
95% CIdiff [1.62, 3.58]; Mdistressing = 4.87, 95% CI [4.01, 5.73], Mdiff = 1.53, 95% 
CIdiff [0.60, 2.46]; Mdisgusting = 2.27, 95% CI [1.53, 3.01], Mdiff = 2.47, 95% CIdiff 
[1.27, 3.66]. Similarly, subjects’ degree of current negative affect increased from 
before to after watching the negative version: Mdiff = 7.87, 95% CIdiff [4.02, 
11.71]. This increase is bigger than that we observed in the norming of the 
negative stories but, considering the maximum possible change score is 40, it is 
still only a relatively modest change. Nevertheless, subjects’ degree of current 
negative affect was only trivially different before versus after watching the control 
version: Mdiff = 2.07, 95% CIdiff [-1.13, 5.26]. Further, subjects rated both the 
negative and control versions as moderately transporting, considering the possible 
range of sum scores was 9-63 (Mnegative = 46.87, 95% CI [42.97, 50.76], Mcontrol = 
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40.73, 95% CI [37.01, 44.46]) and as highly comprehensible, considering the 
possible range of sum scores was 4-28 (Mnegative = 24.87, 95% CI [23.39, 26.34], 
Mcontrol = 17.67, 95% CI [13.96, 21.37]). Finally, no subject reported having 
previously seen either of the clips. 
The results of this norming of the “Blind Eye” clips showed that subjects 
who saw the negative version rated it as very negative: Mnegative = 6.80, 95% CI 
[6.49, 7.11]; Munpleasant = 6.33, 95% CI [5.79, 6.87]; Mdistressing = 5.80, 95% CI 
[5.04, 6.56]; Mdisgusting = 6.07, 95% CI [5.33, 6.81]; whereas those who saw the 
control version rated it as less so: Mnegative = 1.87, 95% CI [1.24, 2.49], Mdiff = 
4.93, 95% CIdiff [4.27, 5.60]; Munpleasant = 2.33, 95% CI [1.50, 3.16], Mdiff = 4.00, 
95% CIdiff [3.06, 4.94]; Mdistressing = 2.20, 95% CI [1.44, 2.96], Mdiff = 3.60, 95% 
CIdiff [2.57, 4.63]; Mdisgusting = 1.73, 95% CI [1.06, 2.41], Mdiff = 4.33, 95% CIdiff 
[3.38, 5.29]. Similarly, subjects’ degree of current negative affect increased from 
before to after watching the negative version, Mdiff = 5.60, 95% CIdiff [1.90, 9.30], 
but was only trivially different before versus after watching the control version: 
Mdiff = 1.40, 95% CIdiff [-0.83, 3.63]. Further, subjects rated both versions as 
moderately transporting (Mnegative = 41.60, 95% CI [36.00, 47.20], Mcontrol = 36.73, 
95% CI [31.27, 42.20]), and highly comprehensible (Mnegative = 24.87, 95% CI 
[22.68, 27.05], Mcontrol = 20.53, 95% CI [16.93, 24.14]). Finally, no subject 
reported having previously seen either of the clips. 
Therefore, subjects in Experiment 2b watched one of these four clips. 
Afterward, they spent approximately 3 minutes reading the non-fiction article and 
noting intrusions related to the film clip they had seen (M = 187.70 s, 95% CI 
[173.44, 201.95], Median = 157.19 s). 
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The changes we made from Experiment 2a for this experiment were all to 
do with adapting it for administration to a remote sample (and are therefore very 
similar to the changes that happened from Experiment 1a to Experiment 1b). 
Before the experiment proper, we gave subjects instructions intended to ensure the 
quality of their data. During the experiment, we incorporated several attention 
checks to encourage subjects to pay close attention (although we paid subjects 
who reached the end of the experiment regardless). Finally, after the experiment, 
we included additional questions to check subjects’ compliance with our 
instructions; to encourage honesty we told subjects we would pay them no matter 
how they responded to these questions. Appendix C details the complete wording 
of the instructions, attention checks, and compliance checks we used for samples 
recruited from MTurk. 
Results & Discussion. 
Exclusions. We excluded subjects who had not correctly completed one or 
more critical tasks (no subject reported having previously seen the film clip). 
Specifically, we excluded subjects if they stayed on the film clip survey page for a 
shorter duration than the length of the clip they were assigned to watch, or if they 
reported they did not watch the entire clip, looked away from the clip, paused the 
clip, or replayed the clip, or if they reported not reading the entire article, or they 
reported pressing the wrong key to note their intrusions. Altogether, we excluded 
116 subjects (29%), leaving us with a distribution of subjects across conditions as 
follows: nWarningNegative = 70, nNoWarningNegative = 72, nWarningControl = 64, nNoWarningControl 
= 73. 
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Manipulation check. At the end of the experiment, 93% of “warning” 
subjects reported they remembered seeing the trigger warning, suggesting subjects 
in the warning conditions took note of our manipulation. 
Ratings of material. How much did trigger warnings affect how negative 
subjects judged the material was? To address this question, as for Experiment 2a, 
we calculated subjects’ mean rating of how negative the film clip was, classified 
by which conditions they were in, and display those means in Table 4 (these same 
results for the other ratings can be found in Appendix D, Table S1). As before, we 
then calculated the mean differences between conditions, and display those results 
in Tables 5 and 6.  
As Table 5 shows, “warning” subjects gave only slightly lower ratings of 
negativity than their “no warning” counterparts, regardless of which film 
condition they were in—a movement of 3% for the “negative film” subjects, and 
4% for the “control film” subjects. The confidence intervals around those 
differences are narrower than in Experiment 2a, yet the ranges of values they span 
still include 0 and values in the opposite direction, indicating that trigger warnings 
had little effect on how negative subjects thought the films were.  
As Table 6 shows, although trigger warnings had little effect, subjects who 
saw a negative film rated it as much more negative than subjects who saw a 
control film rated it—movements of 61% for “warning” subjects, and 60% for “no 
warning” subjects. 
Put in NHST terms, there was no significant interaction between presence of 
warning and negativity of material on ratings of negativity, F(1, 275) = 0.07, p = .
79; and there was no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 275) = 1.32, p = .25; 
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but there was a significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 275) = 433.57, p < .
001, whereby subjects who saw a negative film clip rated it as more negative than 
those who saw a control clip. 
Negative affect. How much did trigger warnings affect how negative 
subjects felt? As for Experiment 2a, having established that baseline negative 
affect was similar across conditions (it was; see Table 3), we calculated subjects’ 
mean ratings of negative affect after watching a film clip, classified by which 
conditions they were in, and then calculated the mean differences between 
conditions, and display those results in Tables 4, 5, and 6.  
As Table 5 shows, “warning” subjects felt similarly negative as their “no 
warning” counterparts, slightly less after watching a negative film clip—a 3% 
movement—and very slightly more after watching a control film clip—a 
movement of less than 1%. The confidence intervals around these effects are 
narrower than in Experiment 2a, but they both still span 0, and include values in 
the opposite direction. These results suggest trigger warnings had little effect on 
how negative subjects felt, regardless of the negativity of the film they watched.  
But, as Table 6 shows, our film materials had the expected effect: “negative” 
subjects reported feeling more negative affect after watching the film clip than did 
“control” subjects—movements of 18% for “warning” subjects, and 21% for “no 
warning” subjects. 
We also conducted a 2(warning, no warning) x 2(negative film, control film) 
x 2(baseline rating, rating after) mixed ANOVA on subjects’ negative affect. This 
NHST analysis yielded no significant interaction between warning, film 
negativity, and time, F(1, 275) = 0.21, p = .65, or between warning and film 
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negativity, F(1, 275) = 0.46, p = .50, or between warning and time, F(1, 275) = 
0.23, p = .63. But there was a significant interaction between film negativity and 
time, F(1, 275) = 88.39, p < .001, whereby subjects who saw a negative film 
reported a greater increase in negative affect over time than did subjects who 
watched a control film. There were also significant main effects of time, F(1, 275) 
= 170.51, p < .001, such that subjects overall felt worse after watching a film; and 
of film negativity, F(1, 275) = 40.87, p < .001, such that subjects who saw a 
negative film clip overall felt worse. But there was no significant main effect of 
warning, F(1, 275) = 1.18, p = .28. 
Intrusions. How much did trigger warnings affect the degree of intrusions 
people experienced? As for Experiment 2a, we examined three measures to 
answer this question. For each one in turn, we calculated subjects’ mean scores, 
classified by which conditions they were in, and display those in Table 4, as well 
as the mean differences between conditions, and we display those results in Tables 
5 and 6.  
First, we considered subjects’ tally of intrusions they reported while reading 
the article (maximum tally = 156, before we Winsorised them); subjects reported 
high adherence to noting intrusions, M = 8.61, 95% CI [8.40, 8.83], indicating 
they took this task seriously. As Table 5 shows, “warning” subjects reported 
slightly fewer intrusions than their “no warning” counterparts after watching a 
negative film clip—a difference of approximately half a thought—and slightly 
more after watching a control film clip—a difference of approximately a fifth of a 
thought. Second, we considered subjects’ ratings of their intrusions symptom 
frequency. Looking again at Table 5, we see that “warning” subjects reported 
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slightly less frequent intrusions than their “no warning” counterparts, after 
watching a negative film clip—a 9% movement—and after watching a control 
film clip—a 3% movement. Third, we considered subjects’ performance on the 
comprehension questions about the article. As Table 5 shows, “warning” subjects 
performed similarly to their “no warning” counterparts, after watching a negative 
film clip—a movement of less than 1%—and after watching a control film clip—a 
4% movement. Looking at Table 5 also reveals that, for each of these measures, 
the confidence intervals around the estimated effects of trigger warnings are 
narrower than in Experiment 2a. Nevertheless, they all still span a range of 
plausible values that includes 0 and values in the opposite direction. Together, 
then, these measures suggest trigger warnings did not affect subjects’ intrusion 
symptoms in a meaningful way. 
Turning now to Table 6, we can see that the negativity of the film subjects 
saw had bigger effects on these three measures, and the confidence intervals 
around these effects are narrower than in Experiment 2a. More specifically, 
“negative” subjects reported a greater number of intrusions than did “control” 
subjects—approximately two more thoughts for “warning” subjects, and 
approximately two and two-thirds of a thought more for “no warning” subjects. 
Similarly, “negative” subjects reported their intrusions were more frequent than 
“control” subjects—movements of 16% for “warning” subjects, and 22% for “no 
warning” subjects. “Negative” subjects performed similarly to “control” subjects 
on the comprehension test, however—movements of 3% for “warning” subjects, 
and 7% for “no warning” subjects. These results suggest that, for the most part, 
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changing the negativity of the film subjects saw had the expected effect on their 
rates of intrusions. 
Likewise, NHST analyses of these measures revealed that, with regard to 
effects on the number of intrusions subjects reported, there was no significant 
interaction between presence of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 275) = 
0.22, p = .64; and there was no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 275) = 
0.05, p = .83; but there was a significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 275) 
= 11.36, p < .01, such that subjects who saw a negative film clip reported a greater 
number of intrusions than those who saw a control one. For subjects’ ratings of 
the frequency of intrusions, there was no significant interaction between presence 
of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 275) = 0.78, p = .38; and there was no 
significant main effect of warning, F(1, 275) = 3.79, p = .05; but there was a 
significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 275) = 34.38, p < .001, such that 
subjects who saw a negative film clip reported more frequent intrusions than those 
who saw a control one. Finally, for subjects’ performance on the comprehension 
questions about the article, there was no significant interaction between presence 
of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 275) = 0.30, p = .58; there was no 
significant main effect of warning, F(1, 275) = 0.40, p = .53; and there was no 
significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 275) = 1.84, p = .18. 
Avoidance. How much did trigger warnings affect how much avoidance 
people experienced? Once again, to address this question, we calculated subjects’ 
mean frequency of avoidance symptoms after watching a film clip, classified by 
which conditions they were in, and display those in Table 4, as well as the mean 
differences between conditions, which we display in Tables 5 and 6. 
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As Table 5 shows, “warning” subjects reported only slightly lower levels of 
avoidance than their “no warning” counterparts, after either type of film clip—a 
4% movement after a negative clip, and a 3% movement after a control clip. 
Further, the confidence intervals around these effects were narrower than in 
Experiment 2a, yet still span 0 and values in the opposite direction, indicating that 
trigger warnings had no meaningful effect on how much avoidance subjects 
experienced. 
Table 6 shows that, as expected, subjects who saw a negative film reported 
more frequent avoidance symptoms than did subjects who saw a control film—
movements of 10% for “warning” subjects, and 11% for “no warning” subjects. 
In line with those results, NHST analyses revealed no significant interaction 
between presence of warning and negativity of material on subjects’ reported 
frequency of avoidance, F(1, 275) = 0.03, p = .86; and no significant main effect 
of warning, F(1, 275) = 1.53, p = .22; but there was a significant main effect of 
film negativity, F(1, 275) = 13.94, p < .01, such that subjects who saw a negative 
film clip reported more avoidance than those who saw a control clip. 
Taken together, the results of this experiment lead to the conclusion that 
although we were successful in choosing negative films that generally elicited 
more distress than the control films, our more specific trigger warnings had very 
little effect on subjects’ distress in either case. As intended, the confidence 
intervals around the estimated effect sizes of trigger warnings and film negativity 
were narrower than in Experiment 2a, meaning we were estimating the size of 
these effects with greater precision in this experiment. But even with this 
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increased precision, the intervals spanning the plausible effect sizes of trigger 
warnings all still included zero.  
One interpretation of these findings is that trigger warnings are ineffective. 
But counterexplanations for why trigger warnings had little—if any—effect 
remain. One such possibility is that people in our experiments simply did not 
notice our trigger warnings. But we have evidence that that supposition is not true: 
At the end of each experiment, the vast majority of subjects in the “warning” 
conditions reported that they remember seeing a trigger warning prior to the story 
or film.  
Perhaps, then, the issue is that although subjects see the trigger warning, this 
warning does not change their expectations about what the material to follow will 
be like. As a result, there are no expectancy-produced changes in the rates of 
symptoms that “warning” subjects experience for us to detect. Relatedly, if people 
see the trigger warning, but it does not lead them to believe that the material to 
follow (in our case, a story or a film clip) will be negative to the point of being 
distressing, then they may decide not to expend the effort to proactively adopt 
strategies to reduce their negative emotions. Alternatively, they may not be 
concerned enough to become overly attentive to the negative aspects of the 
material. Either way, such trigger warnings would yield little effect.  
Our next experiment addressed this possibility by asking subjects to rate 
what they thought the material to follow would be like, before they had actually 
been exposed to it—but after those in the “warning” condition had seen the trigger 
warning. If our trigger warnings do not change what subjects think the films will 
be like, then these pre-exposure ratings should be similar for “warning” and “no 
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warning” subjects. But if the warnings change subjects’ expectations, then 
“warning” subjects should expect that the film they will see will be more negative, 
distressing, and so on than “no warning” subjects. 
Experiment 3 
Method. 
Subjects. We used MTurk to recruit 460 subjects, who received USD0.25 
for completing the study. As for Experiment 2b, we aimed to collect data from 
enough subjects that we could exclude up to 30% of our sample for failing our 
compliance checks and still have 70 subjects in each of the four cells. We retained 
data from 317 subjects for analysis (our exclusion criteria are noted below). Of 
those subjects, 62% were female and 38% male; their ages ranged from 18-72, 
Median = 33, M = 36.25, 95% CI [34.92, 37.59]; 93% of them reported that they 
were citizens of the US; and 98% of them reported that English was their first 
language. 
Procedure. The design and procedure of this experiment were identical to 
that of Experiment 2b, except for the following addition: After all subjects had 
been told they were about to watch a film clip, and “warning” subjects had seen a 
trigger warning—but prior to any of them actually watching their assigned film 
clip—all subjects rated what they thought that film clip was going to be like. 
Specifically, they rated how negative, positive, surprising, interesting, unpleasant, 
distressing, and disgusting they expected it to be, from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely). In this experiment, subjects afterward spent approximately 3 minutes 
reading the non-fiction article and noting intrusions related to the film clip they 
had seen, M = 165.40 s, 95% CI [151.98, 178.82], Median = 142.22 s. 
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Results & Discussion. 
Exclusions. We excluded subjects who reported having previously seen the 
film clip (n = 4), or who had not correctly completed one or more critical tasks—
using the same criteria as in Experiment 2b. Altogether, we excluded 143 subjects 
(31%), leaving us with a distribution of subjects as follows: nWarningNegative = 94, 
nNoWarningNegative = 74, nWarningControl = 73, nNoWarningControl = 76). 
Manipulation checks. At the end of this experiment, 90% of “warning” 
subjects reported they remembered seeing the trigger warning, suggesting subjects 
in the “warning” condition took note of our manipulation. 
Moreover, recall that in this experiment, subjects twice rated the negativity 
of the film clip they saw—the first time they made this rating was prior to seeing a 
clip, but after some of them had seen a trigger warning about that clip. To what 
extent did a trigger warning change subjects’ expectations about the negativity of 
the material to follow? To answer this question, we calculated subjects’ pre-
exposure mean rating of negativity, classified by if they had just read a trigger 
warning (but collapsing across the film negativity conditions, because that 
manipulation had yet to be introduced). We found that, initially, “warning” 
subjects thought the film would be far more negative than did their “no warning” 
counterparts: MWarning = 5.63, 95% CI [5.45, 5.81], MNoWarning = 3.15, 95% CI 
[2.94, 3.36], 95% CIdiff [2.20, 2.75]—a 41% movement. We further found that, 
compared to their “no warning” counterparts, “warning” subjects thought the film 
would be more distressing, MWarning = 5.16, 95% CI [4.96, 5.37], MNoWarning = 2.66, 
95% CI [2.44, 2.88], 95% CIdiff [2.20, 2.81]; more disgusting, MWarning = 4.69, 
95% CI [4.47, 4.91], MNoWarning = 2.47, 95% CI [2.23, 2,72], 95% CIdiff [1.89, 
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2.54]; and more unpleasant, MWarning = 5.38, 95% CI [5.16, 5.59], MNoWarning = 
2.96, 95% CI [2.74, 3.18], 95% CIdiff [2.11, 2.73]—movements on these scales of 
42%, 37%, and 40%, respectively (descriptive statistics for the other pre-exposure 
ratings can be found in Appendix D, in Table S1).  
Critically, these findings suggest that not only did subjects in the warning 
conditions notice the presence of the trigger warning, the content of that warning 
altered what they thought the film to follow would be like. In other words, trigger 
warnings—as intended—negatively affected subjects’ expectations about the 
material they preceded. 
Ratings of material. Subjects rated the negativity of the film they saw a 
second time, too, after they had seen it. As for previous experiments, we 
calculated subjects’ mean post-exposure rating of how negative they thought the 
film clip they saw was, classified by which conditions they were in, and display 
those results in Table 4 (those same results for the rest of the ratings appear in 
Appendix D, in Table S1). We then calculated the mean differences between 
conditions, and display those in Tables 5 and 6.  
As Table 5 shows, once again “warning” subjects gave just slightly less 
negative ratings than their “no warning” counterparts—movements of 5% for the 
“negative film” subjects, and 11% for the “control film” subjects. The confidence 
intervals around those differences include a range of small values as plausible, 
although for “control” subjects only, the interval does not span 0—a result counter 
to what we would have expected, but which requires replication. Further, as Table 
6 shows, we again found that subjects who saw a negative film judged it to be 
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much more negative than subjects who saw a control film judged it—movements 
of 70% for “warning” subjects, and 65% for “no warning” subjects.  
NHST analyses on subjects’ ratings of negativity yielded no significant 
interaction between presence of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 313) = 
1.09, p = .30. But there was a significant main effect of warning, F(1, 313) = 9.28, 
p < .01, such that subjects who saw a trigger warning rated the film clip they saw 
as less negative than did those who saw no warning; and there was also a 
significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 313) = 655.78, p < .001, such that 
subjects who saw a negative film clip rated it as more negative than those who 
saw a control clip. 
Negative affect. As for previous experiments, we first established that 
baseline negative affect was similar across conditions (it was; see Table 3), and 
then calculated subjects’ mean rating of negative affect felt after watching a film 
clip, classified by which conditions they were in, and the mean differences 
between conditions, and display those results in Tables 4, 5, and 6. As Table 5 
shows, no matter which type of film clip they saw, “warning” subjects felt only 
very slightly less negative than their “no warning” counterparts—movements of 
2% for “negative” subjects, and 1% for “control” subjects. Moreover, the 
confidence intervals around those differences span 0 and include values in the 
opposite direction. Once again, these results suggest trigger warnings had little 
effect on how negative subjects felt. Further, “negative” subjects reported feeling 
more negative affect after watching the film clip than “control” subjects—
movements of 15% for “warning” subjects, and 16% for “no warning” subjects—
replicating previous experiments. 
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We also conducted a 2(warning, no warning) x 2(negative film, control film) 
x 2(baseline rating, rating after) mixed ANOVA on subjects’ negative affect. This 
NHST analysis yielded no significant interaction between warning, film 
negativity, and time, F(1, 313) = 1.31, p = .25, or between warning and film 
negativity, F(1, 313) = 0.25, p = .62, or between warning and time, F(1, 313) = 
0.21, p = .65. But there was a significant interaction between film negativity and 
time, F(1, 313) = 52.63, p < .001, whereby subjects who saw a negative film 
reported a greater increase in negative affect over time than did subjects who 
watched a control film. There were also significant main effects of time, F(1, 313) 
= 120.50, p < .001, such that subjects overall felt worse after watching a film; and 
of film negativity, F(1, 313) = 26.38, p < .001, such that subjects who saw a 
negative film clip overall felt worse. But there was no significant main effect of 
warning, F(1, 313) = 0.62, p = .43. 
Intrusions. As for previous experiments, we calculated subjects’ mean 
number of intrusions after watching a film clip (maximum tally = 83, before we 
Winsorised them; subjects reported high adherence to noting intrusions, M = 8.53, 
95% CI [8.32, 8.75], indicating they took this task seriously), subjects’ mean 
frequency of intrusion symptoms, and subjects’ mean performance on the 
comprehension questions about the article they read, each classified by which 
conditions subjects were in, and then calculated the mean differences between 
conditions, and display those results in Tables 4, 5, and 6. As the tables show, 
“warning” subjects reported slightly more intrusions than their “no warning” 
counterparts after watching a negative film clip—a difference of one and three-
quarters of a thought—and slightly fewer after watching a control film clip—a 
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difference just shy of one thought; “warning” subjects reported slightly less 
frequent intrusions than their “no warning” counterparts, regardless of which type 
of film they saw—a 6% movement for “negative” subjects and a 5% movement 
for “control” subjects; and “warning” subjects performed similarly to their “no 
warning” counterparts on the comprehension questions, regardless of film type—a 
3% movement for “negative” subjects, and a 1% movement for “control” subjects. 
Moreover, the confidence interval around each of these differences spans 0 and 
includes values in the opposite direction. Together, then, these measures suggest 
trigger warnings had little effect on subjects’ intrusions.  
By contrast, changing the negativity of the film had the expected effect on 
rates of intrusions: “Negative” subjects reported more intrusions than did 
“control” subjects—approximately two and three-quarters of a thought more for 
“warning” subjects, and approximately an eighth of a thought more for “no 
warning” subjects; “negative” subjects rated their intrusions as more frequent than 
did “control” subjects—movements of 14% for “warning” subjects, and 15% for 
“no warning” subjects; and “negative” subjects had slightly worse comprehension 
than “control” subjects—movements of 1% for “warning” subjects, and 4% for 
“no warning” subjects. 
NHST analyses likewise revealed that, with regard to effects on the number 
of intrusions subjects reported, there was no significant interaction between 
presence of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 313) = 3.63, p = .06; and 
there was no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 313) = 0.35, p = .55; but 
there was a significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 313) = 4.41, p = .04, 
such that subjects who saw a negative film clip reported a greater number of 
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intrusions than those who saw a control clip. For subjects’ ratings of the frequency 
of intrusions, there was no significant interaction between presence of warning 
and negativity of material, F(1, 313) = 0.01, p = .92; there was no significant main 
effect of warning, F(1, 313) = 3.12, p = .08; but there was a significant main 
effect of film negativity, F(1, 313) = 20.93, p < .01, such that subjects who saw a 
negative film clip reported more frequent intrusions than those who saw a control 
clip. Finally, for subjects’ performance on the comprehension questions about the 
article, there was no significant interaction between presence of warning and 
negativity of material, F(1, 313) = 0.33, p = .57; there was no significant main 
effect of warning, F(1, 313) = 0.13, p = .72; and no significant main effect of film 
negativity, F(1, 313) = 0.71, p = .40. 
Avoidance. As for previous experiments, we calculated subjects’ rated mean 
frequency of avoidance symptoms after watching a film clip, classified by which 
conditions they were in, and the mean differences between conditions, and display 
those results in Tables 4, 5, and 6. As the tables show, “warning” subjects reported 
only slightly less avoidance than their “no warning” counterparts after either type 
of film—a 5% movement for “negative” subjects, and a 1% movement for 
“control” subjects. Moreover, the confidence intervals around those differences 
span 0 and include values in the opposite direction as plausible. This result 
suggests trigger warnings had little effect on the degree to which subjects 
experienced avoidance symptoms. But “negative” subjects reported more frequent 
avoidance symptoms than did “control” subjects—movements of 7% for 
“warning” subjects, and 11% for “no warning” subjects, indicating negativity of 
the material affected avoidance as expected. 
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Further, NHST analyses on subjects’ reported frequency of avoidance 
yielded no significant interaction between presence of warning and negativity of 
material, F(1, 313) = 0.40, p = .53; and no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 
313) = 1.31, p = .25. But there was a significant main effect of film negativity, 
F(1, 313) = 10.96, p < .01, such that subjects who saw a negative film clip 
reported a higher frequency of avoidance than those who saw a control clip. 
The results of this experiment once again suggest the conclusion that trigger 
warnings had very little effect on the frequency of subjects’ negative symptoms, 
even though more negative materials increased the rates of those symptoms. What 
is more, this experiment provides evidence against the counterexplanation that our 
trigger warnings have little effect because they do not change people’s 
expectations about the material they precede. In this experiment, subjects 
anticipated that the film clip would be much worse if they had just seen a trigger 
warning about it, compared to if they had not. Considered as a whole, our findings 
converge on the idea that trigger warnings are unhelpful. 
But there is another counterexplanation for our findings. Trigger warnings—
at least, in their narrower conception—are intended to stave off symptoms elicited 
by negative material in people who have experienced a trauma, and should be 
particularly relevant when that material reminds people of their past trauma. But 
we have not examined the effects of trigger warnings using subjects with a known 
history of trauma, and we have not considered the effect of overlap between the 
content of the warned-about material and the potentially-traumatic previous 
experiences that our subjects have had.  
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Therefore, perhaps trigger warnings would have clearer, larger effects 
(helpful or harmful) in people who have had a traumatic experience, and 
especially in those for whom our negative materials are similar to a previous 
traumatic experience they have had. Based on previous epidemiological research 
we would expect that most of our subjects—like most of the general population—
have experienced an event that could be considered traumatic (Breslau et al., 
1998). We conducted Experiment 4 to collect evidence for that supposition, and to 
explore the effects of trigger warnings on people who have experienced a 
traumatic event similar to the one in the film clip they see. 
Experiment 4 
Method. 
Subjects. We used MTurk to recruit 438 subjects, who received USD0.25 
for completing the study. As for Experiments 2b and 3, we aimed to collect data 
from enough subjects that we could exclude up to 30% of our sample for failing 
our compliance checks and still have 70 subjects in each of the four conditions. 
We retained data from 306 subjects for analysis (our exclusion criteria are noted 
below). Of those subjects, 63% were female and 37% male; their ages ranged 
from 18-78, Median = 32, M = 35.64, 95% CI [34.24, 37.04]; 96% of them 
reported that they were citizens of the US; and 98% of them reported that English 
was their first language. 
Procedure. The design and procedure of this experiment was identical to 
that of Experiment 2b, except for the addition of one scale, described below. In 
this experiment, subjects spent approximately 3 minutes reading the non-fiction 
article and noting intrusions related to the film clip they had seen, M = 169.13 s, 
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95% CI [156.15, 182.11], Median = 151.23 s. Then, after subjects had made the 
ratings about the film clip they had seen, they all completed the Trauma History 
Screen (THS; Carlson et al., 2011).  
The THS is a two-part measure of prior traumatic experiences. In the first 
part of the measure, subjects see a list of objectively traumatic events (such as “a 
hurricane, flood, earthquake, tornado, or fire” and “attack with a gun, knife, or 
weapon”; events that would meet criterion A for diagnosis with PTSD, see Table 
1; APA, 2013) and for each they indicate if that sort of event has happened to 
them, and (if it has) how many times. We made two slight alterations to this list of 
events: One, we separated out the first item, regarding accidents, into two items—
the first asking specifically about car accidents (the content of one of our film clip 
pairs) and the second asking about boat, train, and airplane accidents. Two, we 
added a new item, “Domestic abuse – physical or psychological” (the content of 
the other of our film clip pairs). Subjects’ final task in the first part of the measure 
is to indicate if any of those events that have happened to them had “really 
bothered [them] emotionally.” If subjects answer “yes” to this question, they then 
see the second part of the measure. 
In the second part of the THS, subjects answer a series of questions about 
each of up to five of the events they listed in part one that had really bothered 
them emotionally. Specifically, for each such event, subjects are asked to specify 
which type of event it was (with reference to the initial list of events), give a brief 
description of the event, state their age at the time of the event, and indicate 
whether or not, in the course of the event, “anyone [got] hurt or killed,” if they 
were “afraid [they] or someone else might get hurt or killed,” if they felt “very 
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afraid, hopeless, or horrified,” and if they felt “unreal, spaced out, disorientated, 
or strange.” Subjects also indicate how long they were bothered by the event 
afterwards, on a scale with the four options: “not at all,” “1 week,” “2-3 weeks,” 
and “a month or more”; and how much it bothered them emotionally, on a scale 
with the five options: “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” “much,” and “very 
much.” 
There are several ways to examine subjects’ responses on the THS. One is to 
consider whether subjects have been exposed to objectively traumatic events, that 
is, events that really upset most people to whom they happen; these events are 
called high magnitude stressors (HMS), and this determination is made according 
to whether subjects indicated experiencing anything on the initial list of events. A 
second approach is to consider whether subjects have experienced a HMS that 
deeply upset them for a long time—that is, if they have experienced persisting 
posttraumatic distress (PPD) in response to at least one of these events. This 
determination is made according to whether subjects indicated having a HMS that 
really bothered them emotionally, much or very much, and for a month or more. 
The THS was designed to be quick to administer and easily understood—
features achieved by streamlining its structure and using straightforward language. 
In a variety of samples (including undergraduate students, and homeless veterans 
in rehabilitation), both the HMS and PPD scores had high test-retest reliability, 
with correlations ranging from .74-.93 for HMS and .73-.95 for PPD, across 
periods ranging from 1 week to 2 months. Both scores also had good convergent 
validity: HMS scores correlated highly with other measures of traumatic 
experiences, ranging from .73-.81, and both scores correlated at least moderately 
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with measures of PTSD symptoms, ranging from .22-.41 for HMS and .18-.38 for 
PPD. Further, those subjects who indicated at least one PPD event had higher 
rates of PTSD symptoms than those who indicated no PPD events (Carlson et al., 
2011). Taken together, these psychometric properties suggest this scale is suitable 
for use screening our subjects for prior exposure to objectively and subjectively 
distressing events. 
Results & Discussion. 
Exclusions. We excluded subjects who reported having previously seen the 
film clip (n = 9), or who had not correctly completed one or more critical tasks—
the same criteria as for Experiments 2b and 3. Altogether, we excluded 132 
subjects (30%), leaving us with a distribution of subjects as follows: nWarningNegative 
= 80, nNoWarningNegative = 77, nWarningControl = 71, nNoWarningControl = 78. 
Manipulation check. At the end of the experiment, 94% of “warning” 
subjects reported they remembered seeing the trigger warning, suggesting subjects 
in the warning condition took note of our manipulation. 
History of trauma. We first examined the proportion of subjects who 
reported having experienced at least one HMS event, and found that the vast 
majority—89%, 95% CI [85, 92]—had, as we expected. This finding suggests that 
most of our sample have a history of trauma, and that whatever effects of trigger 
warnings we find can therefore be generalised to other people with a history of 
trauma. Next, we checked the proportions of subjects who indicated they had 
experienced car accidents or domestic abuse (the topics of our film clip materials). 
We found that 132 (43%) had experienced a really bad car accident, and 112 
(37%) had experienced physical or psychological domestic abuse, suggesting our 
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film clip materials were about common traumatic experiences. Further, 47% of 
our sample, 95% CI [42, 53], had experienced PPD following at least one of the 
events they had reported.  
But considering both whether subjects had experienced PPD and which type 
of event they had experienced it in relation to, and then adding the fact of random 
assignment to film-topic counterbalance, ultimately only 34 subjects (11%) had 
experienced PPD due to an event that overlapped with the topic of the film clip 
they were assigned to see. This number of subjects is too small to be useful in 
making meaningful comparisons between conditions. We therefore conducted the 
rest of our analyses without consideration of these subgroups. 
Ratings of material. We calculated subjects’ mean rating for how negative 
the film clip was, classified by which conditions they were in, and the mean 
differences between conditions, and display those results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 
(and descriptive statistics for the other ratings in Appendix D, in Table S1). 
Echoing previous experiments, “warning” subjects gave just slightly less negative 
ratings than their “no warning” counterparts, no matter which type of film they 
saw—movements of 2% for the “negative film” subjects, and 4% for the “control 
film” subjects—and the confidence intervals around those differences include a 
range of small values as plausible effect sizes, including 0. But subjects who saw 
a negative film rated it as much more negative than subjects who saw a control 
film rated it—movements of 62% for “warning” subjects, and 60% for “no 
warning” subjects. 
NHST analyses on subjects’ ratings of negativity yielded no significant 
interaction between presence of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 302) = 
!111
0.10, p = .75; and no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 302) = 1.02, p = .31. 
But there was a significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 302) = 467.78, p < .
001, such that subjects who saw a negative film clip rated it as more negative than 
those who saw a control clip. 
Negative affect. We established that baseline negative affect was similar 
across conditions (it was; see Table 3), and then calculated subjects’ mean ratings 
of negative affect after watching a film clip, classified by which conditions they 
were in, and the mean differences between conditions, and display those results in 
Tables 4, 5, and 6. As in previous experiments, “warning” subjects felt similarly 
negative as their “no warning” counterparts. “Negative” subjects felt slightly less 
negative, having been warned—a 3% movement—whereas “control” subjects felt 
slightly more so—a 5% movement. But the confidence intervals around both 
those differences include a range of small values as plausible effect sizes, 
including 0. By contrast, “negative” subjects reported feeling more negative affect 
after watching their assigned film clip than “control” subjects felt after theirs—
movements of 15% for “warning” subjects, and 22% for “no warning” subjects. 
We also conducted a 2(warning, no warning) x 2(negative film, control film) 
x 2(baseline rating, rating after) mixed ANOVA on subjects’ ratings of negative 
affect. This NHST analysis yielded no significant interaction between warning, 
film negativity, and time, F(1, 302) = 1.58, p = .21, or between warning and film 
negativity, F(1, 302) = 1.74, p = .19, or between warning and time, F(1, 302) = 
0.42, p = .52. But there was a significant interaction between film negativity and 
time, F(1, 302) = 63.38, p < .001, whereby subjects who saw a negative film 
reported a greater increase in negative affect over time than did subjects who 
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watched a control film. There were also significant main effects of time, F(1, 302) 
= 130.64, p < .001, such that subjects overall felt worse after watching a film clip; 
and of film negativity, F(1, 302) = 36.93, p < .001, such that subjects who saw a 
negative film clip overall felt worse. But there was no significant main effect of 
warning, F(1, 302) = 0.07, p = .79. 
Intrusions. We calculated subjects’ mean number of intrusions after 
watching a film clip (maximum tally = 138, before we Winsorised them; again, 
subjects reported high adherence to this “noting intrusions” task, M = 8.51, 95% 
CI [8.27, 8.74]), subjects’ mean frequency of intrusion symptoms, and subjects’ 
mean performance on the comprehension questions about the article they read, 
each classified by which conditions subjects were in, and then calculated the mean 
differences between conditions—these results appear in Tables 4, 5, and 6. We 
found that “warning” subjects reported slightly fewer intrusions than their “no 
warning” counterparts, following either type of film (a difference of 
approximately two-thirds of a thought for “negative” subjects, and approximately 
one thought for “control” subjects), very similarly frequent intrusions (“negative” 
subjects slightly less—a 1% movement—and “control” subjects slightly more—a 
1% movement), and performed very similarly on the comprehension questions 
(“negative” subjects slightly worse—a 3% movement—and “control” subjects 
slightly better—a 4% movement). In each case, the confidence interval indicating 
the range of plausible effect sizes for trigger warnings spans 0 to include values in 
the opposite direction. But the effects of film negativity were larger: compared to 
“control” subjects, “negative” subjects reported more intrusions (a difference of 
approximately one and six-sevenths of a thought for “warning” subjects, and 
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approximately one and a half thoughts for “no warning” subjects), and rated their 
intrusions as more frequent (movements of 17% for “warning” subjects, and 18% 
for “no warning” subjects), although they had very similar comprehension 
(“warning” subjects slightly worse—a 4% movement—and “no warning” subjects 
slightly better—a 3% movement). 
NHST analyses of these measures likewise revealed that, with regard to 
effects on the number of intrusions subjects reported, there was no significant 
interaction between presence of warning and negativity of material, F(1, 302) = 
0.05, p = .82; and no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 302) = 1.36, p = .25; 
but there was a significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 302) = 6.10, p = .
01, such that subjects who saw a negative film clip reported a greater number of 
intrusions than those who saw a control clip. For subjects’ ratings of the frequency 
of intrusions, there was no significant interaction between presence of warning 
and negativity of material, F(1, 302) = 0.07, p = .79; and no significant main 
effect of warning, F(1, 302) < 0.01, p = .97; but there was a significant main 
effect of film negativity, F(1, 302) = 28.93, p < .001, such that subjects who saw a 
negative film clip reported more frequent intrusions than those who saw a control 
clip. Finally, for subjects’ performance on the comprehension questions about the 
article, there was no significant interaction between presence of warning and 
negativity of material, F(1, 302) = 1.02, p = .31; no significant main effect of 
warning, F(1, 302) = 0.03, p = .87; and no significant main effect of film 
negativity, F(1, 302) = 0.05, p = .82. 
Avoidance. We calculated subjects’ mean frequency of avoidance symptoms 
after watching a film clip, classified by which conditions they were in, and the 
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mean differences between conditions, and display those results in Tables 4, 5, and 
6. As before, “warning” subjects were very similarly avoidant as their “no 
warning” counterparts (“negative” subjects slightly less—a 1% movement—and 
“control” subjects slightly more—a 2% movement), and the confidence intervals 
around the range of plausible differences span 0, and values in the opposite 
direction. But “negative” subjects reported more frequent avoidance symptoms 
than “control” subjects (movements of 10% for “warning” subjects, and 13% for 
“no warning” subjects). 
NHST analysis of subjects’ reported frequency of avoidance yielded no 
significant interaction between presence of warning and negativity of material, 
F(1, 302) = 0.44, p = .51; and no significant main effect of warning, F(1, 302) = 
0.09, p = .77. But there was a significant main effect of film negativity, F(1, 302) 
= 21.10, p < .001, such that subjects who saw a negative film clip reported a 
higher frequency of avoidance than those who saw a control clip.  
Our findings in this experiment are in essence the same as those in our 
previous experiments, in that we found trigger warnings had no meaningful 
effects on subjects’ distress, even as more negative materials increased subjects’ 
distress. In this experiment, we also found that the majority of our sample had 
experienced an event with the potential to be extremely stressful, in line with 
previous research (Breslau et al., 1998; Carlson et al., 2011). Further, almost half 
of our sample had indeed experienced ongoing distress due to one such event. In 
other words, much of our sample had a history of trauma—yet, once again, we 
found little effect of trigger warnings. Taken together, these findings suggest 
trigger warnings are unlikely to be uniquely helpful for people who have a history 
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of trauma. Even so, based on this experiment, we cannot rule out that trigger 
warnings may have effects of a meaningful size in people for whom the warned-
about content is closely related to a previous experience of theirs, which caused 
them great distress. 
To more precisely estimate the direction and size of the effects trigger 
warnings have—that is, to get a clearer picture of what these warnings do, based 
on the data we do have—we next conducted a series of meta-analyses using the 
1394 subjects whose data we retained in each of our experiments.  
Meta-analyses of Key Measures 
Ratings of material. To more precisely estimate trigger warnings’ effect on 
how negative people judge the subsequent material to be, we used the data from 
all our experiments (except Experiment 1a, in which we did not ask subject to 
make these ratings) to conduct a random effects model mini meta-analysis in 
ESCI software (Cumming, 2012). As Figure 3 shows, “warning” subjects rated 
the materials just 0.15 less negatively than did “no warning” subjects (recall the 
maximum possible difference was 6, making this a 2.5% movement). Importantly, 
the 95% confidence interval around this estimated effect size, [-0.29, -0.01], is 
narrow—more so than in any of the individual experiments. This increased 
precision means the range of plausible values of the true effect size that this 
interval spans no longer quite includes 0, but still comes very close to it. 
Meaningful variance across effect size estimates was low, I2 = 0%, and the 
estimated standard deviation of the distribution of true effect sizes is small, T = 0, 
95% CI [0, 0.30], indicating little heterogeneity.  
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Figure 3. 
Forest plot of trigger warnings’ effect on rating of the material’s negativity. The 
width of the horizontal axis represents the maximum possible raw mean 
difference between subjects who did and subjects who did not get a trigger 
warning. The points plotted vertically represent the mean difference for each 
experiment, or for each type of material within each experiment. The vertical line 
indicates the point of no mean difference between “warning” and “no warning” 
subjects; points to its left indicate a lower mean score for “warning” subjects, 
whereas points to its right indicate a higher mean score for “warning” subjects. 
The black lines extending from each point show the 95% confidence interval 
around that mean difference. Larger points indicate samples given greater 
weighting in the meta-analysis. The diamond (labelled “MA”) represents the 
result of the meta-analysis; its centre represents the estimated raw mean effect size 




Forest plot of trigger warnings’ effect on negative affect felt after exposure to the 
material. The width of the horizontal axis represents the maximum possible raw 
mean difference between subjects who did and subjects who did not get a trigger 
warning. The points plotted vertically represent the mean difference for each 
experiment, or for each type of material within each experiment. The vertical line 
indicates the point of no mean difference between “warning” and “no warning” 
subjects; points to its left indicate a lower mean score for “warning” subjects, 
whereas points to its right indicate a higher mean score for “warning” subjects. 
The black lines extending from each point show the 95% confidence interval 
around that mean difference. Larger points indicate samples given greater 
weighting in the meta-analysis. The diamond (labelled “MA”) represents the 
result of the meta-analysis; its centre represents the estimated raw mean effect size 
of trigger warnings, and its width shows the 95% confidence interval around that 
estimate. 
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This reduction is very small in standardised terms, too: dunbiased = -0.14, 95% 
CI [-0.26, -0.03] (this effect size is also known as Hedge’s g, and is calculated by 
dividing the mean difference by the pooled standard deviation and then applying a 
bias correction, but, as recommended, the CI given is around the uncorrected 
effect; Cumming, 2012). In summary, the best estimate suggests that providing a 
trigger warning about material—written or visual, of greater or lesser negativity—
only very slightly decreased how negative subjects judged that material to be. 
Negative affect. To more precisely estimate the size of trigger warnings’ 
effect on how much negative affect people feel after exposure to the material, we 
conducted another mini meta-analysis, using data from all our experiments. As 
Figure 4 shows, “warning” subjects felt 0.25 more negative affect after exposure 
to the material than “no warning” subjects (the maximum possible difference was 
40, making this a less than 1% movement). Again, the 95% CI around this effect 
size is far narrower than those in any one experiment, but in spite of this increased 
precision it still includes 0 as a plausible value [-0.51, 1.00]; or, in standardised 
terms, dunbiased = 0.02, [-0.08, 0.13]. Further, heterogeneity was low; I2 = 0%, T = 
0, [0, 1.30]. This analysis leads us to the conclusion that seeing a trigger warning 
essentially had no effect on how negative subjects felt, following exposure to a 
variety of materials. 
Intrusions. To more precisely estimate the effects of trigger warnings on 
people’s intrusion symptoms, we conducted three more meta-analyses. As Figure 
5 shows, “warning” subjects reported 0.27 intrusions fewer than “no warning” 
subjects—a difference of approximately quarter of a thought—while reading the 
non-fiction article. What is more, the 95% CI around this difference is narrow, 
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Figure 5. 
Forest plot of trigger warnings’ effect on tally of intrusions. The width of the 
horizontal axis represents the maximum possible raw mean difference between 
subjects who did and subjects who did not get a trigger warning, given the 
maximum (after Winsorisation) number of intrusions reported by subjects. The 
points plotted vertically represent the mean difference for each experiment, or for 
each type of material within each experiment. The vertical line indicates the point 
of no mean difference between “warning” and “no warning” subjects; points to its 
left indicate a lower mean score for “warning” subjects, whereas points to its right 
indicate a higher mean score for “warning” subjects. The black lines extending 
from each point show the 95% confidence interval around that mean difference. 
Larger points indicate samples given greater weighting in the meta-analysis. The 
diamond (labelled “MA”) represents the result of the meta-analysis; its centre 
represents the estimated raw mean effect size of trigger warnings, and its width 
shows the 95% confidence interval around that estimate. 
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Figure 6. 
Forest plot of trigger warnings’ effect on rated frequency of intrusions. The width 
of the horizontal axis represents the maximum possible raw mean difference 
between subjects who did and subjects who did not get a trigger warning. The 
points plotted vertically represent the mean difference for each experiment, or for 
each type of material within each experiment. The vertical line indicates the point 
of no mean difference between “warning” and “no warning” subjects; points to its 
left indicate a lower mean score for “warning” subjects, whereas points to its right 
indicate a higher mean score for “warning” subjects. The black lines extending 
from each point show the 95% confidence interval around that mean difference. 
Larger points indicate samples given greater weighting in the meta-analysis. The 
diamond (labelled “MA”) represents the result of the meta-analysis; its centre 
represents the estimated raw mean effect size of trigger warnings, and its width 
shows the 95% confidence interval around that estimate. 
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Figure 7. 
Forest plot of trigger warnings’ effect on comprehension of the article. The width 
of the horizontal axis represents the maximum possible raw mean difference 
between subjects who did and subjects who did not get a trigger warning. The 
points plotted vertically represent the mean difference for each experiment, or for 
each type of material within each experiment. The vertical line indicates the point 
of no mean difference between “warning” and “no warning” subjects; points to its 
left indicate a lower mean score for “warning” subjects, whereas points to its right 
indicate a higher mean score for “warning” subjects. The black lines extending 
from each point show the 95% confidence interval around that mean difference. 
Larger points indicate samples given greater weighting in the meta-analysis. The 
diamond (labelled “MA”) represents the result of the meta-analysis; its centre 
represents the estimated raw mean effect size of trigger warnings, and its width 
shows the 95% confidence interval around that estimate. 
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[-0.88, 0.34], but it still includes 0 among the plausible sizes for the effect; and 
there was low heterogeneity, I2 = 0%, T = 0, [0, 1.09]. Figure 6 shows “warning” 
subjects rated their intrusions on the IES as 0.84 less frequent than did “no 
warning” subjects (the maximum possible difference was 25, making this a 3% 
movement). The 95% CI around this difference no longer quite includes 0 among 
the most plausible values for the effect, [-1.56, -0.11], but still spans a narrow 
range of small values. Again, heterogeneity was low, I2 = 0%, T = 0, [0, 1.14]. 
Figure 7 shows the proportion of comprehension questions “warning” subjects got 
correct was 0.03 greater than the proportion “no warning” subjects got correct (the 
maximum possible difference was 1, making this a 3% movement), the 95% CI 
around this difference is narrow yet still includes 0 as a plausible value, [-0.01, 
0.07], and although a moderate proportion of the variance between experiments 
was meaningful, I2 = 41.52%, its absolute magnitude is low, T = 0.04, [0, 0.08].  
What is more, each of these effects is very small in standardised terms, too: 
Intrusions tally, dunbiased = -0.04, [-0.14, 0.07]; IES intrusions, dunbiased = -0.12, 
[-0.23, -0.02]; and comprehension, dunbiased = 0.11, [-0.03, 0.25]. Put differently, 
although most subjects experienced intrusive thoughts related to the material they 
saw, the best estimates suggest that seeing a trigger warning beforehand only 
slightly decreased the degree to which they experienced these intrusions. 
Avoidance. To more precisely estimate the size of the effect of trigger 
warnings on people’s avoidance symptoms, we once again meta-analysed our 
data. As Figure 8 shows, “warning” subjects rated their avoidance on the IES as 
0.50 less frequent than “no warning” subjects (the maximum possible difference 
was 40, making this a 1% movement). The 95% CI around this difference is  
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Figure 8. 
Forest plot of trigger warnings’ effect on rated frequency of avoidance. The width 
of the horizontal axis represents the maximum possible raw mean difference 
between subjects who did and subjects who did not get a trigger warning. The 
points plotted vertically represent the mean difference for each experiment, or for 
each type of material within each experiment. The vertical line indicates the point 
of no mean difference between “warning” and “no warning” subjects; points to its 
left indicate a lower mean score for “warning” subjects, whereas points to its right 
indicate a higher mean score for “warning” subjects. The black lines extending 
from each point show the 95% confidence interval around that mean difference. 
Larger points indicate samples given greater weighting in the meta-analysis. The 
diamond (labelled “MA”) represents the result of the meta-analysis; its centre 
represents the estimated raw mean effect size of trigger warnings, and its width 
shows the 95% confidence interval around that estimate.  
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narrow, [-1.45, 0.45], indicating high precision. But this interval still includes 0 
among the plausible true values for the effect. Heterogeneity was low, I2 = 0%, T 
= 0, [0, 1.25]. This effect was also small in standardised terms: dunbiased = -0.05, 
[-0.16, 0.05]. That is, the best estimate suggests that seeing a trigger warning only 
slightly decreased subjects’ avoidance symptoms in relation to the various 
materials we used. 
Of course, one criticism of these meta-analyses is that including the control 
material conditions as we did could dilute the effect of warnings on more negative 
material—conditions under which trigger warnings would have greater 
opportunity to be helpful. Indeed, one reason we switched from using story 
negative materials to film materials was examine the effects of trigger warnings 
given about more versus less negative material. To address this issue, we therefore 
conducted these meta-analyses again, but used only data from subjects exposed to 
negative material. That is, we included data from all subjects in Experiments 1a 
and 1b, who all read a negative short story, but only data from subjects who saw a 
negative film clip in Experiments 2a, 2b, 3. and 4, resulting in a total N = 903. The 
outcomes of these meta-analyses were very similar to those reported above.  
Ratings of material. More specifically, the first in this additional round of 
meta-analyses revealed that “warning” subjects who had seen negative material 
rated that material as just 0.09 less negative than did “no warning” subjects who 
had also seen negative material, 95% CI [-0.25, 0.07]; there was little 
heterogeneity, I2 = 0%, T = 0, 95% CI [0, 0.35]; and the effect was small in 
standardised terms, too, dunbiased = -0.10, 95% CI [-0.25, 0.06].  
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Negative affect. Similarly, “warning” subjects who had seen negative 
material reported feeling just 0.10 more negative affect after exposure to that 
material than did “no warning” subjects who had also seen negative material, 95% 
CI [-0.96, 1.15]; there was little heterogeneity, I2 = 0%, T = 0, 95% CI [0, 2.02]; 
and the effect was small in standardised terms, too, dunbiased < 0.01, 95% CI [-0.13, 
0.13]. 
Intrusions. Further, “warning” subjects who had seen negative material 
reported 0.04 fewer intrusions than did “no warning” subjects who had also seen 
negative material, 95% CI [-0.85, 0.76]; there was little heterogeneity, I2 = 4.28%, 
T = 0.21, 95% CI [0, 1.81]. “Warning” subjects who had seen negative material 
also rated their intrusions as 1.11 less frequent on the IES than did “no warning” 
subjects who had seen negative material, 95% CI [-2.03, -0.20]; there was little 
heterogeneity, I2 = 0%, T = 0, 95% CI [0, 1.48]. The proportion of comprehension 
questions “warning” subjects who had seen negative material got correct was 0.03 
greater than the proportion “no warning” subjects who had seen negative material 
got correct, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.09]; there was a moderate proportion of meaningful 
heterogeneity, I2 = 56.46%, but its absolute magnitude was small, T = 0.05, 95% 
CI [0, 0.01]. Each of these effects was small in standardised terms, too: Intrusions 
tally, dunbiased < 0.01, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.14]; IES intrusions, dunbiased = -0.15, 95% 
CI [-0.28, -0.02]; comprehension, dunbiased = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.30].  
Avoidance. Finally, “warning” subjects who had seen negative material 
rated their avoidance as 0.72 less frequent on the IES than did “no warning” 
subjects who had also seen negative material, 95% CI [-1.88, 0.44]; there was 
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little heterogeneity, I2 = 0%, T = 0, 95% CI [0, 2.16]; and the effect was small in 
standardised terms, too, dunbiased = -0.08, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.05]. 
For each of these additional meta-analyses, the estimated effect of trigger 
warnings and the 95% CI around it are substantially similar to those yielded by 
the previous meta-analyses using all our data. The confidence interval around 
each of them spans a still-narrow range of small effect sizes, all but one of which 
includes zero as a plausible value for the size of the effect trigger warnings have. 
Taken together, these analyses show that the effects of trigger warnings that 
appear prior to negative material are of similarly trivial size as their effects when 
they have appeared prior to a mixture of more and less negative material.  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Chapter 3 
Summary of Findings 
Recall that our primary research question was: to what extent does a trigger 
warning affect the symptoms of distress people experience soon after exposure to 
“warned about” material? We conducted six experiments addressing this question. 
These experiments yielded effects of trigger warnings that were inconsistent in 
direction and, at best, small. Subjects who saw trigger warnings judged material to 
be similarly negative, felt similarly negative, experienced similarly frequent 
intrusive thoughts and avoidance, and comprehended subsequent material 
similarly well as their unwarned counterparts. 
In Experiments 1a and 1b, the material to which we exposed subjects was a 
negative story. Finding little effect of administering a trigger warnings prior to 
those materials, in Experiments 2a, 2b, 3, and 4, we instead turned to film clips. 
Subjects saw either a more negative, or a less negative film clip. Those 
experiments revealed that more negative materials led subjects to feel more 
negative, and experience higher rates of symptoms than did less negative 
materials. Yet trigger warnings continued to have little influence, regardless. 
In Experiment 3, we addressed the possibility that we had found little effect 
of trigger warnings because our warnings were not changing subjects’ 
expectations about the material to follow. We asked warned and unwarned 
subjects to rate what they thought the film clip would be like, before they had seen 
it. We found that subjects who had seen a trigger warning thought the film to 
follow would be more negative, suggesting the trigger warnings changed subjects’ 
expectations.  
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In Experiment 4, we addressed the possibility that the effects of trigger 
warnings would be greater among subjects who had experienced trauma—those 
for whom trigger warnings are often intended. We asked all subjects about highly 
stressful events they had previously experienced. We found that almost all of our 
subjects had experienced events with the potential to be highly distressing, and 
that a little less than half of our subjects had indeed experienced persistent distress 
following one (or more) of those events, suggesting that trigger warnings have 
little effect on populations in which a history of trauma is common.  
Finally, we conducted meta-analyses on data from each of our key measures 
across experiments. These analyses increased the precision with which we could 
estimate the true effect sizes of trigger warnings and allowed us to better answer 
our research question. They revealed that the answer to our research question is: 
trigger warnings have trivial effects.  
Interpretation of Effect Sizes 
As noted earlier, not all small effects inherently lack significance (Abelson, 
1985; Prentice & Miller, 1992; Rosenthal, 1990). But the confidence intervals 
around our meta-analytically estimated effect sizes are narrow, yet most of these 
intervals still include zero as a plausible true value of that effect size. Further, 
putting aside the confidence intervals and taking the meta-analytically estimated 
mean differences as our best estimate of these effects—which they are—we can 
see these, too, are small (Cumming, 2012). We can put “small” into context in a 
number of ways. 
For a start, the standardised mean differences we found in our meta-
analyses, looking at the effect of providing a trigger warning, ranged from 0.02 to 
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0.11 (in absolute terms). Each of these differences is much smaller than 0.41—
recall that this value is suggested as the minimum size an effect must be for 
interpretation as a practically meaningful difference in social science data 
(Ferguson, 2009). But of course, such cut-offs are merely recommendations; we 
must consider these effect sizes alongside other relevant reference points, too. 
As one such reference point, a Cochrane review found the standardised 
mean difference in self-reported symptoms between those who underwent therapy 
for PTSD and controls was -1.60, 95% CI [-2.02, -1.18] (Bisson et al., 2013). 
Although trigger warnings are supposed to reduce symptoms of distress to a 
practically helpful degree, they are not intended to substitute for a course of 
therapy, and so we might expect their effects to be somewhat smaller than that of 
therapy. In fact, the symptom reductions we observed are minuscule in 
comparison to the reductions achieved by therapy.  
As a second reference point, a recent paper meta-analytically examined 
evidence for the controversial claims about the benefits of “brain training” 
activities on underlying mental abilities, such as intelligence—that is, the extent to 
which these activities showed “far transfer” effects (Melby-Lervåg, Redick, & 
Hulme, 2016). These meta-analyses yielded effects on various measures of “far 
transfer,” reported as standardised mean differences, that ranged from 0.01 to 0.20
—notice that the biggest of these effects is larger than the largest meta-analytic 
effect of trigger warning we found. The authors concluded the effects of brain 
training were not sufficiently large to be considered practically meaningful.  
As a third reference point, a large review considered effect sizes resulting 
from over 300 previous meta-analyses, with the aim of examining a broad range 
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of treatment effects (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993). Together, these meta-analyses had 
examined the effects of a large variety of psychology-based interventions on a 
wide range of outcomes related to mental health, workplace performance, and 
educational success. The review revealed that, among a representative sample of 
methodologically strong meta-analyses of treatment effects, the mean 
standardised difference observed was 0.47. Further, 83% of those effect sizes were 
greater than 0.20. Thus, relative to this wide range of other effects—comparable 
in terms of manipulations and outcomes—the effects of trigger warnings here was 
undoubtedly very small. Therefore, each of these comparisons points to the same 
conclusion that, in practical terms, trigger warnings are neither helpful, nor are 
they harmful. 
Relationships with Previous Findings 
This conclusion fits with previous work showing that people are often 
unsuccessful at avoiding unwanted mental influences (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). 
In our case, trigger warnings did not help people reduce the effects of the negative 
materials to which we exposed them. This finding further fits with previous work 
showing that, although people can regulate their emotions to some degree, they 
are not always successful at doing so (Gross, 2015; Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). 
Given that trigger warnings did not help people reduce the negativity 
associated with the material we showed them, it makes sense that trigger warnings 
did not help reduce their other symptoms of distress, either. That result fits with 
previous work showing that the negativity of material (or an event) is linked to the 
degree of related intrusions people experience about it, because greater intensity 
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leads to more accessible memory (Hall & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Boals et al., 
2008; Rubin et al., 2011).  
Our secondary findings are also consistent with this previous work on the 
relationship between negativity and symptoms: We found that people who saw the 
more negative clips both reported feeling more negative, and experienced greater 
rates of symptoms than did people who saw the less negative, control clips (Hall 
& Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Boals et al., 2008; Rubin et al., 2011). Of course, these 
results do not provide direct evidence in line with this memory accessibility 
explanation, because in these latter experiments we did not test subjects’ memory 
for the two types of film clips. 
Our finding that trigger warnings had little effect on how negative subjects 
felt diverges from previous research on the effects of warnings administered prior 
to viewing excerpts of negative films (Cantor et al., 1984; de Wied et al., 1997). 
Two previous studies found that subjects who were forewarned that they would 
see graphic, negative footage afterward reported feeling more upset and distressed 
than subjects told nothing or that they would not see footage of that nature. There 
are multiple methodological differences between those experiments and ours that 
may be responsible for this discrepancy. For example, their clips were of much 
long duration than ours, meaning their subjects had a longer period over which to 
anticipate the warned-about, negative aspects of the material. Future work could 
attempt to address this issue; but another possible explanation is that the small 
effects they found, using small samples and complex designs, do not replicate. 
In addition, at first glance, our findings do not seem to fit with response 
expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985, 1997). We found that trigger warnings changed 
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how negative people expected the material to follow would be, yet we did not find 
that trigger warnings changed how negative people felt, or the frequency with 
which they experienced symptoms of distress afterwards. One possible 
explanation for this discord is that, although we changed people’s belief about 
what the material would be like, we did not change their expectancies about how 
they would respond to that material. Future research could examine this 
possibility by first developing trigger warnings that explicitly describe the 
symptoms that negative material usually elicits, and which alter people’s 
expectancies about their likelihood of experiencing those symptoms, and then 
testing the effects such warnings have on the rates of symptoms people report.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Of course, it is possible that trigger warnings do make a meaningful 
difference to people’s symptoms and related outcomes, but for a variety of reasons 
we failed to observe their effects. One obvious reason trigger warnings may have 
exerted little influence is that our subjects did not notice the warnings. But, as 
outlined in Chapter 2, we have evidence to suggest that supposition is not true: A 
large majority of subjects in the “warning” conditions across experiments said, at 
the end of the experiment, that they remembered earlier seeing the trigger warning 
(and informal inspection of their written explanations describing the warning they 
saw suggested that most subjects accurately recalled the gist of the warning). 
What is more, in Experiment 3 we found that subjects who saw a trigger warning 
expected the material to follow would be more negative—demonstrating that they 
did notice and take on board that warning. Together, these findings suggest we 
!133
cannot explain the consistently small differences between warning conditions as 
being due to subjects simply not noticing the trigger warning manipulation. 
Another counterexplanation for our finding that trigger warnings are 
unhelpful is that our materials were not sufficiently negative or symptom-evoking, 
meaning that there was little room for warnings to reduce how negative subjects 
felt or the frequency with which they experienced symptoms, and so the helpful 
effects of warnings were obscured. There are two reasons that is not a satisfying 
explanation for our results.  
First, if we consider the responses of unwarned subjects who saw negative 
material in Table 4, we can see that the lower limits of the 95% CIs around their 
reported levels of negative affect, or other symptoms, did not overlap with the 
bottom of the scale in any of the experiments. Put another way, people who did 
not get a trigger warning (and were therefore our baseline condition) reported 
having high enough degrees of negative affect and symptoms in response to our 
negative materials that those rates could have been reduced by trigger warnings—
but were not (it is also worth noting that neither did the upper limits of the 
confidence intervals approach the scale maximums, and so there was also room to 
observe effects in a harmful direction).  
Second, we found that subjects who instead saw a control film clip reported 
even lower rates of these symptoms, again demonstrating that the effects in the 
negative condition were not at floor. That said, it is true that the negative films did 
not produce dramatically higher levels of negative affect and symptoms than the 
negative stories had. To more definitely rule out this explanation, future research 
could examine the effects of trigger warnings placed prior to extremely negative 
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materials—although whether it would be ethical to show people such material 
without acquiring their informed consent beforehand would require careful 
consideration. 
A further counterexplanation for our failure to observe any notable effects of 
trigger warnings is that we neglected to measure symptoms or behaviours that 
trigger warnings really did influence. For example, some subjects may have 
withdrawn from our experiments upon getting the trigger warning, thereby 
avoiding the negative material and any ensuing negative emotions. We might, of 
course, think of such behaviour as an example of successful emotion regulation, 
via a “situation selection” strategy (Gross, 2015). But, equally, we might see the 
trigger warning as doing its job, encouraging subjects to withdraw from the study 
to avoid the consequences they fear. In which case, these “drop out” subjects 
would in fact be exhibiting avoidance—itself another symptom of PTSD (see 
criterion C in Table 1; APA, 2013). Therefore, if trigger warnings led subjects to 
withdraw for that reason, it would suggest trigger warnings were acting harmfully, 
rather than helpfully. 
No matter the reason subjects might have withdrawn upon seeing a trigger 
warning, we have evidence that very few subjects in fact did so. To gather this 
evidence, we examined responses from subjects who quit our Qualtrics surveys 
before they had completed every task (and who were therefore excluded from our 
other analyses), classifying those subjects according to which warning condition 
they had been assigned to, and what the last survey page they saw was, before 
they stopped responding and withdrew from the experiment. If many “warning” 
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subjects quit upon seeing the trigger warning, that would suggest those subjects 
had used the trigger warning as an opportunity to avoid the negative material.  
We instead found that the number of “warning” subjects who quit 
specifically upon seeing the warning were: none in Experiment 1a, none in 
Experiment 1b, none in Experiment 2a, nine in Experiment 2b, six in Experiment 
3, and one in Experiment 4 (Appendix E gives more information about how many 
and when subjects quit each experiment). Compared to the nearly 1900 subjects 
who did complete these experiments (some of whom were then excluded for 
reasons other than non-completion), and the hundreds more who started the 
experiments but quit them at some point other than upon seeing a trigger warning, 
these numbers are vanishingly small. These data suggest that few, if any, subjects 
used the trigger warning to avoid negative material—a finding that fits with 
previous work suggesting that people sometimes choose to have a negative 
experience, out of curiosity (Hsee & Ruan, 2016).  
Inspecting these data further revealed that similar numbers of subjects 
withdrew from the “warning” condition as from the the “no warning” condition 
overall. Assuming that subjects were more likely to drop out the more they were 
being bothered by symptoms of distress following the negative material, if trigger 
warnings reduced symptoms then subjects would have been more likely to drop 
out of the “no warning” condition, whereas if trigger warnings worsened 
symptoms then subjects would have been more likely to drop out of the “no 
warning” condition. But that similar numbers of subjects withdrew from each 
condition further fits with our conclusion that trigger warnings instead had trivial 
effects. 
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It is still true that there are yet other behaviours or symptoms that we did not 
measure, but which trigger warnings could have affected to a non-trivial degree. 
For one, we did not ask subjects anything about the content or phenomenology of 
their intrusions. Yet it is possible that warnings may have altered both of those—
for instance, previous research found that telling people an experience they had 
was particularly negative increased the sense of reliving and vividness with which 
they remembered that event, and how stressed they felt about that event 
(Takarangi & Strange, 2010). Therefore, although trigger warnings do not change 
how often people have thoughts related to the negative material, they may make 
those thoughts more vivid and distressing. 
Moreover, we asked people only about their intrusion and avoidance 
symptoms, and did not measure their hyperarousal symptoms (see criterion E in 
Table 1; APA, 2013). It is therefore possible we would have observed effects of 
trigger warnings on physiological measures, such as people’s heart-rate, or the 
sensitivity of their startle reflex, had we measured them (see, for example, Cantor 
et al., 1984; Lepore, Fernandez-Berrocal, Ragan, & Ramos, 2004).  
Relatedly, we relied on people to self-report their symptoms. We did not, for 
example, periodically ask people “just now, were you thinking of something 
related to the film clip?” Yet previous research shows that people are not always 
meta-aware that their minds have turned to negative memories (Baird et al., 2013; 
Takarangi, Strange et al., 2014). We did measure subjects’ comprehension of the 
article they read, but this task only indirectly measures the incidence of such off-
task thoughts. Therefore, it is still possible that trigger warnings affect rates of 
symptoms of which people are not meta-aware. 
!137
Future research could examine the effects of trigger warnings on these other 
symptoms, by including additional measures. But as things stand, one important 
caveat to our conclusion—that trigger warnings are trivially effective—is that we 
cannot speak to trigger warnings’ effects on variables we did not measure. 
A second important caveat to our conclusion is that we do not know how 
well our findings generalise to clinical populations of people diagnosed with 
PTSD, or people with a history of trauma, related to the negative material. In 
Experiment 4 we found that much of our sample had experienced one or more 
traumatic events, reflective of the population at large (Breslau et al., 1998). But 
we were not able to look at the effect of trigger warnings on people who had 
experienced a traumatic event similar to the one depicted in the negative material 
we showed them.  
Of course, given that these warnings are being rolled out in a widespread 
way—for example, appearing in syllabi that all students receive (Palmer, 2017)—
it is important to know what effects such warnings have on most people. But 
future research should next address what effects trigger warnings have on the 
minority of people who may be particularly susceptible to being distressed by a 
given piece of negative material, due to having experienced a similar traumatic 
event that is already causing them persistent distress, or even PTSD. Trigger 
warnings may have even less chance of helping those people. For instance, a 
meta-analysis found that people with more severe PTSD symptoms are worse at 
emotional regulation (Seligowski, Lee, Bardeen, & Orcutt, 2015). This finding 
suggests that a non-specific prompt to regulate one’s emotions—in the form of a 
trigger warning—would be less helpful for people who already experience 
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significant symptoms of distress than it would for people with greater ability to 
regulate their emotions. 
Finally, a third important caveat to our conclusion is that we did not address 
the effects of trigger warnings over time—either the effect of one trigger warning 
after a longer delay, or the cumulative effects of seeing multiple trigger warnings, 
spread across multiple materials, over multiple occasions. But in each of these 
scenarios, there is reason to suspect that trigger warnings could have harmful 
effects.  
In the case of a single trigger warning, warned people may come to 
remember the warned-about material as more negative over time, and experience 
more symptoms related to it, compared to unwarned people. This change could 
happen if knowing that the material was deemed “warning-worthy” leads warned 
people’s memory to become distorted in line with that knowledge. Such an effect 
would fit with previous experiments showing that social feedback about a 
negative experience, given immediately afterward, can change how people later 
feel about that experience after a delay, how accurately they remember it, and the 
degree of PTSD symptoms they experience following it (Lepore et al., 2004; 
Takarangi, Segovia, Dawson, & Strange, 2014; Takarangi & Strange, 2010). This 
effect would further fit with work showing an association between increases in 
how negatively people remember a traumatic experience and increases in their 
rate of PTSD symptoms (Engelhard et al., 2008; Southwick et al., 1997). 
Repeated and widespread use of trigger warnings—a scenario that a student 
could very possibly encounter, in a semester filled with trigger warnings—could 
have the cumulative effect of teaching her to look for the negative side of all 
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materials and situations she encounters. Typically, people more prone to anxiety 
are more likely to pay attention to the negative aspects of situations, and interpret 
emotionally ambiguous situations in a negative way (for a review, see Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005). But repeated practice at not processing stimuli in these negative 
ways can reduce these tendencies in people, and this reduction is associated with 
reductions in people’s symptoms of anxiety (for reviews, see Hertel & Mathews, 
2011; Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). If trigger warnings do the opposite, 
essentially leading people to practice preferentially attending to negative 
information and resolving ambiguity in a negative way, then trigger warnings may 
promote symptoms of anxiety. This prospect is troubling, given that anxiety 
among college students already appears to be on the rise (Center for Collegiate 
Mental Health, 2016). 
Implications and New Questions 
Despite these caveats, our conclusion—that trigger warnings did not reduce 
people’s distress—has implications for theory. Our findings fit within a 
framework explaining why people’s thinking and behaviour are often influenced 
in unwanted ways: People may be unaware of the influence, they may not know 
the size or direction of the influence, or they may not want or be unable to counter 
the influence (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Failing at any one of these points stymies 
people’s ability to counter the influence. An important question our finding raises 
is: where along this process do trigger warnings stumble?  
Our results suggest trigger warnings make people broadly aware of the 
influence that the negative material to follow will have—after all, they judge that 
the material to follow will be very negative. But perhaps trigger warnings are not 
!140
sufficiently informative regarding the specific effects negative material tends to 
have, or regarding the magnitude of its influence. Alternatively, trigger warnings 
may not be worded in a way that makes people want to expend the effort to 
counter the influence. Finally, it may be that people are not able to exert control 
over the processes that give rise to these unwanted influences.  
This latter possibility seems unlikely, though, given that people are able to 
regulate their emotions to some degree, and (at least in the short term) reduce the 
frequency with which a particular thought comes to mind (Gross, 2015; Wenzlaff 
& Wegner, 2000). In any case, addressing this question, regarding why trigger 
warnings are ineffective, would be a useful step towards finding an alternative 
intervention that does reduce people’s distress.  
One such intervention could be a warning that instead downplays how 
negative the material to follow is, and positively changes people’s expectancies 
about how they will react to the negative material. For example, the warning 
could say that the story to follow describes child abuse in detail, but most people 
do not find it overly upsetting, and find it easy to stop thinking about it afterward. 
A successful outcome using this kind of warning would with fit with previous 
research showing that social feedback after a negative experience, which conveys 
that the experience was not so bad, tends to reduce how upset people report 
feeling, and the symptoms they go on to experience (Lepore et al., 2004; 
Takarangi, Segovia et al., 2014). 
Another such intervention could be a warning that includes an invitation for 
people to regulate their negative emotions while reading (or watching) the 
material, and gives detailed instructions about an emotion regulation strategy they 
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could use to do so. For example, people could be specifically told to reappraise 
the negative aspects of the story (Feinberg et al, 2012; Gross, 2015). Of course, a 
warning worded along these lines has ceased to resemble the prototypical trigger 
warning. Further, suggesting that educators should attempt to write and administer 
new warnings such as these is approaching the suggestion that they engage in 
therapeutic practices for which they are not trained.  
What is more, it may be that these “positive warnings” still would not help 
those for whom they are particularly intended—those who have previously 
experienced a related negative experience, which causes them ongoing distress. 
That is, people who experience ongoing posttraumatic distress may have the most 
maladaptive, and difficult-to-shift expectancies about how they will react. These 
people may also be particularly poor at effectively regulating their emotions. Both 
these factors would make it harder for these interventions to help these people 
(Rief et al., 2015; Rubin, Berntsen et al., 2008; Rubin et al., 2011; Seligowski et 
al., 2015; Takarangi et al., 2017). Future work could examine which individual 
differences predict how much people are affected by warnings prior to negative 
material.  
We attempted to investigate one individual difference. In Experiment 4, we 
asked about people’s history of trauma. We found that almost everybody had 
experienced a potentially traumatic event, but fewer had experienced ongoing 
distress as a result. Although we were not able to go on and make the comparisons 
we had intended, this finding alone accords with the model of PTSD proposing 
that events themselves are less important in producing the disorder than are 
people’s reactions to and memories for their experiences (Berntsen et al., 2008; 
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Rubin, Berntsen et al., 2008; Rubin et al., 2011). Future work could investigate 
the differential rates of symptoms reported—and the effect of trigger warnings on 
them—by people who have and have not experienced ongoing distress in response 
to a previous negative experience. 
That some students want (and professors use) trigger warnings despite these 
warnings being ineffective—at least, as far as our data show—raises the question: 
if these warnings do not work, why do some people still think they are useful? 
This apparent mismatch fits with other work showing that people are bad at 
predicting the effects interventions will have on them, and at accurately 
recognising the factors that determined their behaviour in a given situation 
(Michael et al., 2012; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
In particular, the trigger warnings scenario is reminiscent of work on 
“learning styles.” Many students believe that their learning is optimised when 
material is taught in their preferred style—such as visually, rather than verbally 
(and, conversely, that their learning is impaired when it is not; for a review, see 
Pashler, McDaniel, Rohrer, & Bjork, 2008). In line with this belief, people judge 
that they have better learned material when there is a match between their 
preferred style and the delivery style (Knoll, Otani, Skeel, & Van Horn, 2017). 
But, in actual fact, how well people learn material is not related to the degree of 
this match (Knoll et al., 2017; Pashler et al., 2008). 
Our findings also have practical implications. Our experiments bring the 
first experimental data to the “never ending debate” about the use of trigger 
warnings in higher education (Flaherty, 2015). Our results are bad news for 
educators who want to help ease distress their students may feel, because our 
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results suggest trigger warnings do not have that effect. At the same time, our data 
suggest that neither do trigger warnings harm students, as others feared, and so in 
that way our result constitute good news.  
More broadly, our findings also have implications for other situations in 
which people have negative experiences about which they could be forewarned. 
For instance, reporters usually tell viewers (or readers) if their news story contains 
graphic details, and other television shows are typically preceded by information 
about their rating and brief explanation of their content. Our findings suggest that 
media outlets are not inadvertently raising their chances of upsetting their 
audience by providing them with such warning information. 
Relatedly, institutional ethics committees ordinarily require that subjects 
give informed consent to participate in studies. Therefore, if a study involves 
exposure to, say, very negative photographs then subjects must be informed 
beforehand that they will see photographs like that and the experience might upset 
them. Our findings suggest that reading such a warning on a consent form would 
not intensify the negativity of subjects’ experience.  
Finally, people are sometimes traumatised by their experiences as jurors, 
finding experiences such as seeing gruesome evidence very upsetting (Lonergan, 
Leclerc, Descamps, Pigeon, & Brunet, 2016). Unlike television audiences, or 
experimental subjects, jurors cannot easily opt out of exposure to negative 
material. Some jurisdictions forewarn jurors that they are about to hear or see 
some distressing evidence (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2004). Our results 
suggest that such an instruction would be unlikely to help jurors, but nor would it 
worsen their experience. 
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Where does this outcome leave universities, grappling with the issue of 
making policies around the use of trigger warnings? If trigger warnings are merely 
unhelpful then, on the one hand, perhaps professors should use them. Professors 
could treat trigger warnings as a benign concession to students who still feel as 
though trigger warnings are helpful, and are pleased to have them. On the other 
hand, perhaps professors should not use them. If professors and students continue 
to believe and behave as though trigger warnings are helpful—by using them—
then they may be less open to looking beyond the use of trigger warnings. This set 
of experiments paves the way toward looking for such alternative solutions that 
will effectively reduce unnecessary distress.  
!145
References 
Abelson, R. P. (1985). A variance explanation paradox: When a little is a lot. 
Psychological Bulletin, 97, 129-133. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.97.1.129  
Aldao, A., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Schweizer, S. (2010). Emotion-regulation 
strategies across psychopathology: A meta-analytic review. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 30, 217-237. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2009.11.004 
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009). Uniting the tribes of fluency to form a 
metacognitive nation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13, 
219-235. doi:10.1177/1088868309341564 
American Association of University Professors. (2014). On Trigger Warnings. 
Retrieved July 30, 2015, from https://www.aaup.org/report/trigger-warnings 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychological Association. (2009). Publication manual of the American 
Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Anderson, R. C., & Pichert J. W. (1978). Recall of previously unrecallable 
information following a shift in perspective. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 17, 1-12. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(78)90485-1 
Baird, B., Smallwood, J., Fishman, D. J. F., Mrazek, M. D., & Schooler, J. W. 
(2013). Unnoticed intrusions: Dissociations of meta-consciousness in 
thought suppression. Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 1003-1012. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2013.06.009 
Bennett, P., Phelps, C., Brain, K., Hood, K., & Gray, J. (2007). A randomized 
controlled trial of a brief self-help coping intervention designed to reduce 
!146
distress when awaiting genetic risk information. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 63, 59-64. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2007.01.016 
Bentley, M. (2016). Scenes of a disturbing nature: trigger warnings. Critical 
Studies on Security, 4, 114-117. doi:10.1080/21624887.2016.1163932 
Bentley, M. (2017). Trigger warnings and the student experience. Politics, 37, 
470-485. doi:10.1177/0263395716684526  
Berntsen, D., & Hall, N. M. (2004). The episodic nature of involuntary 
autobiographical memories. Memory & Cognition, 32, 789-803. doi: 
10.3758/BF03195869 
Berntsen, D., & Rubin, D. C. (2006). The centrality of event scale: A measure of 
integrating a trauma into one’s identity and its relation to post-traumatic 
stress disorder symptoms. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 219-231. 
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.01.009 
Berntsen, D., & Rubin, D. C. (2008). The reappearance hypothesis revisited: 
Recurrent involuntary memories after traumatic events and in everyday life. 
Memory & Cognition, 36, 449-460. doi:10.3758/MC.36.2.449 
Berntsen, D., Rubin, D. C., & Bohni, M. K. (2008). Contrasting models of 
posttraumatic stress disorder: Reply to Monroe and Mineka (2008). 
Psychological Review, 115, 1099-1107. doi:10.1037/a0013730 
Berntsen, D., Staugaard, S. R., & Sørensen, L. M. T. (2013). Why am I 
remembering this now? Predicting the occurrence of involuntary 
(spontaneous) episodic memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 142, 426-444. doi:10.1037/a0029128 
!147
Bisson, J. I., Roberts, N. P., Andrew, M., Cooper, R., & Lewis, C. (2013). 
Psychological therapies for chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 
adults. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 12, CD003388. doi:
10.1002/14651858.CD003388.pub4 
Boysen, G. A., Wells, A. M., & Dawson, K. J. (2016). Instructors’ use of trigger 
warnings and behavior warnings in abnormal psychology. Teaching of 
Psychology, 43, 334-339. doi:10.1177/0098628316662766 
Bradbury, R. (1951). The Veldt. In The Illustrated Man. New York: Doubleday & 
Company. 
Bransford, J. D., & Johnson, M. K. (1972). Contextual prerequisites for 
understanding: Some investigations of comprehension and recall. Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 717-726. doi:10.1016/
S0022-5371(72)80006-9 
Breslau, N., Kessler, R. C., Chilcoat, H. D., Schultz, L. R., Davis, G. C., & 
Andreski, P. (1998). Trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder in the 
community: The 1996 Detroit area survey of trauma. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 55, 626-632. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.55.7.626 
Brewin, C. R., Dalgleish, T., & Joseph, S. (1996). A dual representation theory of 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Psychological Review, 103, 670-686. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.670 
Brewin, C. R., & Holmes, E. A. (2003). Psychological theories of posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Clinical Psychology Review, 23, 339-376. doi:10.1016/
S0272-7358(03)00033-3 
!148
Bright, D. A., & Goodman-Delahunty, J. (2004). The influence of gruesome 
verbal evidence on mock juror verdicts. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 
11, 154-166. doi:10.1375/pplt.2004.11.1.154 
Bryson, B. (2005). A short history of nearly everything. London: Doubleday. 
Canadian Association of University Teachers. (2015, May). Trigger warnings. 
Retrieved September 3, 2016, from https://www.caut.ca/about-us/caut-
policy/lists/caut-policy-statements/trigger-warnings 
Cantor, J., Ziemke, D., & Sparks, G. C. (1984). Effect of forewarning on 
emotional responses to a horror film. Journal of Broadcasting, 28, 21-31 
doi:10.1080/08838158409386512 
Carlson, E. B., Smith, S. R., Palmieri, P. A., Dalenberg, C., Ruzek, J. I., 
Kimerling, R., Burling, T. A., & Spain, D. A. (2011). Development and 
validation of a brief self-report measure of trauma exposure: The Trauma 
History Screen. Psychological Assessment, 23, 463-477. doi:10.1037/
a0022294 
Catanzaro, S. J., & Greenwood, G. (1994). Expectancies for negative mood 
regulation, coping, and dysphoria among college students. Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, 41, 34-44. doi:10.1037/0022-0167.41.1.34 
Center for Collegiate Mental Health. (2016, January). 2015 annual report 
(Publication No. STA 15-108). Retrieved December 14, 2017, from the 




Christianson, S.-Å. (1992). Emotional stress and eyewitness memory: A critical 
review. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 284-309. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.112.2.284 
Committee on Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Institute of Medicine 
of the National Academies (2008). Treatment of posttraumatic stress 
disorder: An assessment of the evidence. Washington, D.C.: The National 
Academies Press. 
Crane, S. (1901, March). A dark-brown dog. Cosmopolitan, 30, 481-486. 
Cuijpers, P., Turner, E. H., Koole, S. L., van Dijke, A., & Smit, F. (2014). What is 
the threshold for a clinically relevant effect? The case of major depressive 
disorders. Depression and Anxiety, 31, 374-378. doi:10.1002/da.22249 
Cumming, G. (2012). Understanding the new statistics: Effect sizes, confidence 
intervals, and meta-analysis. New York: Routledge. 
Daro, I. N. (2016, January 6). The government of Canada added a trigger warning 
to its website. BuzzFeed. Retrieved September 8, 2016, from https://
www.buzzfeed.com/ishmaeldaro/government-of-canada-added-trigger-
warning-to-mmiw-page 
Devue, C., Belopolsky, A. V., & Theeuwes, J. (2011). The role of fear and 
expectancies in capture of covert attention by spiders. Emotion, 11, 768-775. 
doi:10.1037/a0023418 
de Wied, M., Hoffman, K., & Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R. (1997). Forewarning of 
graphic portrayal of violence and the experience of suspenseful drama. 
Cognition and Emotion, 11, 481-494. doi:10.1080/026999397379890 
!150
Ehlers, A., & Clark, D. M. (2000). A cognitive model of posttraumatic stress 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 319-345. doi:10.1016/
S0005-7967(99)00123-0 
Eich, E. (2014). Business not as usual. Psychological Science, 25, 3-6. doi:
10.1177/0956797613512465 
Engelhard, I. M., van den Hout, M. A., & McNally, R. J. (2008). Memory 
consistency for traumatic events in Dutch soldiers deployed to Iraq. 
Memory, 16, 3-9, doi:10.1080/09658210701334022 
Faasse, K. & Petrie, K. J. (2016). From me to you: The effect of social modeling 
on treatment outcomes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 25, 
438-443. doi:10.1177/0963721416657316 
Feinberg, M., Willer R., Antonenko, O., & John, O. P. (2012). Liberating reason 
from the passions: Overriding intuitionist moral judgments through emotion 
reappraisal. Psychological Science, 23, 788-795. doi:
10.1177/0956797611434747 
Ferguson, C. J. (2009). An effect size primer: A guide for clinicians and 
researchers. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 40, 532-538. 
doi:10.1037/a0015808 
Flaherty, C. (2015, December 3). The never-ending trigger-warning debate. Slate. 





Foa, E. B., & McLean, C. P. (2016). The efficacy of exposure therapy for anxiety-
related disorders and its underlying mechanisms: The case of OCD and 
PTSD. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 12, 1-28. doi:10.1146/
annurev-clinpsy-021815-093533 
Forstie, C. (2016). Trigger warnings. In N. M. Rodriguez, W. J. Martino, J. C. 
Ingrey, & E. Brockenbrough (Eds.) Critical Concepts in Queer Studies  
and Education (pp. 421-433). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:
10.1057/978-1-137-55425-3_40 
Friedersdorf, C. (2016, August 31). Grading the University of Chicago’s Letter on 
Academic Freedom. The Atlantic. Retrieved September 2, 2016, from http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/grading-the-university-of-
chicagos-letter-on-academic-freedom/497804/ 
Galatzer-Levy, I. R., & Bryant, R. A. (2013). 636,120 ways to have posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 651-662. doi:
10.1177/1745691613504115  
Geraerts, E., Kozarić-Kovačić, D., Merckelbach, H., Peraica, T., Jelicic, M., & 
Candel, I. (2007). Traumatic memories of war veterans: Not so special after 
all. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 170-177. doi:10.1016/j.concog.
2006.02.005 
Glenberg, A. M., Wilkinson, A. C., & Epstein, W. (1982). The illusion of 
knowing: Failure in the self-assessment of comprehension. Memory & 
Cognition, 10, 597-602. doi:10.3758/BF03202442 
Goldin, P. R., Ziv, M., Jazaieri, H., Werner, K., Kraemer, H., Heimberg, R. G., & 
Gross, J. J. (2012). Cognitive reappraisal self-efficacy mediates the effects 
!152
of individual cognitive-behavioral therapy for social anxiety disorder. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 80, 1034-1040. doi:
10.1037/a0028555  
Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000). The role of transportation in the 
persuasiveness of public narratives. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 79, 701-721. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.5.701 
Grieve, P. (2016, August 24) University to freshmen: Don’t expect safe spaces or 
trigger warnings. The Chicago Maroon. Retrieved December 14, 2017 from 
https://www.chicagomaroon.com/article/2016/8/24/university-to-freshmen-
dont-expect-safe-spaces-or-trigger-warnings/ 
Gross, J. J. (2015). Emotion regulation: Current status and future prospects. 
Psychological Inquiry, 26, 1-26. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2014.940781 
Gross, J. J., & Jazaieri, H. (2014). Emotion, emotion regulation, and 
psychopathology: An affective science perspective. Clinical Psychological 
Science, 2, 387-401. doi:10.1177/2167702614536164 
Gross, J. J., & Levenson, R. W. (1997). Hiding feelings: The acute effects of 
inhibiting negative and positive emotion. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
106, 95-103. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.106.1.95 
Gross, J. J., & Thompson, R. A. (2007). Emotion regulation: Conceptual 
foundations. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 
3-24). New York: Guilford Press. 
Gust, O. (2016, June 14). I use trigger warnings – but I'm not mollycoddling my 




Hall, N. M., & Berntsen, D. (2008). The effect of emotional stress on involuntary 
and voluntary conscious memories. Memory, 16, 48-57. doi:
10.1080/09658210701333271 
Hanlon, A. R. (2015, May 17). My students need trigger warnings—and 
professors do, too. New Republic. Retrieved May 19, 2015, from http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/121820/my-students-need-trigger-warnings-
and-professors-do-too 
Harvey, A. G., & Bryant, R. A. (1998). The effect of attempted thought 
suppression in acute stress disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 
583-590. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00052-7 
Hertel, P. T., & Mathews, A. (2011). Cognitive bias modification: Past 
perspectives, current findings, and future applications. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 6, 521-536. doi:10.1177/1745691611421205 
Holmes, E. A., & Bourne, C. (2008). Inducing and modulating intrusive emotional 
memories: A review of the trauma film paradigm. Acta Psychologica, 127, 
553-566 doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.11.002 
Horowitz, M. J., Wilner, N., & Alvarez, W. (1979). Impact of Event Scale: A 
measure of subjective stress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 41, 209-218. doi:
10.1097/00006842-197905000-00004 
Hsee, C. K, & Ruan, B. (2016). The Pandora effect: The power and peril of 
curiosity. Psychological Science, 27, 659-666. doi:
10.1177/0956797616631733 
!154
James, E. L., Lau-Zhu, A., Clark, I. A., Visser, R. M., Hagenaars, M. A., & 
Holmes, E. A. (2016). The trauma film paradigm as an experimental 
psychopathology model of psychological trauma: intrusive memories and 
beyond. Clinical Psychology Review, 47, 106-142. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.
2016.04.010 
Jamieson, J. P., Nock, M. K., & Mendes, W. B. (2013). Changing the 
conceptualization of stress in social anxiety disorder: Affective and 
physiological consequences. Clinical Psychological Science, 1, 363-374. 
doi:10.1177/2167702613482119 
Jarvie, J. (2014, March 3). Trigger happy. New Republic. Retrieved September 15, 
2016, from https://newrepublic.com/article/116842/trigger-warnings-have-
spread-blogs-college-classes-thats-bad 
Johnson, M. K., Foley, M. A., Suengas, A .G., & Raye, C. L. (1988). Phenomenal 
characteristics of memories for perceived and imagined autobiographical 
events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117, 371-376. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.117.4.371 
Kamenetz, A. (2016, September 7). Half of professors in NPR Ed survey have 
used ‘trigger warnings’. National Public Radio. Retrieved September 9, 
2016, from http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/09/07/492979242/half-of-
professors-in-npr-ed-survey-have-used-trigger-warnings 
Kane, M. J., & McVay, J. C. (2012). What mind wandering reveals about 
executive-control abilities and failures. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 21, 348-354. doi:10.1177/0963721412454875 
!155
Kensinger, E. A., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Memory and emotion. In M. Lewis, J. 
M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of Emotions (pp. 
601-617). New York: Guilford Press. 
Kirsch, I. (1985). Response expectancy as a determinant of experience and 
behavior. American Psychologist, 40, 1189-1202. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.
40.11.1189 
Kirsch, I. (1997). Response expectancy theory and application: A decennial 
review. Applied and Preventive Psychology, 6, 69-79. doi:10.1016/
S0962-1849(05)80012-5 
Kirsch, I. (2004). Conditioning, expectancy, and the placebo effect: Comment on 
Stewart-Williams and Podd (2004). Psychological Bulletin, 130, 341-343. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.130.2.341 
Kirsch, I., & Lynn, S.J. (1999). Automaticity in clinical psychology. American 
Psychologist, 54, 504-515. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.504 
Kleinsorge, T. (2007). Anticipatory modulation of interference induced by 
unpleasant pictures. Cognition and Emotion, 21, 404-421. doi:
10.1080/02699930600625032 
Knoll, A. R., Otani, H., Skeel., R. L., & Van Horn, K. R. (2017). Learning style, 
judgements of learning, and learning of verbal and visual information. 
British Journal of Psychology, 108, 544-563. doi:10.1111/bjop.12214 
Koster, E. H. W., Fox, E., & MacLeod, C. (2009). Introduction to the special 
section on cognitive bias modification in emotional disorders. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 118, 1-4. doi:10.1037/a0014379 
!156
Kumagai, A. K., Jackson, B., & Razack, S. (2017). Cutting close to the bone: 
Student trauma, free speech, and institutional responsibility in medical 
education. Academic Medicine, 92, 318-323. doi:10.1097/ACM.
0000000000001425 
Lang, F. R., Staudinger, U. M., & Carstensen, L. L. (1998). Perspectives on 
socioemotional selectivity in late life: How personality and social context do 
(and do not) make a difference. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological 
Sciences, 53B, 21-30. doi: 10.1093/geronb/53B.1.P21 
Leavitt J. D., & Christenfeld, N. J. S. (2011). Story spoilers don’t spoil stories. 
Psychological Science, 22, 1152-1154 doi:10.1177/0956797611417007 
Leavitt J. D., & Christenfeld, N. J. S. (2013). The fluency of spoilers: Why giving 
away endings improves stories. Scientific Study of Literature, 3, 93-104. doi:
10.1075/ssol.3.1.09lea 
Lepore, S. J., Fernandez-Berrocal, P., Ragan, J., & Ramos, N. (2004). It’s not that 
bad: Social challenges to emotional disclosure enhance adjustment to stress, 
Anxiety, Stress, & Coping, 17, 341-361, doi:
10.1080/10615800412331318625  
Lesh, M. (2016, August 20). Warning: This article contains ideas that offend. The 
Spectator Australia. Retrieved September 2, 2016, from http://
spectator.com.au/2016/08/warning-this-article-contains-ideas-that-offend/ 
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (1993). The efficacy of psychological, 
educational, and behavioral treatment: Confirmation from meta-analysis. 
American Psychologist, 48, 1181-1209. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.48.12.1181 
!157
Lonergan, M., Leclerc, M.-È., Descamps, M., Pigeon, S., & Brunet, A. (2016). 
Prevalence and severity of trauma- and stressor-related symptoms among 
jurors: A review. Journal of Criminal Justice, 47, 51-61 doi:10.1016/
j.jcrimjus.2016.07.003 
Lukianoff, G., & Haidt, J. (2015, September). The Coddling of the American 
Mind. The Atlantic. Retrieved August 12, 2015, from https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-
american-mind/399356/ 
Manne, K. (2015, September 19). Why I use trigger warnings. The New York 
Times. Retrieved September 21, 2015, from https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/20/opinion/sunday/why-i-use-trigger-warnings.html 
Manning, S., & Wace, C. (2016, May 7). Oxford law students too ‘fragile’ to hear 
about violent crime: Undergraduates given ‘trigger warnings’ before 




Marcotte, A. (2013, December 30). The year of the trigger warning. Slate. 





Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (2005). Cognitive vulnerability to emotional 
disorders. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 1, 167-195. doi:10.1146/
annurev.clinpsy.1.102803.143916 
McManus, F., Sacadura, C., & Clark, D. M. (2008). Why social anxiety persists: 
An experimental investigation of the role of safety behaviours as a 
maintaining factor. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 39, 147-161. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2006.12.002 
McNally, R. J. (2014, May 20). Hazards ahead: The problem with trigger 
warnings, according to the research. Pacific Standard. Retrieved June 9, 
2014, from https://psmag.com/education/hazards-ahead-problem-trigger-
warnings-according-research-81946 
Medina, J. (2014, May 17). Warning: The literary canon could make students 
squirm. The New York Times. Retrieved June 9, 2014, from https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/us/warning-the-literary-canon-could-make-
students-squirm.html 
Melby-Lervåg, M., Redick, T. S., & Hulme, C. (2016). Working memory training 
does not improve performance on measures of intelligence or other 
measures of “far transfer”: Evidence from a meta-analytic review. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 512-534. doi:
10.1177/1745691616635612 
Michael, R. B., Garry, M., & Kirsch, I. (2012). Suggestion, cognition, and 
behavior. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21, 151-156. doi:
10.1177/0963721412446369 
!159
Mooneyham, B. W., & Schooler, J. W. (2013). The costs and benefits of mind-
wandering: A review. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 67, 
11-18. doi:10.1037/a0031569  
National Coalition Against Censorship. (2015). What’s all this about trigger 
warnings? Retrieved December 9, 2015, from http://ncac.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/NCAC-TriggerWarningReport.pdf 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal 
reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231 
Oberlin College, Office of Equity Concerns. (2013). Support resources for faculty. 




Ogle, C. M., Siegler, I. C., Beckham, J. C., & Rubin, D. C. (2017). Neuroticism 
increases PTSD symptom severity by amplifying the emotionality, 
rehearsal, and centrality of trauma memories. Journal of Personality, 85, 
702-715. doi:10.1111/jopy.12278 
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional 
manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 867-872. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.
2009.03.009 
Palmer, T. (2017, March 29). Monash University trigger warning policy fires up 
free speech debate. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved April 
!160
18, 2017, from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-28/monash-university-
adopts-trigger-warning-policy/8390264 
Pashler, H., McDaniel, M., Rohrer, D., & Bjork, R. (2008). Learning styles: 
Concepts and evidence. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 9, 
105-119. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6053.2009.01038.x 
Pichert J. W., & Anderson, R. C. (1977). Taking different perspectives on a story. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 69, 309-315. doi:
10.1037/0022-0663.69.4.309 
Planès, S., Villier, C., & Malleret, M. (2016). The nocebo effect of drugs. 
Pharmacology Research and Perspectives, 4, e00208. doi:10.1002/prp2.208 
Porter, S., & Birt, A. R. (2001). Is traumatic memory special? A comparison of 
traumatic memory characteristics with memory for other emotional life 
experiences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15, S101-S117. doi:10.1002/
acp.766 
Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (1992). When small effects are impressive. 
Psychological Bulletin, 112, 160-164. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.112.1.160 
Price, D. D., Finniss, D. G., & Benedetti, F. (2008). A comprehensive review of 
the placebo effect: Recent advances and current thought. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 59, 565-590. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.113006.095941 
Qualtrics [survey software]. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.qualtrics.com/. 
Rief, W., Glombiewski, J. A., Gollwitzer, M., Schubö, A., Schwarting, R., & 
Thorwart, A. (2015). Expectancies as core features of mental disorders. 
Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 28, 378-385. doi:10.1097/YCO.
0000000000000184 
!161
Rosenthal, R. (1990). How are we doing in soft psychology? American 
Psychologist, 45, 775-777. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.45.6.775 
Rothbaum, B. O., Foa, E. B., Riggs, D. S., Murdock, T., & Walsh, W. (1992). A 
prospective examination of post-traumatic stress disorder in rape victims. 
Journal of Traumatic Stress, 5, 455-475. doi:10.1007/BF00977239 
Rubin, D. C., Berntsen, D., & Bohni, M. K. (2008). A memory-based model of 
posttraumatic stress disorder: Evaluating basic assumptions underlying the 
PTSD diagnosis. Psychological Review, 115, 985-1011. doi:10.1037/
a0013397 
Rubin, D. C., Boals, A., & Berntsen, D. (2008). Memory in posttraumatic stress 
disorder: Properties of voluntary and involuntary, traumatic and 
nontraumatic autobiographical memories in people with and without 
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 137, 591-614. doi:10.1037/a0013165 
Rubin, D. C., Dennis, M. F., & Beckham, J. C. (2011). Autobiographical memory 
for stressful events: The role of autobiographical memory in posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 840-856. doi:10.1016/
j.concog.2011.03.015 
Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W., & Greenberg, D. L. (2003). Belief and recollection 
of autobiographical memories. Memory & Cognition, 31, 887-901. doi:
10.3758/BF03196443 
Schooler, J. W., Reichle, E. D., & Halpern, D. V. (2004). Zoning out while 
reading: Evidence for dissociations between experience and 
metaconsciousness. In D. T. Levin (Ed.), Thinking and seeing: Visual 
!162
metacognition in adults and children (pp. 203-226). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Schwarz, K. A., Pfister, R., & Büchel, C. (2016). Rethinking explicit expectations: 
Connecting placebos, social cognition, and contextual perception. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 20, 469-480. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.04.001 
Seligowski, A. V., Lee, D. J., Bardeen, J. R. & Orcutt, H K. (2015). Emotion 
regulation and posttraumatic stress symptoms: A meta-analysis. Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy, 44, 87-102. doi:10.1080/16506073.2014.980753 
Sheskin, D. J. (2003). Inferential statistical tests employed with two independent 
samples (and related measures of association and correlation). In Handbook 
of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures (3rd ed., pp. 
373-423). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Smallwood, J., Nind, L., & O’Connor, R. C. (2009). When is your head at? An 
exploration of the factors associated with the temporal focus of the 
wandering mind. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 118-125. doi:10.1016/
j.concog.2008.11.004 
Southwick, S. M., Morgan, C. A., III, Nicolaou, A. L., & Charney, D. S. (1997). 
Consistency of memory for combat-related traumatic events in veterans of 
Operation Desert Storm. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 154, 173-177. 
doi:10.1176/ajp.154.2.173  
Suk Gersen, J. (2014, December 15). The trouble with teaching rape law. The New 
Yorker. Retrieved February 9, 2016, from http://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/trouble-teaching-rape-law 
!163
Sundin, E. C., & Horowitz, M. J. (2002). Impact of Event Scale: psychometric 
properties. British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, 205-209. doi:10.1192/bjp.
180.3.205 
Takarangi, M. K. T., Segovia, D. A., Dawson, E. & Strange, D. (2014). Emotional 
impact feedback affects how people remember an analogue trauma event. 
Memory, 22, 1041-1051, doi:10.1080/09658211.2013.865238 
Takarangi, M. K. T., Smith, R. A., Strange, D., & Flowe, H. D. (2017). 
Metacognitive and metamemory beliefs in the development and 
maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder. Clinical Psychological 
Science, 5, 131-140. doi:10.1177/2167702616649348 
Takarangi, M. K. T., & Strange, D. (2010). Emotional impact feedback changes 
how we remember negative autobiographical experiences. Experimental 
Psychology, 57, 354-359. doi:10.1027/1618-3169/a000042 
Takarangi, M. K. T., Strange, D., & Lindsay, D. S. (2014). Self-report may 
underestimate trauma intrusions. Consciousness and Cognition, 27, 
297-305. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.06.002 
Talarico, J. M., LaBar, K. S., & Rubin, D. C. (2004). Emotional intensity predicts 
autobiographical memory experience. Memory & Cognition, 32, 1118-1132. 
doi:10.3758/BF03196886 
Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2003). Confidence, not consistency, characterizes 
flashbulb memories. Psychological Science, 14, 455-461. doi:
10.1111/1467-9280.02453 
University of California, Santa Barbara, Associated Students Senate. (2014, 
February). A resolution to mandate warnings for triggering content in 
!164
academic settings (02262014:61). Retrieved on September 3, 2016, from 
https://www.as.ucsb.edu/senate/resolutions/a-resolution-to-mandate-
warnings-for-triggering-content-in-academic-settings/ 
Vingiano, A. (2014, May 5). How the “trigger warning” took over the internet. 
BuzzFeed. Retrieved August 10, 2016, from https://www.buzzfeed.com/
alisonvingiano/how-the-trigger-warning-took-over-the-internet 
Waldman, K. (2014, May 7). Twitter is no place for trigger warnings. Slate. 
Retrieved August 10, 2016, from http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/
2014/05/07/trigger_warnings_on_twitter_don_t_make_sense.html 
Waldman, K. (2016, September 5). The trapdoor of trigger words. Slate. Retrieved 
September 8, 2016, from http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/
cover_story/2016/09/
what_science_can_tell_us_about_trigger_warnings.html 
Watson. D., & Clark. L. A. (1999). The PANAS-X: Manual for the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form. Retrieved June 23, 2014, from 
University of Iowa, Department of Psychology website: http://ir.uiowa.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=psychology_pubs 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of 
brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., III, & White, T. L. (1987). 
Paradoxical effects of thought suppression. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 53, 5-13. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.53.1.5 
!165
Wells, R. E., & Kaptchuk, T. J. (2012). To tell the truth, the whole truth, may do 
patients harm: The problem of the nocebo effect for informed consent. The 
American Journal of Bioethics, 12, 22-29. doi:
10.1080/15265161.2011.652798 
Wenzlaff, R. M., & Wegner, D. M. (2000). Thought suppression. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 51, 59-91. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.59  
Wilson, R. (2015, September 14). Students’ requests for trigger warnings grow 
more varied. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved September 15, 
2015, from http://chronicle.com/article/article-content/233043/ 
Wilson, T. D., & Brekke, N. (1994). Mental contamination and mental correction: 
Unwanted influences on judgments and evaluations. Psychological Bulletin, 
116, 117-142. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.117 
Wyatt, W. (2016). The ethics of trigger warnings. Teaching Ethics, 16, 17-35. doi:
10.5840/tej201632427 
Wythe, P. (2014, February 18). Trigger warnings needed in classroom. The Daily 




Below are the questions we asked student subjects in Experiment 1a who read 
the story “A Dark Brown Dog.” The correct answers are in bold, but note that 
we varied which letter corresponded to the correct answer in the experiment. 
1. The story can be interpreted as an allegory for the life awaiting newly 
freed slaves, symbolised by the dog. In this interpretation the father 
symbolises: 
a. The Northern states of America 
b. A progressive generation of white Americans 
c. The Southern states of America 
d. Another freed slave 











4. The author compares the relationship between the child and the dog to 
that between a monarch and a subject because: 
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a. The child is protected by the dog 
b. The dog lords over the child 
c. The child fulfils the dog’s wishes 
d. The dog is devoted to the child 
5. Why does the dog become panicked while climbing the stairs? 
a. The dog can see the father at the top 
b. The dog is afraid of heights 
c. The child is beginning to look menacing 
d. The child is pulling him too quickly 
Below are the questions we asked student subjects in Experiment 1a who read 
the story “The Veldt.” The correct answers are in bold, but note that we varied 
which letter corresponded to the correct answer in the experiment. 
1. Which of the following is NOT a piece of advice the psychologist gives 
George? 
a. The children should spend more time outdoors 
b. George should entirely demolish the nursery 
c. The children should see the psychologist daily 
d. George should switch off everything in the house 
2. Why does Peter think it would be dreadful if the whole house got 
turned off? 
a. He is afraid his parents will become too busy with housework to 
look after him 
b. He is concerned that it would look like his family is poor 
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c. He is unwilling to do things for himself 
d. He is reluctant to have to interact with his sister to play games 
3. Which piece of furniture apologises to George? 
a. An armchair 
b. His bed 
c. The dining table 
d. The stove 
4. The psychologist says that one of the original uses of rooms like the 
nursery was to: 
a. See into children’s minds in order to better help them 
b. Create a fun environment for children to play in 
c. Reduce the need for babysitters 
d. Encourage families to spend more time together 
5. Readers can infer that at the end of the story: 
a. The parents go on vacation without their children 
b. The parents are killed by the lions in the nursery 
c. The children lock themselves in the nursery 
d. The children begin therapy with the psychologist 
Below are the questions we asked MTurk subjects in Experiment 1b who read 
the story “A Dark Brown Dog.” The correct answers are in bold, but note that 
we varied which letter corresponded to the correct answer in the experiment. 
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1. The story can be interpreted as an allegory for the life awaiting newly 
freed slaves, symbolised by the dog. In this interpretation the father 
symbolises: 
a. The Northern states of America 
b. A progressive generation of white Americans 
c. The Southern states of America 
d. Another freed slave 
2. The child first hits the dog because: 
a. The dog wouldn’t stop barking 
b. The dog became overexcited 
c. The dog growled at the child 
d. The dog looked ugly 





4. The father’s decision to keep the dog exemplifies his: 
a. Generosity 
b. Fondness for animals 
c. Spitefulness 
d. Recklessness 
5. What does the author say the dog had nightmares about? 
a. Other dogs 
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b. His former owner 
c. The family 
d. The child 
Below are the questions we asked MTurk subjects in Experiment 1b who read 
the story “The Veldt.” The correct answers are in bold, but note that we varied 
which letter corresponded to the correct answer in the experiment. 
1. Readers can infer that the voices Lydia and George repeatedly hear 
screaming in the nursery are: 
a. The children’s voices 
b. Their own voices 
c. The voices of characters in the children’s storybooks 
d. None of the above 
2. Which of the following is NOT stated as a side effect of the technology 
in the “Happylife Home”? 
a. The children becoming more compassionate 
b. The parents having fewer physical childcare duties to do 
c. George becoming more dependent on sedatives 
d. Lydia having less housework to do 
3. What evidence does Lydia present to George to suggest that the 
automated house is bad for him? 
a. He spends more time at work 
b. He is grumpier with her and the children 
c. He is avoiding the nursery 
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d. He is smoking and drinking more 
4. Which piece of furniture apologises to George? 
a. An armchair 
b. His bed 
c. The dining table 
d. The stove 
5. Readers can infer that at the end of the story: 
a. The parents go on vacation without their children 
b. The parents are killed by the lions in the nursery 
c. The children lock themselves in the nursery 
d. The children begin therapy with the psychologist 
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Appendix B 
At the end of Experiment 1a, we asked student subjects a few questions about 
the experiment and about themselves. The questions [and response options] 
were: 
Briefly list specific details from the story (the first passage you read) that 
you found disturbing. [text entry box] 
Had you read the story (the first passage) before? [Yes/No] 
Had you read the article (the second passage) before? [Yes/No] 
Did you see a warning before you read the first story? [Yes/No] 
(if “Yes” selected) What did the warning say? [text entry box] 
We told you that the purpose of this study was to examine the factors that 
affect comprehension of different writing styles. Do you think it could 
have been looking at anything else? [text entry box] 
What results do you think we are expecting to find? [text entry box] 
Outside of this experiment, have you encountered “trigger warnings”? 
[Yes/No] 
What do you think a “trigger warnings” is? What do you think their 
purpose is? [text entry box] 
Are there any other comments you would like to make about this 
experiment? [text entry box] 
What is your age? [number entry box] 
Are you: [Male/Female] 
Have you lived in New Zealand since at least age 3? [Yes/No] 
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At the end of Experiment 2a, we asked student subjects the same questions as 
above, apart from the following changes: The wording was adapted where 
needed so that the questions referred to watching a film clip rather reading a 
story (and to the slightly different cover story we had used regarding the 
purpose of this experiment); and they answered the additional questions [with 
response options]: 
Did you play the video more than once? [Yes/No] 
Did you look away while the video was playing? [Yes/No] 
Some subjects in Experiment 2a also completed an exploratory measure, 
just prior to the end of the experiment, which asked them to make ratings 
regarding thought suppression strategies. But, upon reflection, we 
decided that in adapting these items, their wording had become too 
confusing, and so we would not attempt to analyse or interpret those data.  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Appendix C 
At the start of Experiments 1b, 2b, 3, and 4, we gave MTurk subjects 
instructions about the conditions under which they should complete the 
experiment as follows: 
During this experiment, we ask that you comply with the following 
experiment requirements: 
1. Please maximize the size of your web browser so that it covers 
your entire screen. Complete this experiment on a desktop computer, 
laptop computer, or large tablet, not on a mobile phone or similar 
device. 
2. Please complete the experiment in a single session, and do not leave 
the experiment to engage in other tasks. So don't check your mail, 
look at Facebook, send or read a text message, get up for a drink, etc. 
3. Please do not use your web browser’s back or refresh buttons at 
any point during the experiment. 
4. Because this experiment requires your close attention, we ask that 
you complete the experiment in an environment that is free of 
noise and distraction. Please do not speak to anyone, or have 
anyone near you. Ideally, you would be alone in a quiet room, or in a 
room where other people are quiet (such as a library). 
The reason we ask you to follow these instructions is to ensure the 
quality of the information you give us. We know from previous research 
that if you do take a break, chat with others, etc, it will impair your 
ability to do the tasks set in this experiment. 
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I understand these instructions, and agree to comply with them for the 
duration of the experiment [checkbox] 
During Experiments 1b, 2b, 3, and 4, we included several attention checks. 
Specifically, MTurk subjects in Experiment 1b got the following checks: 
At the end of the PANAS-X measure, visually presented as though they 
were additional items, the instructions “choose box 1” and “choose box 
5” appeared (and the same thing, but different numbers, appeared at the 
end of the second PANAS-X). Subjects responded on the same rating 
scale as they had for the other, real items. 
At the bottom of the page with the story on it, visually presented as 
though it was another sentence in the story, they saw the instruction 
“That is the end of the story. To show that you read all the way to the 
end, type the random word ‘grain’ on the next page.” On the next page 
there was the instruction “Please type the random word here, or if you do 
not know it, just proceed to the next page.” [text entry box] 
At the end of the four-alternative forced-choice questions about the story 
they had read, subjects saw two additional questions. These were visually 
presented in the same way as the previous questions, but each had an 
instruction embedded in the question text. For example, “Near the end of 
the story ignore this question and simply choose option three below. Who 
was responsible?” Subjects selected one of the four options presented 
below the question. 
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MTurk subjects in Experiments 2b, 3, and 4 saw the same attention checks as 
subjects in Experiment 1b, apart from the following changes: They did not get 
the “random word” question, and the four-alternative forced-choice attention 
checks were adapted to be ostensibly about the article they had read. For 
example, “Near the start of the article ignore this question and simply choose 
option three below. Whom was it attributed to?” 
At the end of Experiments 1b, 2b, 3, and 4, we asked MTurk subjects questions 
about the experiment, and about themselves—including how well they 
complied with our earlier instructions. Specifically, MTurk subjects in 
Experiment 1b saw the same end-of-experiment questions as student subjects 
in Experiment 1a (see Appendix B), apart from the following changes: They 
did not see the two open-ended questions about the purpose and expected 
results of the experiment, or the question about having lived in New Zealand; 
and they saw the additional questions [with response options]: 
Did you read the entire story (the first passage), from start to finish? 
[Yes/No] 
Did you read the story (the first passage) carefully, giving it your full 
attention? [Yes/No] 
Did you read the entire article (the second passage), from start to finish? 
[Yes/No] 
Did you read the article (the second passage) carefully, giving it your full 
attention? [Yes/No] 
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Did you use a search engine during the experiment to look up the story, 
the article, or answers to the comprehension questions? [Yes, I did use a 
search engine to look up the story and/or the article and/or answers to the 
comprehension questions / No, but I did use a search engine to look up 
information unrelated to the experiment / No, I did not use a search 
engine at any time during the experiment] 
Did you maximize the size of your web browser so that it covers your 
entire screen? [Yes/No] 
Did you complete the experiment on a mobile phone (or a similar device 
with a small screen)? [Yes/No] 
Did you complete the experiment in a single session, without stopping? 
[Yes/No] 
Did you pause or leave the experiment to engage in other tasks, even if 
they were other computer tasks? [Yes/No] 
Did you complete the experiment without anyone helping you? [Yes/No] 
Did you complete the experiment in an environment that is free of noise 
and distraction? [Yes/No] 
Did you speak with anyone at any time during the experiment? [Yes/No] 
Is English your first language? [Yes/No] 
Have you ever studied psychology? [Yes/No] 
What is your nationality? (i.e. which country or countries are you a 
citizen of) [text entry box] 
MTurk subjects in Experiments 2b, 3, and 4 saw the same end-of-experiment 
questions as subjects in Experiment 1b, apart from the following changes: The 
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wording was adapted where needed so that the questions referred to watching a 
film clip rather reading a story (and to the slightly different cover story we had 
used regarding the purpose of this experiment); they also answered the same 
additional questions as student subjects in Experiment 2a (see Appendix B), as 
well as the following questions [with response options]: 
Could you hear the video? [Yes/No] 
Was the video image clear? [Yes/No] 
Did you look away while the video was playing? [Yes/No] 
Did you pause the video while it was playing? [Yes/No] 
Did you play the video more than once? [Yes/No] 
Did you play the video in full screen? [Yes/No] 
Did you watch the video on the Youtube website (rather than in the 
survey window)? [Yes/No] 
Did you turn on subtitles during the video? [Yes/No] 
Did you change the video quality? [No, I left it at the default quality / 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No student subjects in Experiments 1a and 2a chose to withdraw prior to 
the end of the experimental session. 
Experiment 1b 
Eighty-five MTurk subjects began but did not complete this experiment. 
Of those subjects, 21 (25%) quit at some point prior to being told they would 
next read a story, 25 (29%) quit while on the survey page displaying the story, 
and 39 (46%) quit at some point after having read the story.  
Breaking it down by condition, 44 subjects dropped out of the “no 
warning” condition (14% before told story, 34% during story, and 52% after 
story); similarly, 41 dropped out of the “warning” condition (37% before told 
story, 24% during story, and 39% after story). 
Notably, no “warning” subjects quit on the “trigger warning” survey 
page, that is, no one decided—specifically upon reading the warning—not to 
proceed with the experiment. 
Experiment 2b 
One-hundred-and-twenty-seven MTurk subjects began but did not 
complete this experiment. Of those subjects, 27 (22%) quit at some point prior 
to being told they would next watch a film clip, 12 (10%) quit while on the 
survey page telling them they would next watch a film clip, 9 (7% of total) 
subjects quit while on the “trigger warning” survey page, 11 (9%) quit while on 
the survey page displaying the film clip, and 68 (54%) quit at some point after 
having watched the film clip. 
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Breaking it down by condition, 61 subjects dropped out of the “no 
warning” condition (13% prior to film, 2% upon told film, [0% upon warning; 
wrong condition], 12% during film, and 74% after film); similarly, 66 subjects 
dropped out of the “warning” condition (29% prior to film, 17% upon told 
film, 14% upon warning, 6% during film, and 35% after film).  
Very few “warning” subjects (9 of them) quit on the “trigger warning” 
survey page; a similar number dropped out on the page prior, upon being told 
they would next watch a video (without knowing what it would be about). 
Experiment 3 
One-hundred-and-seventeen MTurk subjects began but did not complete 
this experiment. Of those subjects, 25 (21%) quit at some point prior to being 
told they would next watch a film clip, 12 (10%) quit while on the survey page 
telling them they would next watch a film clip, 6 (5% of total) subjects quit 
while on the “trigger warning” survey page, 3 (3%) quit while on the survey 
page displaying the ratings regarding what they expected the film clip would be 
like, 10 (9%) quit while on the survey page displaying the film clip, and 61 
(52%) quit at some point after having watched the film clip. 
Breaking it down by condition, 57 subjects dropped out of the “no 
warning” condition (23% prior to film, 14% upon told film, [0% upon warning; 
wrong condition], 4% during pre-exposure ratings, 12% during film, and 47% 
after film); similarly, 60 subjects dropped out of the “warning” condition (20% 
prior to film, 7% upon told film, 10% upon warning, 2% during pre-exposure 
ratings, 5% during film, 57% after film). 
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Very few “warning” subjects (6 of them) quit on the “trigger warning” 
survey page, and a similar number dropped out on the page prior, upon being 
told they would next watch a film (without knowing what it would be about). 
Experiment 4 
One-hundred-and-fifty-two MTurk subjects began but did not complete this 
experiment. Of those subjects, 36 (24%) quit at some point prior to being told 
they would next watch a film clip, 19 (13%) quit while on the survey page telling 
them they would next watch a film clip, 1 (<1% of total) subjects quit while on 
the “trigger warning” survey page, 16 (11%) quit while on the survey page 
displaying the film clip, and 80 (53%) quit at some point after having watched the 
film clip. 
Breaking it down by condition, 81 subjects dropped out of the “no warning” 
condition (28% prior to film, 12% upon told film, [0% upon warning; wrong 
condition], 7% during film, and 52% after film); similarly, 71 subjects dropped 
out of the “warning” condition (18% prior to film, 13% upon told film, 1% upon 
warning, 14% during film, and 54% after film).  
Very few “warning” subjects (1 of them) quit on the “trigger warning” 
survey page; many more dropped out on the page prior, upon being told they 
would next watch a film clip (without knowing what it would be about).
